Foreword
Perhaps the most significant strategic aspect of the current round of conflict in the former Yugoslavia has been the combined numbness, confusion and mis-direction which has pervaded worldwide public and political attitudes -- and therefore the associated national decisionmaking in all countries -- as a result of the most successful series of psychological warfare undertakings since World War II. In many ways, the psychological strategies and operations have been the most sophisticated ever, and truly reflect an age dominated by information technologies.
It is clear that since the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, the conflict has been marked by two significant factors:
- The winners have fought the war as a psycho-political conflict, with all conventional armed warfare and other incidents undertaken and controlled by them as part of a broader grand strategy. To them, conventional warfare, including the defense of territory and citizens, has been subordinated to the greater, outward-looking political objectives of certain power groups.
- The losers have been those who have conducted conflict from a "classical" standpoint: utilizing a mobilized society to defend and consolidate their territorial homelands and cultures by turning inward for strength and mutual protection.
Some of the participants -- those associated at this time with the "winners" -- have operated on the premise that victory will derive from how the international community perceives the "truth" and "justice" of the situation, and that they will therefore determine just what "truths" and "justice" will be portrayed. To this end, their efforts have been focused on controlling the high ground of the conflict: perception, and the tools which build that perception.
And still other participants -- those who have been vilified and who have lost the most land and have suffered the most dead and displaced, with the certain prospect of more to come -- have operated on the premise that they would defend their lands, culture, religion and history with their lives, seemingly preferring to do so alone and isolated. Their view that "the truth will ultimately emerge" and that, eventually, "justice will prevail", has been based on a failure to understand what their opponents instinctively knew: History, truth and justice is written and defined by the victors. History has forgotten the civilizations which did not triumph.
Yossef Bodansky, who wrote Offensive in the Balkans: The Potential for a Wider War as a Result of Foreign Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, published by the International Strategic Studies Association (ISSA), in November 1995, has continued his painstaking research on the Balkans conflict as part of ISSA's overall study program. This book. Some Call It Peace: Waiting for War in the Balkans, is an even more detailed study of how the situation in the former Yugoslavia still awaits resolution.
Mr. Bodansky, a thorough and serious researcher with a solid grasp of history, shows in this study how short-term political objectives in the US Administration have dovetailed so closely with the longer-term political objectives of the Iranian Government, and others, to allow a climate to be created which will lead to a further and more tragic war in the former Yugoslavia. Certainly he demonstrates clearly the real structural failings behind what appears to be a fairly cynical attempt to "force" an ultimately unworkable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina merely to satisfy the political agenda of a US Administration searching for "victories" abroad to reflect onto an electorate at home.
The massive and non-partisan research and analysis undertaken by Mr. Bodansky make this book essential reading for senior government officials the world over, because the Balkan crisis -- quite apart from its costs to United Nations members in financial terms -- has already had a profound effect on the shaping of a post-Cold War world. Still more significant ramifications will follow down the years.
The critical acclaim and worldwide political impact of Offensive in the Balkans encouraged ISSA to continue to study of the conflict. Some Call It Peace is a book which does not require that the reader should have first read Offensive in the Balkans, but the two books complement each other well. And in this latest work, Mr. Bodansky amply demonstrates that what is happening in the Balkans today is integral to the major global strategic trends which will affect tomorrow's balances.
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has already seriously affected US-European relations, including US relations with Russia and other former Soviet states. It has seriously impacted the "special relationship" between the United Kingdom and the US. As well, perhaps more profoundly, the conflict may well be seen by history as the watershed which provided the political schism which prevented a workable political union of European states. The war which has symbolically focused to a large degree around Sarajevo in the 1990s is a volcanic rumbling compared with the lightning impact of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. But both events have conspired to ensure that peace remains elusive for much of the world into the future.
This time, however, the Balkan conflict has within its core an element which ties it to the strategic ambitions and realities of states further to the East: Iran, and Iran's strategic partners, such as China. And to other Islamic countries. The Balkan conflict will also have a profound effect on whether Iran is able to sustain its strategic offensive not only into Europe, but also throughout the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and other areas.
If "no man is an island" then it is even more true that no conflict continues for long without having an effect well outside its immediate sphere. And history shows that the effects of conflict scar human progress in ways unforeseen for centuries and even millennia to come.
There will be no containment of the Balkan conflict until the factors discussed here by Mr. Bodansky are taken into account. And there is -- because of the success of the psycho-political campaigns still underway -- little opportunity to get this essential, balancing information from other sources. To this end, Yossef Bodansky's work is vitally important to us all.
ISSA
-- Gregory R. Copley, President,
The International Strategic Studies Association,
Alexandria, Virginia: August 1996,
SOME CALL IT PEACE
Waiting For War In The Balkans
(Author's Introduction)
The slide toward war in the former Yugoslavia seemed to have stopped and even reversed on November 21, 1995. The signing of the draft Accords of a "solution" in Dayton, Ohio, in the aftermath of three weeks of intense US-imposed negotiations, was presented as a turning point. Soon afterwards, on December 14,1995, the final version of these Accords was signed in Paris. With that, a deployment of a 60,000-man, NATO-dominated I-FOR (Implementation Force) began. A third of the force were US troops, and the US effectively exercised political control over it.
The validity, viability and legitimacy of the Dayton-Paris Accords as the cornerstone for a peaceful resolution of the bitter wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina is far from certain. Similarly, the ability of an increasingly US-dominated I-FOR -- even if it could be impartial -- to enforce a peace process should be assessed on the basis of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the willingness of the local key players to accept the peace process. A closer examination of the dynamics in the former Yugoslavia since the Autumn of 1995 casts grave doubt on the logic behind, and viability of, the Dayton-Paris process.
Since late 1995, there has been a major polarization of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, and the Balkans as a whole. This trend is being aggravated by the active implementation of the Dayton-Paris Accords. Two distinct conflicts are unfolding separately but in parallel in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For both, the key point of friction is the collapse of the Muslim-Croat Federation invented and imposed by Washington. These two crises are:
- The Islamicization and radicalization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the consolidation of an Islamist terrorist infrastructure specifically aimed at I-FOR. The main objective of this process is to ensure the Islamic character of Bosnia and further the evolution of a global Islamist jihad. In order to implement this program, the Izetbegovic administration in Sarajevo relies heavily on the continued presence of well over 10,000 foreign mujahedin as well as tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims turned militant Islamists as the most loyal hard core of the armed forces, intelligence and security organs. Considering this distinct character of the Bosnian Muslim defense establishment, it will be impossible for any leader in Sarajevo to disengage from dependency on the Islamists even if this leader really wants to.
- The escalation of an arms race between Croatia and rump Yugoslavia in preparation for the regional war to determine the fate of the post-crisis Balkans. The only thing Zagreb (Croatia) and Belgrade (Yugoslavia) seem to agree on is the inevitably of the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina: that is, the elimination of a Muslim political entity. The differences in the military build-up in the new Yugoslavia and Croatia are a reflection of the emerging national priorities of these two key players in the Balkans. Both are united in their commitment to co-existence in a new Balkans, having first carved up Bosnia-Herzegovina between them.
These dramatic developments did not happen suddenly or in a vacuum. Rather, they are the outcome of a major disruption -- the US imposition of the Dayton-Paris Accords -- to escalating inner tensions and dynamics in the former Yugoslavia. This process, already dangerous and destabilizing in its own right, has been evolving since the early 1990s in and around Bosnia-Herzegovina. As described in this author's earlier book, Offensive in the Balkans, the determination of the Sarajevo leadership to recognize and accept the desire by the key national groupings of the former Yugoslavia -- Serbs and Croats -- to realize their quest for national self-determination, and the determined campaign by the odd alliance of the US and Iran-led Islamists to enforce a Muslim government over the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina, has already led to the continuation and escalation of the fratricidal fighting for four years. To date, the imposition of a US-brokered "peace" only encouraged Sarajevo to increase its struggle for a maximalist solution while driving the other regional powers to attempt to realize their own goals before the Accords were transformed into a new regional reality: a US-imposed new Bosnian order.
Hence, in the aftermath of the Dayton-Paris Accords there is a profound difference in the key players' perception of the immediate future. President Franjo Tudjman's Zagreb believes that there is no escape from a major war before a new realignment of forces in the territory of the former Yugoslavia can be established. President Slobodan Milosevic's Belgrade still hopes to be able to negotiate and bargain its way to Western recognition of the emergence of a new Serb-dominated Yugoslavia and a new Croatia dominating the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina between them. The new Yugoslavia is exhausted from the sanctions and the collapse of Serb spirit. Croatia, in a sharp contrast, is rejuvenated by the success of the offensive in the Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the Western tolerance of the ensuing ethnic cleansing of Serbs. Tudjman is in a fighting spirit, convinced that Zagreb will be able to realize its regional aspirations through the force of arms.
Sarajevo is not oblivious to this process. Fully aware of the extent of the threat to its very existence, the Izetbegovic administration is adamant on instigating crises in order to have US/NATO forces destroy the Serbs and Croats for them so that there is no threat to Sarajevo. Sarajevo has a bigger objective in mind: to evolve regional dynamics, and especially establish outright US commitment to Sarajevo, which will deter Berlin and Moscow from endorsing, and facilitating for their respective proteges the elimination of the Muslim entity. Izetbegovic and his closest aides, particularly Gen. Rasim Delic, are convinced that the Clinton Administration can be manipulated into playing this role even in the face of clear preparations for, and active support of, anti-European Islamist terrorism from the territory controlled by Sarajevo.
These Islamist activities, including the manipulation of the Clinton Administration, are the primary destabilizing factor threatening the chances for a lingering peace in the former Yugoslavia. Sarajevo is determined to deliver the spark that can ignite the region and thus become the catalyst for an uncontrollable escalation of any eruption into the rest of Europe.
* * *
Examining and analyzing these dynamics. Some Call It Peace: Waiting For War In The Balkans is divided into three parts:
Part I -- THE ISLAMIST PEACE -- analyzes in great detail the Islamist activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina in preparation for, and the aftermath of, the Dayton-Paris Accords. This part includes a detailed description of the present Islamist terrorist and mujahedin infrastructure in Bosnia-Herzegovina, an outright violation of the Accords, and the preparations for Islamist terrorist attacks against I-FOR and Western Europe.
Part II -- REGIONAL MILITARY BUILD-UP AND DYNAMICS -- analyzes the military build-up in Croatia, the rump Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Special attention is paid to Zagreb's efforts to capitalize on the Eastern Slavonia crisis as a catalyst for the regional war expected to usher in the new division of power in the former Yugoslavia. The Croat build-up in anticipation for a decisive clash with the Bosnian Muslim forces, to be sparked by a clash in Mostar, is also analyzed.
Part III -- AFTER THE EXPERIMENT -- concludes the book with an analysis of the impact of the real power dynamics in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the inherent dangers in the wide gap between the strategic reality in the Balkans and the wishful policies pursued by the United States. Special attention is paid to the Islamist preparations for an escalation of subversion and terrorism in the Kosovo region of Serbia, Yugoslavia. The longer-term impact of the withdrawal of I-FOR is studied. Special attention is paid to the global ramifications of the Dayton-Paris Accords -- an arbitrary imposition of a "solution" by the US -- and particularly the reaction of, and lessons learned by, hostile powers in the Muslim World and East Asia.
* * *
As in Offensive in the Balkans, this book makes a stark delineation between Islamic/Muslim peoples and governments, generally of a moderate nature, and those termed Islamists: the Islamists use -- or mis-use -- Islam as a veneer or cover for their radical political agenda.
Part I
The euphoria surrounding the signing of the Dayton and Paris Accords toward the close of 1995 created the impression of an emerging political solution for the bitter and cruel wars in the former Yugoslavia. The key to the new era of peace was to be the emergence of the unified state of Bosnia- Herzegovina. Although divided into two distinct entities (Muslim-Croat and Serb) and ruled by a predominantly Muslim government, the Accords stipulated that the new Bosnia was to be a truly multinational, democratic state. Completely ignored in the Dayton-Paris Accords was the Islamist factor: the force which enabled the Sarajevo leadership to endure and fight since the early 1990s, and the force most capable of breaking down the Accords while confronting the NATO forces enforcing it.
Since mid-November 1995, the Sarajevo Administration has been stressing the growing importance of the Islamist factor to its very survival and ability to consolidate its control over Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the process, Sarajevo highlighted and endorsed the vehemently anti-US/anti-West character of the Islamists. Thus, having gone to great lengths to ensure all-out US support during the Dayton negotiations earlier in November, Sarajevo could not wait to resume pursuit of its real policies, having just gained, in the words of US State Department negotiator Richard Holbrooke, 85 percent of its objectives. Washington should not have been surprised by the swift, stark revival of Sarajevo's Islamist character, for even during the Dayton negotiations the Bosnian Muslim leadership was going out of its way to ensure that nobody could doubt Sarajevo's enduring commitment to the radical Islamist cause.
Sarajevo's insistence on retaining and expanding its close relations with the Islamists -- particularly the Islamic Republic of Iran -- was repeatedly stressed and demonstrated during the Dayton negotiations. Since late November 1995, Sarajevo has emphasized its close relationship with Iran and its commitment to the Islamist cause. These activities were conducted along two main courses: (a) high-level political activities in which Sarajevo's gratitude to Tehran and determination to further improve and expand relations have been stressed; and (b) a host of clandestine and semi-clandestine activities in which Sarajevo's willingness and determination to continue the Islamist jihad in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been clearly demonstrated. The latter activities are most significant for they are in flagrant contradiction with Sarajevo's promise to Washington that it would evict all the mujahedin by mid-January 1996.
Already in mid-November 1995, Bosnian Muslim sources in Dayton and throughout the Middle East revealed that during the negotiations, the US delegation made repeated and futile efforts to pressure Sarajevo to reduce the level of its close relations with Iran. Sarajevo not only refused, but rushed to demonstrate its commitment to Tehran. On November 21, on the eve of the initialing of the Dayton Accords, Omar Bahman, the Bosnian Ambassador to Tehran, assured the government that the Tehran-Sarajevo ties were "deep and extensive" and that he "had not heard of any report [from Sarajevo] about cutting or curtailing relations with Iran". He reiterated Sarajevo's commitment to policies agreed upon with Tehran.
Ambassador Bahman also routinely briefed Tehran on the progress and character of the Dayton negotiations. The essence of Bahman's, and thus Sarajevo's, reading of the Dayton process was reflected in the November 23 analysis of the agreement by pro-Islamist circles in Tehran. They suggested that agreement was imposed upon Sarajevo through US threats and pressures. These circles, closely associated with the opinion of the leadership of the Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) and VEVAK (Iranian intelligence), therefore anticipate a resumption of fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "The cruel nature of the imposed Ohio accord reveals why this accord has many dissenters among the politicians, combatants, and people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. No-one knows whether all the Bosnian people and combatants prefer the unjust accords to war. The Bosnian crisis will not end with the Ohio accord. It will smolder under the embers and erupt into a conflagration sooner or later." Tehran, they assure, will wholeheartedly support the Bosnian Muslim forces in the case of such a resumption of the Islamic struggle in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Meanwhile, official Tehran's reaction to the news of an agreement in Dayton was measured and calm, reflecting inside knowledge and confidence that things would continue Tehran's way. Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's Ambassador's to the UN and a senior Pasdaran intelligence officer involved in terrorism sponsorship, stated that Tehran "share[s] the sentiment expressed by Bosnians that although the agreement [signed in Dayton] is not just, it is a move to prevent further bloodshed in Bosnia-Herzegovina". In Tehran, Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Va'ezi stressed Tehran's support for Izetbegovic. If Izetbegovic was content with the agreement, Tehran would support him. The same approach was expressed in Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani's congratulatory message to Izetbegovic.
But the Iranian charade did not last long. On November 27,1995, Ebrahim Rahimpur, a senior Foreign Ministry official, stressed Tehran's commitment to ensuring the Islamic character of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The US-imposed agreement had its shortcomings, Rahimpur explained, the primary being the effort to suppress the country's Islamic character. "Bosnia has survived due to sacrifices of its Muslim citizens and the help of its friends, particularly Iran," he stressed. In the aftermath of the Dayton accord, "the commitment of Muslim countries towards Bosnia and its Muslim population has become deeper than before."
By now, Tehran was at the helm of more than just Islamic solidarity. The Iranian unique position in the Muslim World on the Bosnian issue was clearly demonstrated in the emergency gathering in Tehran of the Islamic Countries' Aid Mobilization Group for Bosnia. The foreign ministers attending included those from Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, all ostensibly recognizing Iran's prominence and leadership.
Reflecting the real emphasis of the conference, Sarajevo's representative was Rasim Delic, Bosnia's Chief of General Staff and architect of its long-term military strategy.
On the eve of the conference, in a separate meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati, Delic defined the Dayton accord as "unjust" and urged "the continuing assistance of Islamic countries to the people of Bosnia". He singled out Iran for its "unstinting assistance" to Sarajevo and expressed his confidence that such aid will continue. Velayati assured Delic that Iranian assistance, particularly military, would only increase.
Indeed, in his address to the Tehran Conference, Delic repeated his argument that "the Dayton peace accord was unjust for Bosnian Muslims" and urged "Islamic countries to increase their assistance particularly in the military area to Bosnia-Herzegovina". Delic anticipated the military confrontation to resume "because the unjust peace may cause fresh clashes in the future". Therefore, Delic stressed, "under present circumstances Bosnia-Herzegovina should continue to be a strategic region for all Islamic countries and these [Islamic] states should increase their political and military aid to Bosnia to alleviate pressures being exerted on it".
In response, the conference chairman, Ja'afar Kamel of Malaysia, reaffirmed the commitment of the Islamic states to provide comprehensive political and military assistance to the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The military factor dominated the key addresses. In his speech, Hashemi-Rafsanjani stressed that assistance to "Muslim Bosnia" has always been an "Islamic Duty". "Establishing military balance [in Bosnia-Herzegovina] in order to guarantee lasting peace ... is one of the main duties of this group," Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati declared. "The message that this meeting should convey is that we as members of a single Islamic Ummah (people) are all sensitive to the future and prosperity of other members." Indeed, the Conference decided to provide "new military assistance" to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Tehran concluded the Conference with the declaration: "Islamic countries should not spare any effort to boost the defense capability of Bosnia along with actively participating in the reconstruction of that country."
Meanwhile, the Conference of the Islamic Countries' Aid Mobilization Group for Bosnia also served as a cover for far more significant meetings between Delic and his aides and senior terrorist and intelligence leaders, and senior commanders from Iran, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, as well as representatives from Sudan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, including senior HizbAllah and Arab Afghan leaders. Their deliberations were devoted to the struggles ahead, anticipating a marked escalation rather than an era of peace. They discussed the transfer of additional combatants/terrorists and arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina to be able to deal with the NATO "invasion" and the demands of the ensuing escalation of the Islamist jihad into Western Europe.
Reflecting these decisions, the pro-Islamist circles in Tehran stressed the anti-Islamic character of the Dayton accords. "The West only thinks of... stopping an Islamic state from taking root in Bosnia," they argued. The all out support from the entire Muslim world should ensure that this design did not materialize.
Meanwhile, on November 29, 1995, upon the conclusion of the Tehran Conference, Iran's Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, left for Zagreb and Sarajevo at the head of a high-level delegation.
In their meeting, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman asked Velayati for Tehran's help in mediating outstanding disputes with Sarajevo in order to improve relations between the three countries. Tudjman stressed that Zagreb recognized Tehran's unique position in Sarajevo.
The most important part of Velayati's visit was the discussion of bilateral -- Iranian-Croatian -- strategic relations. These were held between Velayati and Gojko Susak, Croatian Defense Minister. Iran agreed to sell cheap oil to Croatia and purchase ships from Croatian shipyards as part of expediting Iran's ability to contribute to the "reconstruction" and "consolidation" of Bosnian Muslims: especially the transfer of arms and personnel via Croatia. Zagreb stressed the importance of the "military cooperation among Bosnia, Iran and Croatia" agreed upon with Velayati. Before leaving Zagreb, Velayati announced that Iran and Croatia would conclude a military cooperation deal before the end of 1995.
On November 30, Velayati arrived in Sarajevo on a UN aircraft. He was denied his request to fly in a special Iran Air aircraft in order not to alienate the Serbs. Tehran highlighted this incident as an example of the UN's and NATO's anti-Muslim stance.
The official reason for Velayati's visit to Sarajevo was the inauguration of the new huge complex of the Iranian Embassy.
President Alija Izetbegovic and virtually the entire Sarajevo elite attended the ceremony. In his remarks, Izetbegovic stressed the importance of the enduring close relations between Iran and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Significantly, the new Embassy complex includes a major communication center, as well as a vast intelligence and terrorism sponsorship complex. These facilities were built in accordance with the Iranian-Bosnian cooperation agreement which Baker Izetbegovic, the son of Alija Izetbegovic, signed in Tehran back in November 1994. Presently, this Iranian Embassy complex now also provides "legal" cover for numerous (close to 100) senior Iranian experts previously operating semi-clandestinely in the ranks of the Bosnian Muslim military and intelligence arms.
In Sarajevo, Velayati held lengthy discussions with Izetbegovic on the regional and strategic situation, their joint reaction to the Dayton agreement, and the challenges ahead. Velayati reiterated Iran's all out support, especially military, for the Sarajevo leadership. Velayati also met with Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic and Presidency Member Ejup Ganic.
During Velayati's visit, Tehran and Sarajevo reached a new memorandum of understanding between their countries. They agreed that Iran had an important role to play in the reconstruction and securing of a Muslim Bosnia even though this would be "a source of displeasure" for some governments, particularly the US.
Velayati and the Iranian delegation also met with the Bosnian Muslim leadership led by Reis ul-Ulema Mustafa Efendi Ceric and Hadzi Haset Ismet Effendi Spahic to discuss the position of Bosnian Muslims in the region, and Iranian assistance to strengthen Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkans as a whole.
Velayati returned to Tehran convinced that Iranian relations with both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina "have brighter prospects ahead than in the past".
The main reason for Tehran's optimism was the rapid implementation of the military-terrorism preparations in Bosnia-Herzegovina despite the Dayton Accords. The Bosnian special forces, including the Mujahedin, play the central role in these activities.
Immediately after the Dayton accords were initialed, official Sarajevo expressed its apprehension that fighting would soon resume. In an interview with Sarajevo weekly Ljiljan, President Izetbegovic did not rule out that "the Serb side will annul the [Dayton] agreement, but if that happens... the fighting will continue, but under far more favorable conditions for us. Then the Serbs will wage war against the rest of the world." Furthermore, Izetbegovic attributed the outcome of Dayton, at least to a certain degree, to the contribution of the Muslim world. "The Islamic world is still not well organized and strong enough. Nevertheless, the very fact that the Islamic world exists has influenced the behavior of the West to a degree, and particularly that of some Western countries." Thus, it is impossible for Muslim Bosnia to trust or rely on the West for its future and salvation. Izetbegovic concluded that he returned from Dayton convinced that under the leadership of the West, "it is a world in which it is possible to start an unjust war and impose an unjust peace".
The conclusion driven to by official Sarajevo in late 1995 was that irrespective of the Dayton accords and the anticipated deployment of the strong NATO forces, it was imperative for the Bosnian Muslim forces to prepare for the imminent resumption of fighting.
These were not idle threats. Starting in late November, as the Dayton negotiations were drawing to conclusion, several senior foreign experts with the Bosnian Muslim forces, including senior Iranian intelligence officers, went underground. Many Iranian and Arab "Afghans" were deployed undercover to the Tuzla area, and other sites where US forces were expected to deploy, in order to conduct reconnaissance and operational preparations should the need arise to launch strikes against the US forces.
Meanwhile, there was an increase in the number of attempts by Bosnian Muslim commando units in the greater Sarajevo area to cross the Serb lines. The primary objective of these operations was to instigate provocations which might tarnish the image of the Serbs and strengthen the Muslims' hand in the forthcoming struggle over the Serb sectors of Sarajevo. For example, on November 27/28, a detachment of the 445th Light Infantry Brigade (permanent base in Konjic) was engaged in the Serb rear near Mt. Igman. On December 3/4, another Bosnian Muslim reconnaissance-sabotage detachment was engaged behind the Serb lines in the Mount Ozren area. There were also a few cases of sniping into the Muslim sector of Sarajevo from "gray areas" between the Serb and Muslim lines. The Bosnian Serbs denied that their forces were responsible and UNPROFOR "could not determine" who was responsible for these snipings.
At the same time, the Bosnian Muslim army continued to integrate the mujahedin into its ranks. This process was clearly demonstrated in the December 10 parade in Zenica. It was a major show of force presided over by Rasim Delic and President Alija Izetbegovic. Some 10,000 troops representing numerous units paraded, and a variety of heavy weapons -- tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft guns and mortars, rockets and missiles -- were presented. "This is our demonstration of power. We must prove we have the power for further fighting if it's needed; if Dayton doesn't work," an army spokesman explained. The fighters of several elite units paraded in front of Izetbegovic and Delic shouting such slogans as "Allah-hu-Akbar!" [God is Great] and "American tanks will not scare us!"
The centrality of the foreign component of the Bosnian Army was evident, albeit not specifically mentioned. In his comments, Mr. Izetbegovic highlighted the contribution of the 3rd Corps -- the mother unit of the Mujahedin -- to the war effort. The elite elements \ of the 3rd Corps paraded wearing green and red headbands with Islamic slogans.
Observers on scene noted that "Best-equipped were the elite 7th Muslim brigade ... whose members copy the ardor and bravery of foreign Islamic warriors, known as mujahedin, whom they have fought alongside." Actually, even by most conservative estimates, there were still more than 800 mujahedin from Islamic countries in the ranks of the Zenica based 7th Muslim brigade in December 1995. Many of the fighters of the 7th Muslim brigade were dressed in white coveralls over their uniforms. Officially, these were "white winter camouflage", but the green headbands these warriors were wearing left no doubt that these were actually Shaheeds' shrouds.
The Zenica parade clearly demonstrated Sarajevo's effort to portray the Bosnian Army as a Muslim force relying as much on public prayers and Iran-style unit motivation methods as on conventional weapons. The vast majority of mujahedin have long been fully integrated into these elite forces. Being clean-shaven now, they are impossible to detect from a distance.
A closer examination of the entire Bosnian Muslim Armed Forces of late 1995 clearly demonstrates not only the magnitude of the Islamist forces, but that their relative importance and influence far outweighed their sheer numbers. Significantly, all the Islamist -- so-called mujahedin -- units constituted integral parts of the Bosnian Muslim Armed Forces. The Islamists were now serving in Bosnian national uniforms and as such were entitled to Bosnian citizenship and were exempt from eviction by the Dayton-Paris Accord.
In late 1995, the key Mujahedin units were:
The Armija Republike BH 3, Korpus Odred 'el-Mudzahidin' remained the main Mujahedin unit, serving as the primary assault troops of the Bosnian Muslim Army. The main HQ was in Zenica. The 3rd Mujahedin Corps was comprised of three Brigades, each of about 1,500 troops. These brigades were: The 7th Muslim Liberation Brigade in Zenica, The 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade in Travnik (now operating under the Tuzla-based 2nd Corps), and The 4th Muslim Liberation Brigade initially deployed in the front lines in the "bulge" (Botsilo region) and then in Konjic. Another Brigade -- the 807th Muslim Liberation Brigade --was established and sworn-in on December 20, 1995. The 807th Muslim Liberation Brigade is an integral component of the Gorazde-based 81st Division.
There were separate Islamist elite forces in the Zenica-Travnik area known as the Volunteer Mujahedin Battalion, the Ansar. The Ansar was 300 to 600 troops strong. The main headquarters was in the Vatrostalno Factory building in Podbrijezje (near Zenica). In ad-edition, there was a new camp called the "Martyrs' Detachment", which, since the Spring of 1995, had absorbed a few hundred new Mujahedin (including suicide terrorists and other experts) arriving from Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Another elite special forces unit which was still being expanded in late 1995, at the time the foreign mujahedin were supposed to be leaving Bosnia-Herzegovina, was the Kata 'eb al-Manikin (Battalions of Believers). Troops, mainly Arabs including "Afghans", were still arriving from Sudan. They were serving under the command of military officers from Pakistan and Afghanistan. The trainers and leadership were from Iran. Each Battalion was 300 to 600 troops strong. The first operational battalion was based in the Buzim area (north-west Bosnia-Herzegovina). Another battalion served as a special forces unit for the 2nd Corps in the Tuzla area. Other battalions were being organized throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.
According to Abu-Ma'ali, the commander of the mujahedin, the entire organized mujahedin forces numbered between 5,000 and 6,000 troops. Yugoslav, Croat and Bosnian Muslim military sources put the number at more than 7,000 troops.
Another major Islamist force remained: the Handzar Division, named after the 13th SS Handzar Division which served under the German flag in World War II. The current Handzar Division is Sarajevo's Praetorian Guards, and is comprised of a 2,500 to 3,000 elite force deployed in Sarajevo and a 6,000 to 7,500 strong back-up force at a major training base around Fojnica, but is moved around to augment major fighting fronts. The majority of the troops of the Handzar Division come from the region's non-Bosnian Muslim minorities, primarily Albanians, and are led by veteran Pakistani and Afghan experts.
During the escalation of 1995, elements of the Handzar Division took part as special forces in fighting in the Sarajevo area, Tuzla and in the surge into western Bosnia-Herzegovina. In many cases, particularly in the surge into western Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Summer-Fall of 1995, they operated in close cooperation with the "Eastern Europe" mujahedin units.
There were also a few thousand Islamist military experts from Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia, and other Muslim countries serving in key positions in regular units of the Bosnian Muslim forces. They were providing expertise in artillery, air defense, logistics, etc. Their numbers are not included in the estimates above. In late December 1995, there was no indication that they were about to leave for their home countries.
There were other sizable Islamist forces involved in subversive and terrorist operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A major component of the Iran-sponsored Islamist terrorist infrastructure in the former Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was being concealed in the ranks of various Islamic charities. The key Islamist humanitarian organizations are confirmed to be working under the sponsorship of Iranian intelligence. These organizations operate from Zagreb, Croatia, in cooperation and coordination with the local representatives of Iranian intelligence and the HizbAllah. Mohammad Javad Asayesh, a senior diplomat in the Iranian Embassy in Zagreb, responsible for overseeing intelligence and terrorism operations in the Balkans and Europe under the cover of humanitarian activities. The vast majority of funds for these "charities" are coordinated via the Mostazafin Foundation (a front of Iranian intelligence) and a host of Saudi and Persian Gulf foundations that, through Usama bin Ladin, answer to Sudan's radical Islamist leader, Hassan al-Turabi. Altogether, in late 1995, between 4,000 and 6,000 Islamist terrorists were operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the cover of these "charities" and "humanitarian projects". (Their numbers are on top of the mujahedin forces in the ranks of the Bosnian Muslim Army.)
As for the anticipated removal of the mujahedin by mid-January 1996 -- as promised by President Izetbegovic -- both Islamist and UN sources in Sarajevo were in agreement that, at best, it would be a half-hearted, show effort. With the official estimates of only a few hundred mujahedin in-country accepted by the US, Sarajevo would parade a few bearded hard-core cases to the Sarajevo airport and "deport" them, most likely to a well-deserved R&R in Sudan or Pakistan. Indeed, a Sarajevo official explained in late December that "El-Mujahid" was "merely a small unit" whose members would pull out "when all other foreign military and paramilitary withdraw from Bosnia". Indeed, the majority of the 15,000 to 20,000 foreign volunteers were already fully integrated into the key Bosnian Muslim units. Both Islamist and UN sources in Sarajevo acknowledged that for as long as these mujahedin remained clean shaven and in proper uniforms, nobody would touch them.
Since mid-November 1995, once it was becoming clear that the Dayton negotiations would result in some form of an agreement, the international Islamist leadership (primarily in Iran and Sudan) and their senior representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been studying the ramifications of the agreement for their activities in and out of the Balkans. The primary issue studied by the Islamists is the character of the future Islamic State in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the aftermath of a US-brokered agreement. Presently, the Islamist leadership leaves no doubt as to its determination to ensure the establishment of an Islamist State in Bosnia-Herzegovina even by force of arms. Significantly, the Islamists consider the US forces as the primary threat to their immediate and long-term objectives, thus laying the justification for military confrontations or terrorist strikes in the future.
This commitment was first stated authoritatively on November 18, 1995. Abu-Ma'ali, the commander of the Mujahedin, declared their readiness to continue the war against both Serbs and Croats if the just demands of the Bosnian Muslims were not met in Dayton. "Bosnia is the country conquered by Islam," he stressed. Such a situation was irreversible, he said, even though the political process was threatening this development. "For us, there is no difference between the Serbs and the Croats. Croatia has territorial pretensions toward Bosnia and Serbia wants to create a greater Serbia. The Muslims in Bosnia will never accept such an outcome," Abu-Ma'ali concluded.
Abu-Ma'ali's stand accurately reflected a major study of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina conducted by the international Islamist leadership. This internal study, which was also signed on November 18, examined the situation in Sarajevo as the Dayton negotiations were drawing to a successful completion. Significantly, this study is presently being circulated among senior Islamist leaders as a guideline for future activities.
The international Islamist leadership is apprehensive about the principles of the future Bosnia-Herzegovina as outlined in Dayton. But they stress, despite appearances and popular impressions to the contrary, that there are no real surprises in the negotiations process and the principles of the agreement.
According to the Islamist study, the real role and posture of the United States constitutes the key to understanding and confronting the emerging situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A close examination of both the negotiations process and the final outcome revealed, to the study, the true face of Washington, portrayed as an active ally of the Serbian anti-Muslim campaign. The Islamist study states that "history will see this deal-making as the West's compliance with Serbia's territorial demands, brutally obtained up to now by genocide under the guidance of America's new friend in Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, whom many have called the 'Butcher of the Balkans'." Indeed, the ultimate objective of the NATO I-FOR has nothing to do with the wellbeing of the Bosnian Muslims. "The NATO troops will go in to try to protect the credibility of NATO and the UN," the study concludes.
The international Islamist leadership has already determined that "real peace will not be possible since the peace agreement is being signed under pressure and is thus illegal, null and void". The study further stressed that the principals in Sarajevo shared this reading of the situation. The international Islamist leadership assured in mid-November that the Dayton Agreement had already been "rejected" by the centers of power in Sarajevo, particularly "the Bosnian Army generals and all their soldiers".
The Islamist elite is not worried by the apparent support for the negotiations process and the proposed agreement demonstrated by President Alija Izetbegovic. They recall four previous cases when the elite in Sarajevo had overruled Izetbegovic's signature on so-called international solutions and plans for ending the war because such plans failed to deliver the maximalist demands of the hard-core leaders in Sarajevo and their Islamist allies.
But just in case Izetbegovic had been co-opted by the US, the international Islamist leadership also laid down the legal and moral case for the overthrow of Izetbegovic. The leadership stressed the precarious legal position of Izetbegovic, namely, that there was no legal justification for his stay in power. They noted, and quite correctly, that Izetbegovic continued to serve as President "three years after his constitutionally prescribed (12 months) term and mandate ought to have expired". This situation alone made his signature on any agreement non-obligatory, and therefore "Izetbegovic's forced and illegal promotion of these plans" need not obligate the loyal leadership in Sarajevo.
It is in the context of delegitimizing Izetbegovic that the international Islamist leadership admitted that "Serb mortar shells" used so effectively to promote Sarajevo's cause were actually self-inflicted. The study explains that because "the Bosnian people reject his claim to being President," Izetbegovic had to resort to means of terror in order to remain in power. Toward this end, "he has often used the Serb grenades/shells against Sarajevo as the negotiating argument for his terroristic/horrific-style state to be accepted by the Bosnians and signed on by the USA".
The main challenge facing the Islamists in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still the anticipated deployment of massive NATO forces, and particularly the large US contingent. The study interprets the NATO mandate as an intentional effort to contain the Bosnian Muslims and prevent them from establishing an Islamic State. "The preliminary NATO mandate states quite literally that 'decisive military action will be exercised against any party that violates the new borders'," which, to the Islamist leadership, means active prevention of the Muslim forces from completing the liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. "Whatever happened with Bosnia's internationally recognized borders or internationally recognized (1992) legal system?"
Hence, as far as the international Islamist leadership was concerned: "US Soldiers in Bosnia are on mission ... to guard Serb Gen. Mladic's gains in Srebrenica region, and guard his logistic corridor near the Tuzla region." They stress that such a development cannot and will not be tolerated by the Muslim combatants and all these committed to the establishment of an Islamic State in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The international Islamist leadership concludes its November 18, 1995, study with a seemingly veiled threat to the US forces: "The question will boil down to only one: How many US boys will have to pay with their lives by Serb criminals' sniper bullets and landmines this Christmas for the new decisive American policy in Bosnia?... The Americans are falling into the Balkan trap of entering Bosnia to protect the Bosnian Serb front lines."
A closer examination of this statement shows that this is a ver loaded threat. Having stressed above the utility of self-inflicted "Serb" grenades/shells to the Islamist cause, the study need not elaborate on the real origin of the Serb sniper bullets, mines, and other threats. Furthermore, the study is quick to stress that the actual objective of the US forces is to preserve the gains of the Serb forces, which means that the Serbs have no reason to take on their US protectors. The Islamist forces, on the other hand, being committed to the liberation of all of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the establishment of an Islamic state, have every reason to confront the US, and other NATO, forces deployed to Bosnia in order to suppress the march of Islam in the Balkans.
The possibility of Islamist provocations against the NATO forces was also alluded to by Morteza Sarmadi, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister. In a December 19 interview, he warned that "there are certain warmongers in Bosnia -- like the Bosnian Serbs --who would challenge the commitment of the United States and NATO to the Dayton peace accord." He then discussed in great length the reservations several Muslim leaders and communities in the Balkans and the Near East had, stressing Izetbegovic's observation that the Dayton Accord was "unjust" toward the Bosnian Muslims. Sarmadi stressed Tehran's conviction that the Bosnian Muslims were the aggrieved party against whose interests the deployment of the NATO forces was actually aimed.
By now, mid-December 1995, the role of Izetbegovic was no longer an issue. The international Islamist leadership was confident that its allies and supporters in Sarajevo are in full control over the situation. Ultimately, the Islamists are now even confident that they can include Izetbegovic himself among their loyalists for he had not been co-opted by the US, as feared beforehand (when he was in Dayton). The mere signing of the Paris Peace required closer study of the situation in Bosnia- Herzegovina.
* * *
The signing of the Dayton and Paris Accords, and the worldwide expressions of commitment and support for Izetbegovic's Bosnian Muslim administration in Sarajevo, only aggravated the situation as far as the international Islamist leadership was concerned. On December 13, Khartoum, Sudan-based Pan-Islamic Movement (PIM) leader Hassan al-Turabi decreed the Dayton Agreement as "a plot aimed [at] eradicating Islam in Bosnia in a way which resembles eradicating Islam in Europe 500 years ago".
On December 16, 1995, the international Islamist leadership issued a new analysis of the Dayton-Paris Agreement under the headline "Erasing Islam From Bosnia!" Their key argument is that the essence of the US-led diplomatic and military effort is to ensure under the guise of a "peace treaty" the establishment of a westernized secular state so that the Muslims of Bosnia would not be able to establish an Islamic State in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Islamist analysis builds the case that the anti-Muslim design has been a major objective of Washington from the very beginning of the Dayton Process. To prove this, the Islamist analysts point to remarks made by US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott on November 1, 1995, and entitled "Strengthening American Security Through World Leadership -- Bosnia and Beyond".
The Islamist analysts stressed that Mr. Talbott confirmed that the US had global designs in devising the Dayton process. They cited Mr. Talbott: "The entire Islamic world, from Morocco to Indonesia, is watching to see how events unfold. Muslims everywhere are waiting to see whether their co-religionists in Bosnia will be accorded the same rights and protections as other Europeans. The answer to that question could have an impact on the future of moderate, pro-Western leaders such as Prime Minister [Tansu] Ciller of Turkey and Prime Minister [Benazir] Bhutto of Pakistan. Other less friendly forces in the Middle East and Persian Gulf see the Balkans as a target of opportunity."
The analysts see the roots of the conspiracy in these sentences. "Strobe Talbott recognizes that Muslims are feeling and reacting as one body, admitting to a worldwide Islamic revival."
The Islamist analysts point to subsequent statements made by Mr. Talbott on November 1 as substantiating their analysis: "Doing the right thing in the Balkans has been especially difficult.... But there is no question what doing the right thing means today -- and today is surely a crucial moment. It means using a combination of diplomatic skill and the credible threat of force to keep the parties at the negotiating table."
For the analysts, these sentences constitute proof of the anti-Muslim conspiracy. "Talbott here tells it as it is: Credible threat was definitely used to force the Bosnian Muslim State to agree to both the partition and the federation ideas which were designed by NATO."
A close examination of the Dayton-Paris Agreement clearly demonstrates the success of the anti-Muslim designs and conspiracies of the West. Moreover, the Islamist analysts stress, the agreement over Bosnia could be considered as a prototype for future anti-Muslim efforts by the US-led West. "The [Dayton] document is of great importance because it provides Muslims with the American-European strategy in dealing with emerging Islam." Within the entire agreement, the Islamists are especially worried by the segment defining the "Constitution" of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Islamist analysts state: "NATO countries have designed a constitution which is aimed at liquidating any Islamic presence in Bosnia; the word "Muslim" is rarely mentioned."
The two main problems which the Islamist analysts have with the agreed upon constitution are that: (a) the "legal existence" of Bosnia-Herzegovina will be secured "under international law as a state"; and, (b) that "Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections." (These are direct quotations from the Dayton Agreement.) The Islamist analysts see in these clauses "step one in erasing any Islam, [which] is by declaring the state as democratic" [sic].
The analysts see in the internal division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the Muslim-Croat federation and the Serb republic the next phase in the destruction of Islam in Bosnia. "Step two [in] erasing any Islamic entity [is] by first dividing the country, then conglomerating and joining the mostly Muslim part into a Croat federation, thus denying Muslims any independent existence politically or otherwise.
The next phase in the intentional effort to destroy Islam in Bosnia could be found in the segment of the Dayton-Paris Agreement devoted to ensuring "Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" to all the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Islamist analysts emphasized the importance of the determination that the rights and freedoms accorded to all Bosnians would be based on "international standards" as "set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols". These principles, the Dayton-Paris agreement stipulates, "shall have priority over all other law". (These are direct quotations from the Dayton Agreement.)
For the Islamist analysts, these sentences contain "step three" in the campaign for the suppression of Islam. By stressing the overruling stature of international law, the West is "ensuring that Shari'a or Islamic Law can never be implemented by making other laws supersede it. The Europeans have done this in every Muslim country they colonized. The US is particularly doing it in Egypt." Pres. Hosni Mubarak's Egypt is considered one of the fiercest enemies of the international Islamist leadership. The mere comparison of the Dayton-Paris Accords to Pres. Mubarak's Cairo reflects the extent of Islamist hostility toward the Accords.
The Islamist analysts see in the definition of the Bosnian Presidency yet another facet of the conspiracy against Islam. This definition delves in great length into the delicate composition of the centralized institutions and decisionmaking process aimed to ensure that the rights of all national groups are taken into consideration. For the analysts, these arrangements constitute the seeds of an intentional suppression of Muslim rights. "The similarities between Bosnia and Lebanon are astonishing. The French have installed a constitution which ensured minimal representation of the Muslim majority and turned the government into a mixed bag of ethnic blend. There was one problem -- it failed!" Left unsaid here is the fact that the fratricidal Lebanese civil war which ultimately doomed the French-installed system of government was unleashed by an alliance of Islamists and Palestinian terrorists. The intended readers of this analysis are fully aware of what happened in Lebanon in the 1970s-'80s, and, for them, this comparison is more than just an academic issue.
The Islamist analysts are also worried about the powers of the Presidency in Sarajevo. They find the roots of yet another conspiracy of far-reaching potential in the fact that the Presidency is expected to have responsibility for "Conducting the foreign policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina," including the "Appointing [of] ambassadors and other international representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no more than two-thirds of whom may be selected from the territory of the Federation ..." (Again, these are direct quotations from the Dayton Agreement.)
For the Islamist analysts, the main reason for this arrangement of Presidential powers over foreign policy is to de-link Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Muslim World. "Another step to uproot Islam is by ensuring important arms of government are controlled by non-Muslims. The above provision would deprive Bosnia from a vital foreign policy link to other Muslim countries." Consequently, without massive help from sisterly Islamist states and organizations, and given the pressure from the West, it will be extremely difficult for the Muslim leadership in Sarajevo to establish and maintain a proper Islamic State.
The composition of several key state institutions provides the Islamist analysts with the proof of a Western design to prevent the establishment of an Islamic State. One such example is the multiethnic composition of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly considering that some of its members will be appointed by a European Court to ensure impartiality and judicial excellence. "Even the Constitutional Court is occupied by foreigners who will most likely ensure that any Islamic Tendencies are stopped," the Islamist analysts explain.
Of greater threat to Islam are "Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms", as accorded by the Dayton-Paris Agreement to all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Islamist analysts stress the hidden agenda behind the decree that "No amendment to this Constitution may eliminate or diminish any of the rights and freedoms" as guaranteed to all citizens. (Direct quotations from the Dayton Agreement.) For the Islamist analysts, this is a legal "smoking gun": "There you have [it] Muslims: Even the Qur'an can not overrule the laws set up for Bosnian Muslims by US and European militaries. It is truly an occupation at all levels of life in this Muslim country."
The Islamist analysts further strengthen and substantiate this point by providing a detailed list of the 15 international human rights agreements that the Dayton-Paris Agreement ensure will be applied to all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. "It is amazing to see the enemies of Islam write thousands of books about freedom, draft hundreds of laws about human rights and hold many conferences and conventions for human rights, but when it comes to applying these rights for Muslims, then suddenly there is no-one listening. The above so-called human rights were never intended to protect Muslims, they were intended solely to protect the interest of the enemies of Islam so that they can selectively use them as they wish and whenever they please."
The Islamist analysts conclude their December 16 study of the Dayton-Paris Agreement with a tacit threat that the suppression of Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be the catalyst for the forthcoming spread of Islam into Western Europe. They quote an exchange between the Prophet Muhammad and one Amr Ibn al-Asi. Amr Ibn al-Asi asked: "Which of the two cities will be opened to Islam first? Constantinople or Rome?" Muhammad answered:
"The city of Hercules will be opened [to Islam] first." Indeed, Byzantium, and with it Eastern Christianity as a regional power, fell to the Turks in 1453. Now, the Islamist analysts explain, the time of Rome, and with it Western Christianity as a regional power, has come. This is because NATO's perceived imposition of anti-Muslim order in Bosnia-Herzegovina is bound to incite a backlash against Western Europe. The Islamist analysts concluded their analysis of the Dayton-Paris Agreement with the promise: "And Rome will be opened to Islam. It is a Godly Promise told to us by the Prophet, and it looks like NATO has started that Promise fulfillment."
The international Islamist leadership is quite optimistic about the prospects of a confrontation with NATO. A follow-up analysis issued by the international Islamist leadership on December 18, noted: "It is striking to see NATO so fearful from mujahedin," as well as from the rise of "Islam in Europe". The Islamists relish this phenomenon. "We recall the saying of our Prophet, Peace and Blessing be upon Him, when He said: "I was helped by Allah with the terror in the heart of the enemy for as far as a month's walk.'"
At the same time, the international Islamist leadership considers NATO, and especially the US, responsible for the possibility of armed confrontation between the mujahedin and NATO troops. The Islamists are furious with the military segments of the Dayton Agreement that call for the deportation of at least some of the mujahedin from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Islamist analysts consider this demand an integral part of a US conspiracy to weaken the Muslim forces and strengthen the Serb forces. "The Bosnia agreement which was forced on the Muslim government sums it all up. On the one hand the US is pretending to request arming and training of Muslim forces, [but] on the other hand they are telling them to expel their best defenders from [among the] mujahedin, in addition to turning a blind eye to the thousands of tons of supplies that are making their way under the nose of the US embargo observers from Russia and Greece to Serbia." The aggregate impact of these steps, if the US has its way, is seen to significantly weaken the Bosnian Muslim forces, a development the Islamists are determined not to allow.
The Islamist analysts have no doubt that the NATO preparations in Bosnia-Herzegovina are aimed to create favorable conditions for the escalation of fighting against the mujahedin and loyal Bosnian Muslim forces. They point out that according to Article IV: "All Parties understand and agree that they shall be subject to military action by the I-FOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance" with numerous clauses from withdrawal to the new lines to cessation of hostilities. (Dayton Agreement.) The Islamist analysts couple this provision with these of Article III which stipulates the deactivation of independent irregular forces, which theoretically include some mujahedin elements: "The Parties also commit themselves to disarm and disband all armed civilian groups ... within 30 days after the Transfer of Authority." (Dayton Agreement.) Taken together, the international Islamist leadership concludes, these two Articles constitute the legal key to the initiation of armed clashes between NATO and the Islamist forces. "Note that in accordance with the Agreement, NATO will use force if the mujahedin did not leave in 30 days," the Islamist analysts conclude.
By the intent of the Dayton-Paris Agreement, and in accordance with promises made by Izetbegovic to Holbrooke, the vast majority of the mujahedin should have left Bosnia-Herzegovina within the first 30 days. Theoretically, with the mujahedin disarmed and gone, there should not have been any threat of an armed confrontation between them and the NATO I-FOR. The possibility of such a clash need not worry the Islamist leadership. However, this is not the case. The international Islamist leadership knows very well that the vast majority of the mujahedin and other Islamist forces, as well as the legions of Bosnian and other Balkan Muslims, they have indoctrinated, trained, organized and still lead, intend to legally remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Having received Bosnian citizenship and having been integrated into the Bosnian Army, they are exempt from the Dayton-Paris Agreement. Little wonder that the Islamist analysts are convinced that there will be clashes between NATO and their own forces. Therefore, the anticipation of clashes with the NATO forces should be considered as yet another facet in the building of the case for an escalation in the Islamist struggle for the establishment of an Islamic State in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Taken together, the analyses written for the international Islamist leadership build a strong case that the Dayton-Paris Accords are inherently anti-Muslim and that an armed struggle -- & jihad -- is the primary method for the realization of an Islamic State in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In late December 19 95, the Sarajevo weekly Ljiljan, which is considered Izetbegovic's mouthpiece, highlighted the contribution of the Islamist volunteers to Bosnia's military might through their personal sacrifices and the overall Islamicization of the Bosnian Muslim forces. The December 10 parade in Zenica was presented as an example of the latter achievement. Ljiljan favorably quoted several Arab mujahedin still in Bosnia-Herzegovina reaffirming their commitment to the Islamist cause and expressing disregard for the Dayton-Paris Accords. "The infidels will not tell us how to live and what to do. This is a Muslim country and the Muslims have to defend it," explained an Arab mujahid. Ljiljan left no doubt that the mujahedin were ready to fight for an Islamic Bosnia against the NATO forces. Considering the unique role of Ljiljan in political Sarajevo, the mere inclusion of this article cannot but be interpreted as Izetbegovic's tacit endorsement of the Islamist defiance and readiness to confront the US/NATO forces.
Significantly, these sentiments are not limited to the extremist Islamist circles. Even the relatively "moderate" factions of the Muslim Brotherhood in Western Europe are adamantly against the Dayton-Paris Agreement because of its "anti-Islamic clauses". They even label the Peace Treaty signed in Paris "the Butcher's Bill". These Islamists also imply that the signing in Paris will only result in a resumption of fighting. "A surrender treaty was signed in Paris on Thursday 14 Dec[ember] 1995 that allegedly ends the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina," they explain. "Clinton's Bosnian peace may turn out ... as 'a period of cheating between two periods of fighting'."
Taken together, the importance of these Islamist documents, particularly the November 18, and more so the December 16 analysis of the Dayton-Paris Agreement -- "Erasing Islam From Bosnia!" -- issued by the international Islamist leadership, lies in that these analysts are also the supreme leaders of the mujahedin and the Bosnian Muslim forces operating with them. These documents essentially constitute a legally valid spiritual and ideological justification for resisting the implementation of the Dayton-Paris Agreement, including armed confrontation with the NATO troops enforcing it. In their December 1995 documents, the Islamist analysis also sets forth the justification for the escalation of the fight over Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina into a fateful clash aimed to destroy "Rome". While radical militant Islam is incapable of conquering Europe or destroying Western Christianity, it surely can express its wrath and frustration in the form of spectacular terrorist strikes at the heart of Europe.
Considering that the leadership of the Bosnian Muslim military is very close, both ideologically and in working levels, to the Islamist leadership, this Islamist document -- "Erasing Islam From Bosnia!" -- should be considered as reflecting the reading of the agreement in Sarajevo as well. Furthermore, since the early 1990s, and particularly since 1994, the Islamist leadership's interpretation of events in the Balkans has indeed been identical to the analysis of the same events by President Izetbegovic and his closest aides. Therefore, the mere existence and distribution of the document "Erasing Islam From Bosnia!" in late 1995 amounted to laying the spiritual and ideological foundations for an obligatory declaration of jihad against the Western forces about to embark on an effort to destroy Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, what is still being termed in Washington as "the implementation of the Dayton-Paris Agreement".
These were not idle threats. The international Islamist leadership issued its first explicit warning to the United States over the presence of NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the last days of December 1995. The warning was issued as a communiqué of the Islamic Committee for the Defense of the Persecuted [ICDP] titled "Beware of Erroneous Handling of Mujahedin Issue". The communiqué was disseminated through authoritative Islamist channels in Cairo and Western Europe, thus leaving no doubt that it originated at the highest levels of the international Islamist leadership in Tehran and Khartoum. An accompanying letter presented The Islamic Committee for the Defense of the Persecuted as "a body comprised of prominent leaders of Arab religious groups that are in close contact with the Arab mujahedin in Bosnia". The ICDP, like the International Justice Group that already issued communiqués over terrorist operations in Switzerland and Pakistan, is a front organization used as an organ for publishing authoritative high-level communiqués for the Islamist leaders without implicating them directly.
The essence of the ICDP communiqué is to warn Washington of the ramifications of its handling of the mujahedin issue, as well as to reiterate that many of the mujahedin intend to remain in Bosnia. The ICDP warns that the US "is leading a hostile NATO campaign against Muslim mujahedin. This grave situation is not unique to Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the contrary, it is a natural component of the blatant US position, which is hostile toward whatever is Islamic, has become a distinguishing feature of US foreign policy." With this depiction of the overall situation, the ICDP sets the logic for the all-Islamic aspects of the continued presence of the mujahedin in Bosnia- Herzegovina and for the possibility of a worldwide Islamist struggle to ensure the interests of these mujahedin in the context of the global anti-US Islamist jihad.
The ICDP communiqué first explains that the US is hostile to the! mujahedin because they prevented the US design to destroy Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "The United States was not alarmed by the thousands of people who helped the various parties, while it continues to make a stir over a few hundred mujahedin, even though these have repeatedly declared that they have no political objectives in Bosnia and that they will depart once they have assured themselves about the Muslims' safety and the recovery of their rights. So why is the United States condemning them? Is it because they thwarted its schemes by heroically standing by their brothers, defending them with their lives, while it [the US] was gambling on the Muslims' defeat and surrender when they were besieged between the Serbs and the Croats? Or is the United States condemning them because of their role in the Islamic Call and their efforts to acquaint Muslims with their religion, which, with Allah's help, has had a great impact on the Muslims' coherence and steadfastness?"
The ICDP stresses that the mujahedin are answerable only to Islam. The communiqué states that although "the Mujahedin do not need anyone to recognize their role and efforts in Bosnia ... if the United States or anyone else want to acquaint themselves with their [the mujahedin's] role, they should go to the cemeteries to see their headstones." However, the ICDP highlights the vital contribution of the mujahedin to the Islamicization process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, urging that the US "should go to the cities and villages to feel their [the Mujahedin's} effects and count those taught by them".
The ICDP communiqué now raises the terrorism issue, accusing the US of intentionally portraying the mujahedin as terrorists simply because they are Islamists. First, the communiqué strongly denies that the mujahedin have anything to do with terrorism. But then the ICDP threatens the US and NATO with terrorism if they confront the mujahedin. "What right does the United States have to accuse the mujahedin of terrorism? Did they rape women? Did they slaughter children? Did they annihilate mankind as the Serb and Croat criminals did? No wonder ... standards have been disrupted and racism and ill intentions prevailed."
The ICDP now dwells on the heroic combat record of the mujahedin in Bosnia, and particularly their willingness to confront the enemy despite most adverse odds. The mujahedin prevailed through their heroism and willingness to endure heavy losses. The communiqué emphasizes that "the mujahedin set the most brilliant examples of sacrifice, Islamic brotherhood, and self-initiative, proving that the Islamic peoples, Arab and non-Arab, are qualified to carry out the greatest of tasks, even if some governments are lax".
In this context, the ICDP warns that just as the mighty weapon of Islamist sacrifice was used so effectively against the Serbs and Croats, the mighty weapon of martyrdom -- suicide terrorism -- can be directed also against the US. "Here is the weapon of martyrdom and death for the sake of Allah's cause being highly valued once again:
the lethal weapon that is worrying the United States."
Instead of confronting Islam, the communiqué suggests, the West should come to terms with the presence of the mujahedin in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ICDP stresses that "the mujahedin issue should be tackled within a framework of wisdom and through the Bosnian Government, for which the mujahedin have always declared their respect. They have also declared their intention not to embarrass it. Their policy is not to interfere in its affairs. The Bosnian people, represented in their government, know their interests well."
The above does not mean, however, that all the mujahedin are ready to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead, the ICDP brings up the primary methods already used by the Sarajevo Government to conceal the continued presence of the mujahedin as legitimate reasons for their continued stay in Bosnia. The communiqué explains that "in view of the reality resulting from a four-year war, during which the Mujahedin intermingled with the Bosnian people, marrying among them and having children, some are entitled to live in this land, to whose people they are bound. The humanitarian aspect of the issue cannot be ignored, nor can the Bosnian Government's right to grant residence permits or citizenship to those who fought alongside their Bosnian brothers to defend this people."
Furthermore, according to the ICDP, there are legitimate reasons even for the continued stay of hard-core Islamist terrorists in the former Yugoslavia: for settling scores with Croatia. The Islamists are determined not only to avenge the arrest and extradition of Fuad Tal'at Qassim as well as the assassination of Sheikh Anwar Sha'ban and four of his escorts, the responsibility for all of which they accurately attribute to the highest levels of the Croatian Government in Zagreb, but also to deter further Croatian confrontations with the Islamists traveling to and from Bosnia-Herzegovina via Croatia. Significantly, the ICDP stresses that the December 14 ambush of the mujahedin "was a blatant violation of the ceasefire declared under recent [Dayton-Paris] agreements". Hence, since the Croats have already violated the Accords, so can the Bosnian Muslims and the mujahedin in pursuit of higher and nobler causes.
In conclusion, the ICDP communiqué returns to the growing threat of conflict between the mujahedin and the US/NATO forces, The ICDP emphasizes that it is virtually irrelevant what the mujahedin do or don't do because the present problems between the US and the mujahedin "proceed from a US position hostile toward whatever is Islamic". Therefore, the ICDP concludes, it is quite possible that a confrontation will take place. Under such circumstances, the mujahedin do not intend to remain passive. "If some of them [US/NATO forces] try to use the big stick and the language of threats, intimidation, and treachery with the mujahedin, the Arab proverb says: They have brought it upon themselves."
Islamist terrorism was not the only threat facing the NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in late 1995. The Bosnian Muslim Military was already intensifying its preparations for the possible resumption of fighting in the Spring of 1996. The Sarajevo High Command was determined to be able to fully exploit, if not actually instigate, the anticipated major clashes between the US-led I-FOR forces and Bosnian Serbs. General Delic alluded to these preparations in an address on Sarajevo TV back on December 10, 1995. "If the Dayton agreement is not respected, the Army of Bosnia has to be the guarantee that it will be carried out in another way," he quipped. The next day, Brigadier Sead Delic, the commander of the Tuzla-based 2nd Corps, was even more explicit. The Bosnian Army urgently needs combat aircraft, helicopters, artillery and tanks to create "a military balance which must be achieved as soon as possible," he explained. "The Bosnian army must be prepared to resolve the situation by military means if necessary. We must be prepared to liberate territory." Significantly, the Islamist leadership had already decreed this struggle an obligation.
It was into this Bosnia-Herzegovina, not the Sarajevo of the TV evening news, that NATO forces were being deployed. Irrespective of the extent of the US Clinton Administration's support for the Sarajevo cause, the Bosnian Muslim elite forces and their mujahedin allies remained vehemently anti-US and committed to the furthering of the Islamist jihad against "the Great Satan". The Islamist militants and terrorists did not, and still do not, care about the declared nature of the US military missions, but react to the mere presence of US military forces.
A close examination of the proposed role of the US, and other NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina pointed to a potential threat growing in phases. Islamist terrorists were contemplating, first to instigate provocations, inciting the US forces to attack the Bosnian Serb and Croat forces in order to deliver victory for Sarajevo. Then, once I-FOR had outlived its usefulness, particularly in the case that the US did not deliver total victory over the Bosnian Serbs, the Islamists would have had "proof of the US anti-Islam conspiracies. This would surely provide the sought-after justification for revenge:
anti-US terrorism both to kill and humiliate as many Americans as possible (the Islamists, at least, remember Beirut). The ultimate objective of these terrorist attacks would be to make the US forces kill Muslims, even if in self-defense, thus inciting a wider populist jihad which both Sarajevo and the Islamists are convinced would then spread into Western Europe and the US.
Thus -- with the US-imposed peace agreement considered by the warring powers as little more than a brief interlude on history's bloody march -- the greater dynamics which dominated events in the Balkans for nearly a decade remain valid and very much in effect. Hence, the possibility of a major conflagration turning into a regional and even European war remained, in late 1995, a most cogent threat. Ultimately the worst is possible: with US forces and Iran-sponsored terrorists roaming around Bosnia-Herzegovina; with Sarajevo still committed to manipulating Washington to destroy its enemies for it;
and with the Clinton Administration eager to please Sarajevo's radicals even at the expense of the NATO forces deployed in Bosnia.
I-FOR units on December 16, 1995, formally assumed responsibility for the enforcement of a series of force separation policies and for the redeployment of the local forces, in accordance with the provisions of the Dayton/Paris Accords. It has been clear from the beginning that although formally a NATO force, I-F OR was in effect an instrument for the implementation of the Bosnian policies of the Clinton Administration. This distinction will determine the whole scope of military and subversive activities of the Bosnian Muslim forces and their Islamist allies: the mujahedin. Meanwhile, the presence of Islamist terrorists openly committed to confronting the US and establishing an Islamist state in Bosnia was recognized as one of the major threats facing the US forces deploying to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
And from the beginning, Sarajevo belittled the extent of the Islamist presence and its potential threat. The Clinton Administration was eager to believe Sarajevo. On December 29,1995, a White House official said that Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbey had met with US National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and assured him that "between 400 and 500 Islamic fundamentalist fighters from such venues as Iran, Egypt and Turkey would depart Bosnia as scheduled by mid-January".
On January 31, 1996, NATO/I-FOR formally announced the successful evacuation of the mujahedin: "The last group of Islamic 'mujahedin' who fought on the side of the mainly-Muslim army in Bosnia's three-year war, has left the country." Still, given the known preparations of the Islamists -- both mujahedin and their Bosnian Muslim supporters -- to confront I-FOR, such confidence was at the very least premature.
There should be no doubt that the Islamists and their Bosnian Muslim patrons were determined to strike I-FOR and especially US forces. That has been repeatedly clarified by the most authoritative Islamist leaders.
Already in late December 1995, the international Islamist leadership issued its first explicit warning to the United States over the presence of NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The communiqué warned that just as the mighty weapon of Islamist sacrifice! was used so effectively against the Serbs and Croats, the mighty weapon of martyrdom -- suicide terrorism -- can be directed also against the US. "Here is the weapon of martyrdom and death for the sake of Allah's cause being highly valued once again -- the lethal weapon that is worrying the United States."
In mid-January 1996, the Islamist leadership released a sermon of Sheikh Umar Abd-al-Rahman made on the eve of his sentencing (for his leadership role in the Islamist terrorist networks in New York in 1993). This sermon stressed the centrality of Bosnia to the Islamist cause and specifically threatened the US with terrorism in retaliation "America worked tirelessly to weaken Muslims in Bosnia... Such action made America a partner to the Serbs in killing hundreds of thousands of Muslims, and in raping women and annihilating children. If Germany is supporting the Croats, and Russia is strengthening the Serbs, we see that everyone, led by America, have united to isolate and weaken Muslims, and the whole plan is for destroying Muslims in the Balkans.
"Behold, the whole world, listen! Islam can not be stopped with violence, with warfare, with spending millions of dollars, with lies, deception, corruption, and with fabricated trials like this one.... The US, with its power and influence, must not bruise itself in stopping these Islamic forces, and whatever they do towards that end will only harm them, and they will bring upon themselves bankruptcy and destruction if they try to stop Islam."
The invoking of Sheikh Abd-al-Rahman's statement was intended to further inspire and motivate the terrorists preparing for strikes on I-FOR. In the second half of January 1996, Arab Islamists passing through the primarily Egyptian Islamist community in Vienna, Austria -- a well-organized body already implicated, among other things, in support for the Islamist terrorism in New York in 1993 -- reported that Arab Mujahedin with Bosnian passports "swore deadly vengeance on US troops" for both crimes against Islam committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as for the life sentence imposed on Sheikh Umar Abd-al-Rahman in New York. These Arabs have no intention to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina for as long as I-FOR remains and there is no Islamic Government in power in Sarajevo. They consider any effort to establish a secular multi-ethnic government in Bosnia, as stipulated by the Dayton/Paris Accords, a grave crime against Islam. As will be discussed later, the devotees of Sheikh Umar Abd-al- Rahman fulfill unique and crucial roles in the expanding Islamist terrorist infrastructure in the Balkans.
The Sarajevo authorities have, since late 1995, been actively adapting the Islamist infrastructure in order to cope with the peculiar conditions stemming from the presence of I-FOR. However, these changes were essentially cosmetic, adapting the Islamist infrastructure in order to conceal its presence in Bosnia and enhance its preparations for terrorist operations primarily against I-FOR.
As part of this, the 3rd Army Corps was officially "disbanded" in early January 1996 and then transformed into a training unit where former mujahedin turned Bosnian citizens train Bosnian Muslim troops. The first class of 1,000 Bosnian Muslims began training back in November 1995 to serve as replacements for mujahedin transferred to other units all over the country. Moreover, the Arab Corps Commander -- Abu-Ma'ali -- was replaced by Brigadier-General Sakib Mahmuljin, a Bosnian Islamist. Abu-Ma'ali's exact whereabouts are not known.
In the Winter of 1995/96, the Bosnian Muslim Army launched a major program to conceal the presence of the mujahedin in its ranks. The majority of mujahedin with military experience -- mainly Pakistanis, Afghans and Iranians --were integrated into the Bosnian Army, and then dispersed throughout the entire Army. The radical Islamists, most of them Arabs, were permitted to operate in their own groups, either within larger units or as non-military entities.
In late January 1996, Croatian and Bosnian-Croatian security officials were apprehensive about the continued presence of mujahedin and other Islamist elements in the Bosnian Army, especially in view of their growing influence. For example. General Zivko Budimir, HVO Chief of General Staff [Croatian military] stressed that the bulk of the Islamist volunteers "have still not left" Bosnia-Herzegovina even though the key mujahedin unit has been "dissolved". These Croat officials began warning about the dire ramifications to the regional strategic posture if the US went along with its declared plans to arm and train this Bosnian Army. A Dalmatia-based official explained that "the mujahedins [sic.] have been dispersed into small groups... armed only with small arms." Therefore, the I-FOR High Command he dealt with are convinced these mujahedin "do not represent a military threat" to I-FOR. However, Croat officials note, I-FOR suppressed the extent of a mid-January clash between British I-FOR troops and mujahedin. Given this mis-reporting, Croat security officials wonder and worry about both I-Fore's awareness of the true magnitude of the Islamist threat and its willingness to share data it has about terrorism with Zagreb and other allies.
In February 1996, as the continued presence of large numbers of mujahedin was becoming a political "issue", Sarajevo undertook additional steps to better conceal their presence and operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By mid-February, growing numbers of "former" Arab mujahedin, especially in elite units of the Bosnian Army, were becoming "humanitarian workers" in international organizations accredited to international bodies and supported by Sarajevo. In this new capacity, they could remain in their former bases and facilities, especially in central Bosnia. On February 20, Croatian security authorities in Mostar warned that "Islamic terrorists, mujahedin, who should have already left Bosnia-Herzegovina in compliance with the Dayton agreement, are still where they were."
Another tested and proven mechanism to legalize the presence of the mujahedin -- getting them married to Bosnian women so that they are entitled to Bosnian citizenship -- was markedly expanded. Croatian and Bosnian-Croatian security officials reported that since late 1995 "a large number of mujahedin have been getting married in Bosnia and thereby acquiring all the necessary documents to stay in Bosnia."
The exact number of mujahedin using this means to stay is unclear. Pres. Izetbegovic insists that only 50 to 60 mujahedin, all released or invalided from military service, have remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina because they married local women. Both Croat and Serb intelligence estimate that a few thousand mujahedin married and stayed. Considering that a total of about 40,000 Islamists served in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the early 1990s, the estimated number of married mujahedin -- a few thousand -- could constitute as many as10 to 15 percent of the total Islamist presence. There is only one "own independent statistical case: that of one of the first Lebanese Islamist units organized by the Iranians and dispatched to Bosnia in 1992 for a two-year tour. Of these, about 300 mujahedin, only some 200 returned to Lebanon while about 50 got married and remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The rest, also about 50, were killed in action. That is about a 16 to 17 percent marriage rate, slightly above the estimate by Croat and Serb intelligence.
The reassignment of the mujahedin was completed in February and March 1996. This dispersal was more than just the concealment of individuals forbidden to remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This dispersal was but one, albeit very important, aspect of a far more profound process: the reorganization of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina to meet future challenges. In early 1996, official Sarajevo was stressing its ultimate objective, namely, that "by next Summer [1996] the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army will have become a regional power".
Indicative of Sarajevo's intentions and priorities is the appointment in January 1996 of Hasan Cengic to the position of Deputy Defense Minister: the man in charge of the implementation of the reorganization. A veteran of the SS Handzar Division during World War II, Cengic is a close personal friend and confidant of Alija Izetbegovic, especially since the time they served together in Yugoslav President Tito's prison.
Hasan Cengic is a committed Islamist and a close ally of Tehran. He spent much of the current war in Vienna and Tehran, in charge of weapons procurement operations and other strategic cooperation with Tehran. In this capacity Cengic worked closely with Iranian intelligence on illegal weapons acquisition and transfer of funds, building intimate relations and deep mutual trust with the mullahs in Tehran.
Cengic has repeatedly argued that the only key to the salvation of the Izetbegovic administration is by adopting an unambiguous Islamic identity and waging an Islamist struggle. Considering Cengic's strong and known positions, his nomination to such a key post -- deputy Minister of Defense -- means that his position has been adopted by official Sarajevo.
Indeed, the majority of mujahedin still served in the ranks of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina by mid-1996, where they were increasingly being transformed into an elite core which was helping to bring about the overall Islamicization of the military establishment. The mujahedin were divided between three clusters of operational units and a fourth cluster of units directly engaged in terrorism and other covert special operations. As will be discussed below, this distribution was not rigid. Particularly, some of the main units including mujahedin are also used to conceal and provide cover for Islamist terrorist elements. The four unit clusters are:
- Quality core of the Muslim Liberation Brigades;
- Operational units in central Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- Operational units in the Bihac Pocket; and
- Special units connected to terrorism and covert operations.
Among them, these units have between 11,000 and 15,000 foreign mujahedin in their ranks.
In addition to these mujahedin forces, there are numerous Islamist terrorist facilities -- ranging from schools to operational forward bases -- under the tight control of the Sarajevo Government, particularly of AID (the new intelligence service of Bosnia-Herzegovina) and under the cover of a myriad of humanitarian organizations.
The Quality Core of the Muslim Liberation Brigades: The three Muslim Liberation Brigades are the main organized elements to have emerged from the disbanded Armija Republike BH 3, Korpus Odred 'el-Mudzahidin', the main mujahedin unit during the war. Until the Fall of 1995, the 3rd Mujahedin Corps was comprised of three Brigades. Starting late 1995, these Brigades were subordinated to other Corps. Their size has been increased from about 1,500 troops each to over 2,000. These brigades are built around a hard core of foreign mujahedin while the rest of the troops are Bosnian Islamists. These brigades are:
- The 7th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 3rd Corps with HQ in Zenica;
- The 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 2nd Corps with HQ in Travnik (the 2nd Corps is Tuzla-based); and
- The 4th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 4th Corps with HQ in Konjic.
Official Sarajevo is stressing the crucial importance of these Brigades to the overall military capabilities of the Bosnian Muslim forces.
In early March 1996, the Sarajevo weekly Ljiljan, which is considered Izetbegovic's mouthpiece, published an article stressing the importance of the Muslim units and threatened the US if interfered with their activities. Sarajevo points out the growing tension between the US Army and the Bosnian Army over the prevalence of Muslim units, and particularly over Sarajevo's Insistence to keep the 9th Muslim Liberation Brigade, which is subordinate to the Tuzla based 2nd Corps, garrisoned in the immediate vicinity of US Army bases in Tuzla. In this context, the Lillian article stresses that the 9th Bde "was established according to the model of the 7th", which means that "the unit consists exclusively of Muslim youngsters, who transferred to the unit voluntarily from other 2nd Corps units because they embraced the Islamic code of life offered in the brigade, its only 'sin' -- an outward resemblance with the mujahid from Islamic countries -- produced in the US base near Tuzla the fear two months ago that they might be 'Bosnian terrorists'."
The article stresses that "these famous Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina units -- the 7th, 4th and 9th -- will form the core of the future professional contingent of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina". Considering the terrorist factor, the article ridicules "the irrational fear that the US troops have from Iran". This irrationality, the Ljiljan article concluded, was behind the repeated anti-Islamic provocations and harassment carried out by the US Army against the 9th Brigade. The article concluded with a veiled threat to the US Army: "No-one even thinks of what could happen if the 'Bosnian terrorists' really responded!"
In late April 1996, Yugoslav and Croat military experts were in agreement that the quality core of Sarajevo's politically reliable military might -- the guardians of the Izetbegovic administration -- were "somewhat more than 8,000 [Iranian-controlled foreign] soldiers who form three very strong brigades". These troops are members of Iran's "al-Quds" forces deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina following intensive training and indoctrination in Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Sudan and constitute the core of the 4th, 7th and -3rd Muslim Liberation Brigades.
Indeed, by mid-April, the importance of the Islamist units was growing further as they were being modified to serve as the high quality core of the entire Army. The first to be so converted is the 7th Muslim Chivalrous Brigade of the 3d Corps. The new and now "mechanized" 7th Brigade consists of parts of the 319th and 330th Brigades, three maneuver battalions, a Green Beret company (mujahedin-dominated Islamist Special Forces), and a tank company. "We are creating a new army now. We must change many things in this process; however, the 7th Brigade will remain for as long as we live," declared Brigadier-General Sakib Mahmuljin, commander of the 3rd Corps.
Another aspect of this reorganization is yet another circumvention of the Dayton-Paris Accords. As the US was conditioning the supply of heavy weapons to Bosnia-Herzegovina on the removal of the "remaining" Islamist elements from the operational units of the Bosnian Muslim Army, Sarajevo moved the Islamist forces in central Bosnia-Herzegovina into a new status: stand-by units. This arrangement enabled a Bosnian military official to claim in late May 1996, that "Islamic fighters from Iran and other countries have been mostly removed from the Bosnian army." However, he acknowledged, "four Bosnian mujahedin brigades numbering more than 6,000 fighters remain on stand-by." These are the three Muslim Brigades with the fourth being the newly-established 17th Muslim Light Brigade of the 1st Corps in Sarajevo, "replacing" the Handzar Division.
Operational Units in Central Bosnia-Herzegovina: Back in late December 1995, the Bosnian Muslim Forces began establishing and activating additional mujahedin units, comprised of cadres of foreign volunteers and Bosnian Muslims trained by them, in order to spread and conceal the foreign mujahedin throughout the entire armed forces. One example is the 807th Muslim Liberation Brigade, which was established and sworn in at Gorazde on December 20,1995. B} June 1996, there were at least 10 such units in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina:
- The 807th Muslim Liberation Brigade of the 81st Division with HQ in Gorazde;
- The 117th Brigade -- the "Dzemisetski Golubovi" -- with HQ in Lukovac;
- The 119th Special Forces Mujahedin Brigade with HQ in Banovici.
This Brigade is divided into two task forces known as: (a) "Tigrici", (b) "Zelena Strela";
- The 203 Brigade with HQ in Tesanj. This Brigade is divided into three "Independent mujahedin Special" task forces known as: (a) "Krtice", (b) "Vitezovi", (c) "Tigrovi";
- The 204th Light Brigade -- the "Citlucki Vukovi" -- with HQ in Citluk;
- The 115th Muslim Brigade with forward HQ in Vogosca;
- The 17th Muslim Light Brigade, of the 14th Division of the 1st Corp with HQ in Pazaric;
- The 379th Motorized Brigade of the 37th Division with HQ in Tesanj;
- One Operational Group known as "Zivinicke Ose" with HQ in Zivinice;
- One Operational Group with HQ in Tuzla. It is divided into two special task forces known as: (a) "Janicari" (Janissary), (b) "Taut". (This Operational Group is independent of the Tuzla-based 2nd Corps.)
The exact number of foreign Mujahedin in each of these brigades is difficult to ascertain. All reliable estimates put the average size of the foreign elements at about 750 to 1,000 Mujahedin per Brigade.
In late March 1996, a mujahid member of the 117th Brigade in Lukovac, identified only by the nom de guerre "Muharram", stressed the continuity between these brigades and the earlier mujahedin forces. He explained that "all religious rules and commitments that were applied in the mujahedin formations have been applied to the Islamic Brigades as well, though officially they come under the command of the Bosnian Army. But because they occupied a distinguished position, they were called the mujahedin Brigades." "Muharram" complained that his unit was being singled out by US and Swedish forces for harassment because of its Islamist character, despite repeated protests by Gen. Sead Delic, the Commander of the 2nd Corps, as well as efforts to block I-FOR patrols from entering the Brigade's compound.
As of mid-March 1996, the increased activities among the Islamist and terrorist elements concealed in the Bosnian Muslim Armed Forces has been noticeable. Members of these units have begun to participate in special operations across the Bosnian Serb lines.
One of the first operations took place on the night of March 22, 1996. A group of Bosnian Muslim terrorists attempted a sabotage operation on the Pale-Lukavica road but were captured by the Bosnian Serb forces. They disclosed that they were members of the reconnaissance-sabotage unit of the 115th Muslim Brigade. Back on March 15, Saban Begovic, the Brigade commander, ordered the Brigade's command echelons and the commander of the reconnaissance-sabotage unit to prepare several three-man teams for a series of sabotage and terrorist operations in the Grbavica region. lie team discovered and captured on March 22 was the first sent across the Serbian lines.
In mid-April 1996, with the active preparations for terrorist operations against I-FOR in the Doboj-Tesanj area mounting (for details see below), the Bosnian Muslim Army formed a new elite unit -- the 379th Motorized Brigade -- within the ranks of the 37t|, Division of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to service and provide support for the growing Islamist terrorist infrastructure in the area. The 379th Motorized Brigade is a special forces unit comprised of the best fighters from the Tesanj, Teslic, and Doboj region.
During the Spring of 1996, there was an overall increase in Islamist militant activities in contention points where mujahedin units are deployed. Most were demonstrative actions, statements of Islamist presence despite Sarajevo's assurances to the contrary. For example, in mid-April, Major Kasim Podzic, the commander of the 17th Muslim Brigade told his men and a large group of visiting Islamist dignitaries that "we are ready to fight under any conditions until even inch of occupied Bosniak land is under our control". One such incident took place in late April in Gorazde, the site of the 807th Muslim Liberation Brigade. A few Islamists dropped inflammatory leaflets calling for a jihad against the Serbs under the banner of Hamas. The leaflets were dropped from vehicles in a Bosnian Government convoy as it passed through Serb Gorazde on the Sarajevo-Gorazde blue route. These leaflets were distributed in full view of the I-FOR escort that failed to stop this activity.
Operational Units in the Bihac Pocket: The Bihac-based 5th Corps has recently become a haven of mujahedin units. The first mujahedin special forces were deployed to the area clandestinely via Croatia (many of them smuggled in by the UN and international relief organizations, while others were flown in with illegal weapons supplies) in order to bolster the local units loyal to the Sarajevo Izetbegovic leadership in their clash with the forces loyal to Fikret Abdic, the local popular (Muslim) leader. Sarajevo needed non-local Muslims as the hard core of its own forces in the Bihac pocket to withstand the mass defection of its troops to Abdic's camp.
Starting the Fall of 1995, a large number of the mujahedin expelled from central Bosnia and expected to travel back to their home countries via Croatia had actually been smuggled back into the Bihac Pocket. Indeed, in late January 1996, General Zivko Budimir, the HVO (Croatian Army) Chief of General Staff, warned that a large mujahedin force was being organized in the Bihac area. Mujahedin expelled by I-FOR to Croatia for further travel to home country were being integrated into these units.
The emergence of a mujahedin-dominated Islamist core in the 5th Corps is not surprising and extremely troubling considering the identity of the Corps commander: Gen. Atif Dudakovic. Gen. Atif Dudakovic is a devotee of Izetbegovic and a member of the Executive Committee of the SDA (the Serbo-Croat initials for Izetbegovic's Democratic Action Party). He is also a staunchly pro-Iranian Islam-
For example, in mid-February 1996, General Atif Dudakovic, in his capacity as the Commander of the 5th Corps, organized a celebration of the anniversary of Khomeini's Revolution in Bihac. Iranian and Arab Islamists from all over Bosnia-Herzegovina, including intelligence officers and terrorist commanders, were invited to these celebrations. Many attended.
The key mujahedin units of the 5th Corps are:
- The 501st Mountain Brigade IDG known as "Tigrovi";
- The 503rd Mountain Brigade IDG known as "Caruge";
- The 505th Mountain Brigade IDG known as "Tajfun", "Hamze", and "Balije";
- The 511th Light Brigade IDC known as "Apaci".
By designation, all of the mujahedin units of the 5th Corps are elite reconnaissance, sabotage, airborne-hellebore (Desant) groups [known by the initials from its Serbo-Croat designation, IDG]. The exact number of foreign mujahedin in each of these brigades is difficult to ascertain. All reliable estimates put the average size of the foreign elements at about 1,200 to 1,500 mujahedin per Brigade. IDC units are smaller units than IDG brigades, but also combine a number of specialist functions.
Special Units Connected to Terrorism and Covert Operations:
Both Croatian and Serbian intelligence stress that the mujahedin remain the "backbone" of the elite reconnaissance-saboteur units as well as the SDA's own Muslim Defense Force. The latter force now incorporates over 1,000 Bosnian Islamists, many of them with overseas military and religious training. Foreign mujahedin are also the key instructors of "special actions" [special operations and terrorism], intelligence officers, as well as religious commissars and operational commanders of tactical special units. Both the foreign mujahedin and Bosnian Islamists involved in special operations and terrorism are divided between two main "units" of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and an assortment of clandestine terrorist bases, both training facilities and operational sites.
The main "units" are:
1. The I Bosniak Brigade "Nocne Ptice" [Night Birds]. This is a highly specialized "mother unit" that includes an assortment of specialists and experts from Turkey, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Lebanon. The I Brigade provides cover for numerous Islamic terrorist elements such as "Allah's Combatants" and other small relatively autonomous terrorist units. Among the experts serving with the I Brigade are car-bomb experts from Lebanon, some of them veterans who planned the suicide attacks against the US Marine barracks and other installations in Beirut in the early 1980s. The I Brigade is the unit that will sponsor, operationally support and assist in terrorist operations against I-FOR.
2. The III Corps. As discussed above, the direct mujahedin component of the 3rd Corps is presently a training unit for Bosnian and foreign Islamists, both for service with other elite units and for the terrorists. However, the 3rd Corps provides shield and cover for special operational units known by the code "G" or the "G" Force "G" stands for "Gazija" [in Serbo-Croat transliteration]; that is, "Gazi'a": retribution, retaliation, punishment, in Arabic. This is a training force with operational capabilities that has absorbed some of the more sensitive elements of the original 3rd Corps. For example, the "Martyrs' Detachment" and the training camps of the Ansar Force have been integrated into the "G" Force. The operational core of this terrorist and special force consists of a group of Saudi Islamists committed to avenging the "infidels' crimes" against Islamic Bosnia. They are formally affiliated with, as well as draw support and manpower from, the Bosnian Army's reconnaissance sabotage battalion in Vukovije. There are unconfirmed reports that Abu-Ma'ali is now the commander of the "G" Force.
The various terrorist bases aimed at I-FOR are most important to the future direction of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Preparations at these bases are conducted under the auspices of AID: the new intelligence service of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In late January 1996, Bakir Alispahic, a former senior official of the old communist Yugoslav secret police, SDB , and the State security organs, and a former minister of the interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was nominated as Chief of the Agency of Investigation, Research and Documentation (AID), Bosnia's intelligence service. Tailored after the old communist Yugoslav secret services, AID is responsible for both domestic and international security. Alispahic was directly answerable to Izetbegovic and reported to him regularly.
Officially, the main threat which AID is confronting is the "Cetnik" threat: that is, the Serbian unwillingness to surrender. Serbian aggression, and not Islamist terrorism is defined by AID as the main threat to I-FOR. AID considers the "non-viability" of the federation with Croatia "the biggest burden" because of the Croats' preventing the arrival of equipment and experts needed to bolster AID, particularly from the Middle East.
In reality, aid's primary mission is to ensure the establishment of an Islamic State throughout the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina established the Agency for Research and Documentation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (AID) on January 12, 1996. as a centralized security and intelligence service replaces the myriad of secret and security services inherited from the former Yugoslavia and gradually adapted during the early 1990's to the peculiar needs of Sarajevo with the assistance of Iranian intelligence experts. AID has emerged, as planned, as Izetbegovic's security service: a political secret police committed to wishing "complete control" over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The best expression of this objective is the legacy of its predecessors. By the Spring of 1994, during the height of the siege on Sarajevo, aid's predecessor maintained files on approximately 160,000 individuals in the city, mostly for petty black market and other minor/minute offenses. Despite the Bosnian Serb military threat and the continued siege, Izetbegovic ordered the allocation of extensive manpower and resources to close monitoring of the predominantly Muslim population. Among the "crimes" investigated and pursued by the secret police was the case of a few non-Muslim troops (both Croat and Serb) in the Army's 1st Corps who hunted a wild boar at the time there was no food in the Winter of 1993-94. The unit's Bosnian Muslim officers ordered the destruction of the meat, reported the offense to the security services, and ensured that the culprits were punished in accordance with guidelines from the secret police. By 1995, by cautious and conservative estimates, the secret police already had over a quarter of a million files in the Sarajevo area alone.
The most important branch of the secret police was answerable to a high-level official of the special secret military police of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army 1st Corps. Their members are still characterized by their black uniforms and brand new weapons -- such as handguns and Heckler & Koch MP5 submachineguns -- which "somehow" reached Sarajevo despite the siege and at the expense of the ostensibly badly needed food. At the same time, the secret police also established a vast computerized filing system as the key part of the secret police's new computer system and center. The new computers also reached Sarajevo despite the siege. At the same time, the secret police was using more "traditional" methods inside Sarajevo to ensure the stability of the Izetbegovic administration. According to Croatian intelligence experts, "the executioners were criminals and professional murderers who were awarded with the release from prison" for getting rid of Izetbegovic's enemies in Sarajevo.
In mid-February 1996, faced with the implementation of the Dayton-Paris Accords, Croat experts warned about the true character of Sarajevo's emerging centralized secret services: the newly established AID. They stressed that there was "clear evidence that from the beginning of the war Izetbegovic has been building his security system on the principles of the KOS [counter-intelligence service] and SDB [state security service] organizations that existed in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia". The Croatian experts were especially worried about these developments in view of the Izetbegovic's own personal and political background. "By having chosen to retain his position in this way, by looking for the main enemies in his own people, even though the war was raging, he obviously forgot that he himself was a victim of the same system." This trend was only worsening because with the January 1996 establishment of AID, "all Izetbegovic's intelligence and counterintelligence services have thus been united under one administration." The Croat experts concluded that this recent evolution of the Bosnia-Herzegovina secret services constitutes an accurate reflection of the inner dynamics in Sarajevo:
"Especially worrying, however, is the fact that AID was established after the ruling party leadership and the commanders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army had been 'cleansed' of all who did not agree with the leading Muslim hard liners, even after it became known in Dayton that an election would be held in Bosnia-Herzegovina soon. The AID leader warns that this has practically made AID an intelligence agency, and -- having in mind the present experiences with similar Izetbegovic services -- also a repressive body of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA].
"All this makes us conclude that complete control of Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens in the territories under Bosnia-Herzegovina Army control, which is carried out on the principles of the KOS and the SDA of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia -- perhaps justified in wartime -- is going on during peacetime. The only difference lies in the form and the name behind which the people in charge of the 'protection' of citizens are hidden. It is a fact that control is now being performed by Alija Izetbegovic's faithful supporters and his followers, which leads to the conclusion that the SDA has started a fierce fight against everybody. They are interested neither in Dayton nor in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina nor its citizens; it is a mere fight for power, for the maintenance of their regime."
The initial leadership of AID confirmed the Croatian analysis and apprehensions. The first AID Chief, Bakir Alispahic, was a faithful SDB official before the war who transformed into a "devoted executor" of Izetbegovic's own orders, as well as other "delicate tasks" for the SDA during the war. Assuming his new position, Alispahic stressed that aid's primary task would be "to protect and develop the factors for the integration of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina".
Other key officials in AID come from the ranks of the old Yugoslav secret police apparatus. Fikret Muslimovic, a veteran KOS officer with more than 20 years of service, was in charge of the security and counter-intelligence services in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army during the war before moving on to AID. Enver Mujezinovic, with a comparable 20-year service in KOS, has been responsible for the same tasks at the Interior Ministry.
They brought trusted colleagues to run intelligence for Izetbegovic. In late May 1996, Avdo Hebib, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, stressed the enduring importance of these intelligence veterans to Izetbegovic's security apparatus: "I only know that some quality changes occurred with the arrival of the new director, Kemal Ademovic, a glorious fighter for Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is a fact that a certain number of people who used to work in the intelligence service of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] worked in the Agency. Since I personally know those people, I will tell you that they left the JNA in time and placed themselves in the service of their own nation. Therefore, it is not fair to make accusations against these people for having been KOS and UDBA members."
Zagreb has no illusions about the real objectives of AID. In mid-February 1996, Croat intelligence officials in Zagreb gloated that one of aid's primary crises and headaches was the discovery that "Western intelligence services obtained the information on the infiltration of mujahedin in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army." Izetbegovic ordered a quick resolution of the problem and the prevention of future embarrassing leaks virtually at any cost. Following the French exposure of the terrorist base in Fojnica (to be discussed below), the Mujahedin issue became a major reason for a shake-up at the top of the fledgling AID.
On March 15,1996, after pressure from NATO countries over the clear affiliation of the terrorist base with AID and the continued presence of mujahedin in Bosnia-Herzegovina, acting president Ejup Ganic relieved Bakir Alispahic from his position as chief of AID and nominated Kemal Ademovic instead. This "shake-up" was not only cosmetic, but demonstrated Sarajevo's enduring commitment to Islamist terrorism. Ademovic was the commander of the Special Forces Brigade in the Ministry of Interior: a Mujahedin unit. He transferred this Brigade, along with key elements of the Handzar Division, to AID upon his nomination to Chief of AID.
At the same time, Zija Dizdarevic, a leading pro-Government commentator, blamed the US for the firing of Alispahic. Alispahic had to go, "under pressure from Washington" because of suspicions that he "was directly in charge of maintaining the Iranian connection". Dizdarevic protests, but does not deny, Western accusations that AID serves the interests of Izetbegovic's SDA in the capacity of "a partisan [secret] police that maintains particular connections with the Iranian intelligence service".
Another loyalist of Izetbegovic in Sarajevo stressed that not only was the US behind these changes, but they were completed against Sarajevo's best judgement. He stressed that the purges were "the result of the suggestions and pressures of the mighty friends from behind the scenes, primarily the United States. Bakir Alispahic has been removed from the head of AID under pressure from the United States". Furthermore, his closest associates, Nedzad Ugljen, Enver Mujezinovic, and Irfan Ljevakovic were also removed as "a part of the same package". He stressed that the purge at the top of AID was brought solely by the discovery of the terrorist training camp in mid-February, and that neither the US nor its NATO allies had had any other reason to object to aid's operations and performance.
However, a closer examination of the Sarajevo elite shows that these purges were largely cosmetic. Bakir Alispahic was appointed Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of contacts with the Muslim World, particularly Iran and other Islamist forces. For all intent and purposes, he continues to dominate foreign intelligence and Islamist-related activities. Similarly, Irfan Ljevakovic, the former SDB officer, was moved from assistant director of the AID to the position of "counselor" to the new chief of AID. Enver Mujezinovic and his protector, Fikret Muslimovic, both former KOS, lost their formal positions but were offered worthy "alternative" positions.
Moreover, the only senior AID official made to be an "example" was Munir Alibabic -- Munja -- the former head of the CSB [Security Service Center] of Sarajevo. He has long been known for what Sarajevo insiders call "conflict with Bakir Alispahic" over both individual powers and policy issues. His purge serves as "a lesson and warning to all" not on the character of AID but that the power structure and web of personal loyalties established by Alispahic has not been affected by his own removal from AID.
Indeed, the new director of AID, Kemo Ademovic, has only intensified the imposition of Islamicization. Kemo Ademovic is a former Interior Minister and the commander of their special forces. He is a close associate of Izetbegovic and has close ties with Iran. The ensuing substantive changes in AID personnel during the Spring of 1996 further consolidated the dominance of Izetbegovic's own cronies who are as close to Tehran as to Sarajevo. The total size of AID surpassed the 10,000 personnel in the Spring of 1996.
According to Croatian intelligence sources, in the Spring of 1996, AID had 1,400 well-trained operatives. In comparison, at the height of Tito's reign, his UDBA [State Security Administration] had only about 350 operatives in the same region. Moreover, AID employs some of the most experienced former UDBA. The task of these AID operatives is "to carry out assassinations of distinguished politicians and foreign citizens".
Toward this end, AID is "linked to secret army training camps, managed by Muslim fighters from Iran, who might plan attacks on US soldiers". The main instructors are VEVAK [Iranian intelligence] officers, many with practical experience in assassinating Tehran's enemies in Europe. Turkish intelligence officials identified some of aid's Iranian instructors as VEVAK officers who had been involved in "directing the killing of Iranian dissidents in Turkey". With Sarajevo's encouragement, the VEVAK instructors recruited several dozen key AID officers, trained as operatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and sent them for long-term advance training in Iran. In the meantime, Sarajevo had already organized and activated Iranian-trained assassination and terrorism squads. These AID teams are tailored after Tehran's own hit teams which had been operating quite successfully throughout Europe and the Middle East.
Another major responsibility of AID is providing shelter for the hard-core mujahedin who Sarajevo had promised to evict. AID provides these mujahedin with new identities and appropriate Bosnia-Herzegovina documents and passports. For example, the key members of the El Mujahid unit, which had been based in the Zenica suburb of Podbrezje, were recently provided with disguise, Bosnian citizenship, and living arrangements in surrounding villages: an area commonly known as "the green triangle". Some of these mujahedin were being hidden in confiscated houses in nearby Croatian villages under Bosnia-Herzegovina control so that they could ensure the loyalty of the Croat villagers to Sarajevo and ultimately Islamicize them. On average, there are 30 to 50 Mujahedin, in addition to local wives and children, in each village. One of these groups is still based in Ante Tavic's house in Podbrezje. Other mujahedin squads are concealed in the Croat-inhabited villages of Orasac and Mehuric, near Travnik. The most recent recruitment ceremonies of Bosnian mujahedin were transferred to Mehuric. In central Bosnia-Herzegovina, the mujahedin are concealed in Han Bila and a few other villages. Another cluster of villages concealing mujahedin exists around Zavidovici.
There should be no doubt that these Mujahedin-turned-Bosnian-citizens remain committed to their Islamist jihad. Many of them consider their current resettlement as an interlude between various phases of their Holy War. For example, in March 1996, a young Arab inhabitant of the green triangle was expecting more trials and tribulations for Muslim Bosnia. "Only Allah knows what will happen with Bosnia. If the Muslims in Bosnia are satisfied with this situation, and we will be with our people, Allah will certainly provide some solution. We must be aware, however, that the infidels will not give up their ultimate objective: to plant the cross in Mecca and celebrate the mass in Medina. They will not be satisfied until we accept their faith. It is to be hoped that Muslims will see that Islam is their only support and strength and will not sell out and reject their faith." The local Mujahedin community was as determined as ever before to continue the jihad until Allah's Law was established in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the meantime, these "Bosnians" are involved in a comprehensive Islamist educational program aimed to establish an Islamist way of life in the entire area.
Croatian intelligence sources stress the importance of the mere use of AID and its mujahedin to ensure the loyalty and Islamicization of regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the comprehension of Sarajevo's real objectives. "It is illusory to expect that Izetbegovic would renounce AID, which safeguards his control over the political processes in his own peoples," they stress. What AID is implementing in Bosnia-Herzegovina "simply involves a transfer of the Iranian concept of a para-state military police with whose assistance the country keeps control over its own population and ensures influence among the famous terrorist groups in Egypt (Jamma'a al-lslamiyya), Israel (Hamas), Lebanon (HizbAllah}, and so on. AID would serve this purpose in Bosnia, that is, Europe."
The Croatian sources note the similarity between the real power structure of AID and the Iranian intelligence empire. In both countries, "the masterminds of the entire service are actually in the Islamic religious community and in diplomacy". Little wonder that as Deputy Foreign Minister, Bakir Alispahic continues to exercise dominant influence over the Bosnian intelligence system. With close support from VEVAK, AID continues to pursue "the realization of the goals for which it was set up, namely, the creation of the Muslim state on the designated territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with an internal setup that would reflect the Iranian concept of the Islamic state".
However, the Croats note, under Western pressure to ensure semblance of democracy, "the realization of Izetbegovic's ideas" is being hampered by opposition from "the parties and the politicians among the Muslim peoples who champion a secular internal setup of the Turkish type". AID is Sarajevo's primary instrument to swiftly neutralize this opposition, especially as Washington expects Sarajevo to conduct free elections later this summer. The importance of aid's potential contribution to the consolidation of Izetbegovic's power was clearly demonstrated in Croatia.
The April 8, 1996, arrest by Croatian security authorities of an armed group of Bosnian Muslims on their way "to commit an act of state terrorism" should dispel any remaining doubt about Sarajevo's active involvement in terrorism. The Croat security authorities discovered a group of six Bosnian Muslims (five males and one female) which they identify as a "terrorist group sent from Bosnia" to assassinate Fikret Abdic, the former and still very popular leader of the Bihac area.
The Croat security forces arrested five of the conspirators near Senj on the Adriatic coast, 60 miles south of Rijeka only because of a traffic violation. Subsequent investigation by the Croatian security services discovered that these Bosnian Muslims work for the Bosnian police and/or intelligence service in the Bihac area. The terrorists planned to fire RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades) at Abdic's car on a busy road between the industrial port of Rijeka and the tourist resort of Opatija on the Adriatic coast.
The five arrested were the operational cadres. A sixth suspect, known to be a senior officer of AID, escaped. Croatian intelligence learned that the brains behind this operation are "within the Bihac Party of Democratic Action [SDA] who wished to physically rid themselves of Fikret Abdic, a dangerous political opponent". The operation was planned and carried out by the Bihac AID on specific instructions from Sarajevo.
Some members of the network were Bosnian citizens who had been living in Croatia for quite some time. This was not their first assassination attempt. They had already managed to get close to Abdic on about a dozen occasions but did not have an opportunity fire their weapons or activate bombs.
According to the Croat security authorities, the group had a large cache of weapons stashed in Croatia, including large amounts of explosives, grenade launchers, submachineguns, as well as anti-tank and hand grenades. The part of the weapons cache captured included two portable rocket launchers with four shells, four hand grenades, a 7.62 mm caliber machinegun with 14 rounds of ammunition, five dispersion antitank hand grenades, a kilogram of plastic explosive, and three hand grenades. The arms were hidden in the little forest called Costabella near the Preluka camp along the Rijeka-Opatija road. Others caches known to have been prepared in advance by AID support personnel are yet to be discovered. The mere existence of such a system of weapons caches suggests that AID has a larger and wider network of terrorists and operatives in Croatia.
Meanwhile, the six conspirators were indicted (one in absentia) on April 10 in Rijeka for "state terrorism" in the form of active preparations to assassinate Abdic.
Little wonder, therefore, that Croatian intelligence sources now warn about the long-term ramifications of "Muslim state terrorism" exported out of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They stress that "Islamic terrorism, which it seems is gaining strength in this region, is not only Croatia's problem". Since the Islamist guardians of the SDA's hold over power in Bosnia-Herzegovina are equally committed to the spread of Islamist jihad throughout the world, "it is now the turn of the others!" The Croatian intelligence sources leave no doubt as to their reading of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina: "The international community stigmatized only a handful of countries as themselves supporting and financing international terrorism. To Iran and Libya, Bosnia-Herzegovina should now also be added, that is, the Muslim authorities from Sarajevo, to be exact."
By now, I-FOR HQ had already been getting first-hand exposure to the Islamist terrorist threat in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On February 15, 1996, French forces of I-FOR raided and captured an Islamist terrorist training base west of Sarajevo, arresting 11 terrorists. The training facility was based in a former ski chalet about 20 miles west of Sarajevo and about six miles south of Fojnica. This chalet is part of the compound of the Handzar Division. Bosnian government sources told Reuters that "the site was an intelligence school in the process of being closed down". Those arrested included three Iranian instructors and eight Bosnian Intelligence officers: six of the Bosnians were native Bosnian Muslims but the original nationality of the other two was not clear. They were most likely Afghans or Pakistanis who received Bosnian citizenship. All eight were serving officers and intelligence operatives of the Ministry of the Interior of the State of Bosnia. I-FOR recovered their classified notes for forwarding, including addresses of the state security offices where they were employed. The three Iranians were senior terrorist trainers. Izetbegovic told reporters that he understood the three had diplomatic status.
The terrorism school contained classrooms and an extensive armory. There were pictures of Izetbegovic and Iran's late Ayatollah Khomeini on walls and desks. The arsenal contained explosives and 60 weapons: hand-guns, sniper rifles, rocket launchers and grenade launchers, as well as assault rifles and large quantities of ammunition. Most significant was the sabotage equipment recovered, including hand grenades, detonators, blasting caps and large stores of high explosives. Among the systems discovered were bombs built into children's small plastic toys, including a car, a helicopter and an ice cream cone, as well as a shampoo bottle filled with explosives and other booby-traps. One red plastic toy car filled with explosives was already fixed with a radio-triggered detonator pending imminent use.
I-FOR recovered considerable instructional material, much of it in Farsi. One of the classrooms was used for espionage training, and the equipment found there included hollowed-out toys and pens for making "drops" of secret messages and related instructional materials included students' exams. I-FOR also found detailed cardboard models of houses and clusters of buildings which were being used for active preparations for terrorist operations.
I-FOR recovered a folder entitled "the special operations project to kidnap the Serbian officer or liaison at the PTT [telecommunications] engineering building". It was a very professional target file, with more than 30 photographs and detailed sketches of the building and a lengthy, hand-written operational plan. The PTT building in Sarajevo was used as a NATO Headquarters. Only the raid on the Fojnica school prevented an attempt to carry out this operation.
The discovered Islamist terrorist training base in Fojnica is but one of many such installations operating under the protection of the Sarajevo Government. Indeed, on February 17,1996, in reaction to the French capture of the terrorist base, Izetbegovic defended his government's performance on Bosnian TV. "We have more such camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where we train people to hunt down war criminals. We will continue that activity," he declared.
Because of the high political profile of the Fojnica operation, and ensuing pressure from Washington, subsequent anti-terrorist operations by European elements of I-FOR were conducted almost clandestinely. According to Italian sources, around February 20/21, European NATO forces quietly discovered and "neutralized" another terrorist base in the general Sarajevo area. This base also employed Iranian instructors and the evidence seized pointed to active preparations for terrorist strikes against I-FOR.
Around March 21, French special forces with I-FOR raided the HQ of the 4th Corps, particularly the base of the 4th Muslim Liberation Brigade near Konjic, in search of mujahedin. The 4th Corps Command described the I-FOR raid as "barbarous". Bosnian Muslim military intelligence was most upset because the French took photographs of troops and personal details. A French officer said the results were "inconclusive" because they could not detain suspected individuals for further investigation. Especially disturbing to the French were "10 people [who] were discovered in a house" in the compound of the 4th Muslim Liberation Brigade.
The few terrorist bases raided, mostly with dismal results, were a fraction of the sprawling Islamist terrorist infrastructure in Bosnia-Herzegovina which was known to be involved in active preparation for operations once the weather improved.
Actual preparations for anti-I-FOR terrorism began the moment it became apparent that US forces might be deployed to Bosnia. Starting in the Fall of 1995, once the Dayton negotiations were showing signs of progress, the Bosnian Muslim forces began establishing a series of terrorism training facilities dedicated to confronting I-FOR. One of the first training facilities specifically for preparations of operations against I-FOR -- both sabotage or bombing of facilities and assassination of individual I-FOR soldiers -- is in Gradacac. The operatives based there include mujahedin, Bosnian Muslim operatives and even Serb "mercenaries" to be used for provocations. The terrorist unit in Gradacac became operational in late December 1995. Other mujahedin terrorist training and organizational facilities are located in the Zavidovici, Ozren, Fojnica and Banovici areas.
In early February 1996, the main Islamist terrorist headquarters in the Vatrostalno Factory building in Podbrijezje (near Zenica) was still operational. US Special Forces patrolling the area were repeatedly denied access by the Turkish forces surrounding and guarding the huge factory compound. The local Mujahedin receive supplies from the 7th Muslim Liberation Brigade in Zenica. Moreover, the "Martyrs' Detachment" camp continues to function. An indication of what is taking place in the compound came on December 18,1995, when a huge car bomb exploded in the parking lot of the Vatrostalno factory. One foreign mujahid was killed and several others were injured. The Islamists were constructing a powerful car bomb and made a technical error. In early 1996, many of the area's Islamist terrorists went underground. A Tuzla-based mujahid identified only as "Abu-Rashid" acknowledged in late March 1996 that many of his colleagues in the Zenica area "had to trim their beards to avoid harassment by NATO forces".
There are more ominous indications of Islamist preparations for terrorist operations against I-FOR. Starting December 1995, Islamists from West European states -- particularly France, the Netherlands and Germany -- were moved from such high visibility mujahedin units to clandestine basing. Significantly, these Islamist youngsters were born and grew up in Western Europe and thus can impersonate NATO/I-FOR soldiers. There are numerous reports that between 100 and 120 of these young Islamists are being prepared to impersonate I-FOR/NATO troops in terrorist operations.
In early January 1996, there was also a deployment of Islamist terrorists who can operate as US servicemen to the forward base in Tuzla. These "Americans" bolster the Iranian-run terrorist infrastructure in the Tuzla area.
Starting back in late November 1995 several senior Iranian intelligence officers and Islamist "Afghan" terrorist experts deployed undercover to the Tuzla area in order to conduct reconnaissance and preparations should the need arise to launch strikes against the US forces. The Iranians first established, and still maintain, a support base of about 25 foreign mujahedin in Celic, some 20 km east of Tuzla. Many of these Mujahedin acquired Bosnian citizenship through marriage. In late March 1996, one of these Mujahedin, identified only as "Abu-Rashid", explained that he and his friends "have been working in the field of religious guidance and are ready to resume the Holy jihad should the need arise." In early 1996, the Iranians also established a forward operational base in Lukovac, some 10 km from US main base in Tuzla. Presently, some of the terrorist facilities are concealed in the garrison of the 117th Brigade.
It is into the forward operational base that the US Islamists deployed. Among the "Americans" was Kevin Holt, a.k.a. Issa Abdullah Ali, who had participated in the HizbAllah's Beirut bombings in the early 1980s. Another American is a veteran mujahedin leader who fought in Afghanistan and Bosnia. Known only as Abu-AbdAllah, he is a Palestinian background, a deserter from the US Marines Corps, who is very close to the Hamas and Islamist International leadership. He is a veteran of Beirut in the early 1980s, a former member of AbdAllah Azzam's Islamic Brigade in Afghanistan, and a devotee of Sheikh Umar Abd-al-Rahman in 1990-92. In March 1993, Abu- AbdAllah led the first group of a dozen US Islamists organized by the Brooklyn branch of Al-Kifah to Zagreb and on to the Mikosovic barracks near Tuzla.
As of early 1996, Abu-AbdAllah shared his time between his forward base in Tuzla where, in close cooperation with Iranian Pasdaran terrorist experts, he runs an "American force" of over 20 US Islamist terrorists, and government intelligence and terrorism schools in Sarajevo where he conducts advanced terrorist training. Preparations for sophisticated and spectacular terrorist strikes against I-FOR also take place in this intelligence facility, including preparing over a hundred sets of US and European NATO uniforms.
Other active preparations for terrorism also take place in Sarajevo itself. Starting November and December 1995, the Islamist terrorists began several cycles of active preparations in Sarajevo itself. A few delegations of terrorist experts, some with Iranian diplomatic papers, have surveyed the area in order to inspect and assess preparations for specific operations. Moreover, the flow of weapons, ammunition, explosives, and expert Islamist terrorists has continued at least until late February 1996.
Other preparations for terrorist strikes continue. In early March 1996, the Islamist hard-core in the Zenica area seemed unaffected by the search for terrorists and even more determined to strike at NATO. An Algerian commander of a local mujahedin terrorist unit, identified only as Abu-Salim, stressed the Islamist commitment to the Islamist jihad: "We did not come here just to leave as soon as the Americans arrive. We are living in the time when Islam will prevail. Bosnia is a Muslim country and we will defend it." Another mujahid in Zenica stressed that they are in Bosnia-Herzegovina because "Islamic fighters should defend every Muslim country, regardless of where it is". He confirmed that he and some of his comrades had been affiliated with the Iranian 7th Revolutionary Guards Brigade until recently.
Another terrorist base became operational in mid-April in the village of Svracici, 10 km from Kalesija. The core of this terrorist force are mujahedin from Saudi Arabia that belong to the "Gazija" company. The terrorists live in a religious facility, "Menzet", and are directly subordinated to Efendi Nusret Imamovic from Kalesija. He had organized their arrival in this area. Members of the reconnaissance-sabotage battalion in Vukovije are deployed in Svracici along with the Saudi Islamists. The battalion provides this Islamist terrorist force with support, supplies, and personnel. This Islamist terrorist deployment is of strategic importance because highly-trained Special Forces -- as the personnel of the "Gazija" company and the troops of the Vukovije reconnaissance-sabotage battalion are -- can easily reach the Drina and the main bridge in the Zvornik area from the base in the Kalesija area. Such operations can disrupt the main lines of communications between Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs.
These facilities are but a few examples of a rapidly expanding terrorist infrastructure. Starting in mid-March 1996, Bosnian-Serb and Yugoslav intelligence have reported that the Islamist terrorist infrastructure included facilities in Teslic, Petrovo, Modrica, Bosanski Samac, Bosanski Brod, and Derventa. Later that month. Western intelligence sources confirmed that I-FOR knew about "up to 10 small, secret training camps, most of them in central or north-central Bosnia". Of these, five to seven were clandestine military camps in central Bosnia where mujahedin were training and preparing terrorists for impending operations against I-FOR. These camps belong to the Bosnian administration's intelligence arm -- AID -- but are run by Iranian VEVAK officers. The Iranians are also running comprehensive clandestine programs, including covert operations on their own, to monitor I-FOR and prepare for strikes against them. The mujahedin involved in these activities are provided with Bosnian papers, some of military service and others of a "civil service" nature. At the same time, Croat security authorities pointed to the transformation of the Zenica area into an Islamist terrorist haven, an operational center run by VEVAK under the protection of the 7th Muslim Brigade.
By mid-February 1996, growing numbers of former mujahedin, especially members of elite units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, were becoming "humanitarian workers" in organizations accredited to international bodies and supported by the Sarajevo administration. A survey by Croatian intelligence of recent incidents raised the alarm about the prevalence of Islamist terrorist activities under the guise of humanitarian activities.
In early February 1996, Croatian police in Travnik arrested Ahmad Z. S. Zuhairi, a Saudi citizen, traveling from Bihac to Sarajevo in a Nissan belonging to the Saudi Committee, an humanitarian organization. They discovered in the car three AK-47s, grenades and a dagger. The only documents Zuhairi had on him were a Saudi passport and a Bosnian Army permit "to move out of unit's center" issued by VJ 5680 in Travnik and stamped by the "Reconnaissance-Saboteur Battalion of the 7th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina", a special forces unit. the passport was full of stamps indicating extensive traveling to Pakistan, Jordan, Syria, Slovenia, Italy and Croatia, but included no record of formal entry to, or exit from, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although married and the father of five in Saudi Arabia, Zuhairi told the Croatian police he was expecting his Bosnian documents soon, having married a Bosnian Muslim woman as well, who was already pregnant. Zuhairi also admitted that he was a member of the Saudi "Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula", an Islamist organization affiliated with Khartoum and Tehran.
On February 10, four mujahedin were arrested by the HVO on the Kresevo-Kiseljak road while driving in a UN Nissan suspected as stolen. They were Ahmad bin-Muhammad al-Nusairat (from Jordan, and an UNPROFOR employee), Hermas Sami (from Konjic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a Jordanian father, Bosnian Muslim mother, and with a Jordanian passport), Al-Rayis Hussayn bin Ramadan Ramadan (Gaza-born, serving in a medical unit of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army), and Muhammad bin-Ali al-Humani (from Jordan, a former employee of UNPROFOR in Sarajevo; now residing there). The vehicle was taken from UN/I-FOR without permit and was to be used to smuggle people into Sarajevo.
On February 16, an I-FOR checkpoint near Sarajevo arrested a Saudi mujahid in a UN vehicle full with weapons and explosives. He was on a supply run for the Islamist networks in the greater Sarajevo area.
On February 17, Croatian police arrested nine Iranians in Jajce (Croat-held western Bosnia). Seven of them were traveling by bus from Tesanj to Bihac and the other two in a four-wheel drive behind the bus. They arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina 15 days beforehand, and had documents of students and professors. No weapons were found in the vehicles. The Iranians carried a lot of propaganda material and "state-of-the-art technical equipment which is generally used for intelligence purposes". They were found to be part of a Vitez area Islamist agitation group sent to Bosnia to enhance the Islamicization campaign. This "cultural" activity includes counter-intelligence activities against anti-Islamic elements. When stopped, the Iranian group was on its way to attend the celebration of the anniversary of Khomeini's Revolution organized in Bihac by Gen. Atif Dudakovic, the Commander of the 5th Corps. Because they were unarmed, the Iranians were released to I-FOR, who transferred them to the Iranian Embassy in Sarajevo.
The exposure of these and similar "humanitarian workers" has not deterred Sarajevo and Tehran. Indeed, the Islamist "humanitarian" networks continue to expand throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. By mid-March 1996, the Iranians were maintaining "humanitarian" offices in Mostar, Zenica, Bihac, Visoko, and Sarajevo. In early June 1996, Iran opened a huge new medical center in Bihac with Iranian staff. A Tuzla office was recently closed due to "communications problems". Instead, in March 1996, a veteran mujahid known as "Abu-Sulayman" (one of the first mujahedin to arrive in Bosnia back in the Fall of 1992) is running an Islamist "relief organization" in Tuzla affiliated with the local Dar al-Fatwa. "Abu-Sulayman's" center provides humanitarian and religious assistance not only to the local community, but also to the several "foreign fighters" still serving in the "seven brigades known as the 'Islamic Brigades'" of the Bosnian Army. According to "Abu-Sulayman", these brigades are deployed in Tuzla, Zenica, Sarajevo, Konjic, and Bihac.
The revitalization of the "humanitarian" network is but one aspect in the transformation of the Iranian activities and operations throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina in the aftermath of the Dayton-Paris Accords.
Between 1992 and late 1995, the IRGC, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps {Pasdaran), maintained an organized unit-- the 2,000 Pasdaran strong 7th Revolutionary Guards Brigade -- in Bosnia-Herzegovina within the Bosnian Muslim Armed Forces. With its main base in Zenica, the Iranian Brigade shifted between training cadres and participated in the most dangerous operations in the front line. The 7th Revolutionary Guards Brigade was officially disbanded in December 1995 during Velayati's visit to Sarajevo.
In addition, Iran has maintained a high-quality training unit of some 400 officers from Pasdaran Intelligence and VEVAK to work with the fledgling Bosnian Muslim intelligence forces and related terrorist units. The long-term presence and roles of this Iranian contingent was codified in the Iranian-Bosnian agreement of November 15, 1994. The agreement was reached in the wake of a secret visit to Tehran by Bakir Izetbegovic, the President's son, in which Iran and Bosnia-Herzegovina agreed on a long-term program to strengthen their overall security cooperation: ranging from a marked increased in the Iranian military assistance to the clandestine stationing of both HizbAllah and VEVAK cadres in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In the aftermath of the signing of the Dayton-Paris Accords, the key cadres of the Pasdaran's unit -- at the very least some 150 to 200 IRGC NCOs and officers, but, according to other assessments, as many as between 750 and 1,000 -- have been subsequently integrated into the training and elite segments of the Bosnian Army. Meanwhile, the Iranian command echelon and the key intelligence advisors were attached to the Military Attaché's office in the Iranian Embassy in Sarajevo. In addition, several dozen Iranian intelligence experts, primarily top VEVAK and Pasdaran Intelligence instructors, have been reassigned to AID.
Moreover, some of the experienced Iranian trainers -- many of whom spent several years in Bosnia-Herzegovina and learned the language and became acquainted with the people -- returned to Iran and were assigned to training camps preparing Bosnian cadres sent to Iran. A few hundred Bosnian Muslim troops were sent to Iran in early 1996 for special forces and terrorism instruction, as well as Islamist indoctrination training. Starting in early March 1996, the numbers of Bosnians officials -- both military and AID personnel sent to Iran -- began to grow steadily. Most Bosnians were being sent for various security (intelligence and terrorism) and military training in Iran. This dispatch constitutes a significant increase over the routine training of Bosnians in Iran during the early 1990s.
Most significant, however, was the transformation of Tehran's attitude toward its presence in Bosnia. By March 1996, Tehran was concentrating on a long-term and clandestine presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, further consolidating its infrastructure while waiting for I-FOR to leave, either on its own or through a clash, before the full extent of the Iranian influence emerged. Sarajevo supports fully the growing Iranian presence despite the adverse impact of NATO accusations of terrorists' presence. On March 18, Sarajevo formally complained that the Izetbegovic administration "is being blackmailed with demands for suspension of all relations with the friendly Islamic Republic of Iran". Soon afterwards, the Sarajevo media began highlighting the Iranian denials of running terrorist training camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while stressing important and enduring humanitarian and civilian relations.
In late March 1996, NATO confirmed that Iran not only continued to train the Bosnian Army, but that the Iranian cadres constitute a terrorist threat to the I-FOR forces. "A threat does remain from foreign forces in Bosnia," said Capt. Mark van Dyke (USN), NATO's chief spokesman. "It's a threat from terrorist activity, and it's also a violation of the Dayton peace agreement." Under pressure, Izetbegovic admitted that about 50 to 60 Iranians had remained in Bosnia-Herzegovina, stressing however that all of them were discharged soldiers married to Bosnian women.
The recent activation of an international Islamist network of expert terrorists based in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- and a high-quality back-up headquarters in Sofia, Bulgaria -- was and is most significant.
The final touches of this network were put in place in early March 1996 with the arrival of 40 Egyptian Islamist expert terrorists in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were immediately despatched to bolster mujahedin networks in Zenica, Konjic (known as "Al-Muderis"), and Kakanj ("Black Swans") in central Bosnia, and Tesanj ("Al- Mujak") in northern Bosnia. Other terrorist training facilities used by these Islamists are in Mehuric (village) near Busovaca in central Bosnia, Pazaric (village) near Sarajevo, and Bistricak (village) north of Zenica.
Most significant is the concurrent activation of the senior HQ in Sofia. Since early-1992, the extent of the Islamists' commitment to a Jihad against the West has been tested in the Balkans. The escalation in Islamist terrorism has been a direct outcome of the marked expansion in the commitment of international Islamist organizations to the struggle of Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A forward center of support and coordination was already established by the Fall of 1991 in Bulgaria, where Sudan's Hassan al-Turabi enjoys "special relations" with Dr Ibrahim Natali, a member of the Bulgarian Parliament and a member of the Bulgarian Freedoms and Rights Party.
The Center in Sofia, Bulgaria, has been gradually upgraded since late Summer of 1994, when it was put under the responsibility of Ayman Zawahiri. He first visited Sofia in September 1994 and stayed there under the alias Muhammad Hassan Ali. The frequency of visits increased during 1995, reflecting the growing importance of the Balkan Front to the Islamist International. In the Summer of 1995, in the aftermath of the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak under his command, Zawahiri began shifting some of his HQ from Geneva to Sofia. The mere nomination of Zawahiri as the regional Islamist commander is of great importance. Zawahiri is a highly experienced terrorist commander, an Egyptian devotee of Sheikh Umar Abd-al-Rahman, who is fully trusted by both Tehran and Turabi in person. In the Fall of 1993, Zawahiri was the Islamist on-site commander in Mogadishu and personally oversaw the lethal clashes with the US troops. During 1994-95, the main responsibility of his Geneva HQ was preparing for, and, should Tehran so order, conducting spectacular terrorist operations inside the US.
In late 1995, once it became clear that I-FOR was to be deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zawahiri moved his HQ to a Sofia suburb, still using the name Muhammad Hassan Ali. Soon afterwards, he activated a rear senior HQ for anti-West/anti-US operations in the Balkans. Moreover, once the Croat venue became unreliable -- because of the arrest of Fuad Tal'at Qassim and the assassination of other Islamists in Croatia and Croat controlled parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina -- Bulgaria became the key HQ for deniable operations (in order not to embarrass Sarajevo). In mid-November 1995, some 20 to 25 senior Islamist commanders met in Sofia to discuss the new wave of operations in the aftermath of Fuad Tal'at Qassim's arrest in Zagreb (back in August 1995) and the then inevitable deployment of I-FOR to Bosnia-Herzegovina. On November 20, 1995, the Islamists "announced" the emergence of their center in Bulgaria, sending a gunman to open fire on the Egyptian Embassy: a "reminder" for the Egyptian Government not to look too closely at the Islamists' activities in Sofia.
In early 1996, confident in his ability to maintain secure and solid lines of communications to the Islamist terrorist forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zawahiri ordered the deployment of key experts capable of planning, overseeing and leading major spectacular terrorist strikes against such objectives as US/I-FOR facilities. The arrival of 40 Egyptian terrorists was the first major forward deployment for this purpose. Additional Iranian and other Islamist expert terrorists continued to arrive in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1996.
In early May 1996, these Islamist forces were ready for action. Soon afterwards, they issued a new and credible threat of spectacular and highly lethal terrorist strikes against the US components of I-FOR. The warning specified suicide bombing as the likely form of attack.
The warning was issued by an Egyptian Islamist using the nom de guerre "Salim al-Kurshani". "Al-Kurshani" is a veteran of the mujahedin units who married a Bosnian woman and who now legally lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Al-Kurshani introduces himself as the commander of a jihadist organization called the "Islamic Group [al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah} -- Military Branch in Bosnia". However, he issued the warning in the name of a new group called the Bosnian Islamic Jihad.
Al-Kurshani stressed the centrality of martyrdom to his forces. "We are looking for ways to die so we can meet Allah in Heaven with dignity," he explained. He stressed his strikes will be most effective because I-FOR has no defense against martyrdom operations. "I have a message for NATO forces in Bosnia. None of you will sleep peacefully. We shall send suicide bombers to punish the United States and I-FOR for their occupation of an Islamic land."
Al-Kurshani has a special warning to the US element of I-FOR:
"Wherever they have interests, we shall be their shadow. There are no security measures against those willing to die. We are fundamentalists. We are terrorists and we shall terrorize them." He added that "Croatia was on top of the hit list" second only to the US.
Significantly, the main strike force of the Bosnian Islamic Jihad is comprised of young Bosnian Islamists -- blond Caucasians in their early 20s --who can easily pass as Europeans or Americans. "These are our Bosnian brothers," al-Kurshani explained, introducing some of them. "Very soon the world will hear their message. They are trained for kidnaping, assassination, using explosives and carrying out suicide missions without hesitation." Their Bosnian Islamic Jihad is a worthy companion to the examples set by "their brothers" in the Middle East: the HizbAllah and Islamic Jihad.
The threat issued by al-Kurshani should be taken most seriously. In his statement, al-Kurshani clarified his own, and his organization's, affiliation with the Egyptian Islamist terrorist elite under the Armed Islamist Movement. This movement now has a forward headquarters in Sofia, Bulgaria, under the command of Ayman al-Zawahiri. He is personally committed to avenging the arrest and extradition to Egypt of his deputy, Fuad Tal'at Qassim, by the Croatian government. The Islamist terrorist forces under Zawahiri's command were activated in early April 1996.
Therefore, the warning issued by Salim al-Kurshani in early May 1996 should be considered an on-site declaration by the Islamist terrorist forces that in the aftermath of lengthy and highly professional training and preparations, they are now ready and about to strike.
Numerous intelligence services active in the former Yugoslavia, starting in mid-February 1996, began raising the alarm about ongoing preparations for Islamist terrorist strikes against I-FOR, and particularly US personnel.
On February 15/16,1996, Croatian intelligence in Vitez, Bosnia-Herzegovina, warned that "members of mujahedin units, and that many of them have stayed in Bosnia, [were] preparing themselves to cause serious incidents for I-FOR representatives, which they would then accuse the Croat side of. I-FOR has been informed about this." The Croats complained that the US officials to whom the warning was delivered were slow and reluctant to take action.
At the same time, a source in the Italian military intelligence with I-FOR also warned that "the official withdrawal of a number of Islamic 'military advisers' is being accompanied by the arrival of new men connected to fundamentalist terrorist groups. And this time the target of the attacks would not be the Bosnian Serb militias but, rather, NATO forces."
In late February, a report of the Greek Intelligence Service (EIP) with I-FOR warned that "Bosnian Muslims could attack Greek troops within the international Implementation Force (I-FOR) and make it look as if it had been carried out by the Serbs... Such actions aim to provoke an I-FOR intervention against the Serbs." "Muslims are the greatest threat to I-FOR," the report stated. An EIP source stressed that US intelligence officials on site agree with this assessment, but US higher-ups in NATO HQ prevent action. This is most disturbing, according to the EIP report, because of the intelligence data already available. "Both the Greek and US intelligence service have confirmed that groups of Bosnian Muslims had prepared to carry out terrorist attacks."
In early March, British intelligence had specific reports that the highest levels of government in Sarajevo had already decided that once a certain amount of weapons was delivered, the Bosnian Muslim forces would launch operations and ultimately start a war against I-FOR. In case weapons supplies from the west were not forthcoming, Sarajevo was leaning toward authorizing the use of spectacular Islamist terrorism to instigate clashes with I-FOR .
In mid-March 1996, Bosnian-Serb and Yugoslav intelligence transmitted warnings that mujahedin and Bosnian Muslim terrorists were actively preparing for operations in the general Doboj area. Final preparations for sabotage operations take place in Teslic, Petrovo, Modrica, Bosanski Samac, Bosanski Brod, and Derventa. The initial targets of attacks are I-FOR and international humanitarian facilities. The Islamists planned to launch anti-Serb operations to instigate confrontations with I-FOR, as well as to create public unrest in Bosnian Serb held areas. As discussed earlier, the 379th Motorized Brigade was formed in April 1996 in order to provide support for the growing Islamist terrorist infrastructure in the Doboj-Tesanj area.
In late March 1996, Yugoslav intelligence was expecting the beginning of Islamist terrorist operations behind Bosnian Serb lines. Belgrade acquired highly reliable information according to which "as soon as the demarcation line is cleared of mines, groups of three to four Mujahedin will penetrate deep into [Bosnian] Serb territory and begin attacks on I-FOR soldiers, particularly the Americans. They plan to plant mines on roads along which I-FOR troops are moving, and also to carry out direct attacks on their command posts."
"The terrorist groups are well equipped to survive for a long time in hostile territory. The order they have received states [specifically] that none of the terrorists must be captured alive by the enemy. In the case of possible capture, however, they are supposed to commit suicide by activating an explosive device sewn into their clothing. Those [mujahedin} who perform their task successfully can count on high financial rewards -- the reward for killing US soldiers ranging from $5,000 to $50,000 per head, depending on the victim's rank." These reports should not have surprised I-FOR. In late March, Western intelligence sources confirmed that they knew of about 10 small, secret terrorist training camps, mostly in central or north-central Bosnia. Five or seven of these camps, all in central Bosnia, are clandestine military camps used for the training and preparations of mujahedin for strikes against I-FOR. These camps belong to AID, but are run by Iranian VEVAK officers, some with Bosnian citizenship, and others with Iranian diplomatic papers accredited to the Sarajevo Embassy. In mid-April, Islamist terrorists established forward bases for operations across the Bosnian Serb lines. Most important are the facilities of the "G" force near Kalesija, in eastern Bosnia, for operations against the main supply lines from Serbia, and in Tesanj, in central Bosnia, for operations in the strategically crucial Doboj area.
Meanwhile, starting in mid-March 1996, Sarajevo's official media continued to highlight not only the seeming fallacy in the reports of a presence of foreign Mujahedin and Iranians in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but increasingly attribute such reports to anti-Muslim conspiracies instigated by the US. Ljiljan specifically ridiculed the US "fears" of the alleged presence of Kevin Holt in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
By late March, Zija Dizdarevic, a pro-Government commentator in Sarajevo, criticized the US pressure on Sarajevo to severe its links with Iran as a precondition to massive US aid. He opined that if compelled to chose between Tehran and Washington, the Izetbegovic administration will go with the former. Washington does not care a bout the welfare of a Muslim Bosnia and its objection to Sarajevo's close ties with Tehran are based on anti-Islamic policies. "All in all, to the United States, Iran is a dangerous ideological opponent that endangers its global interests and even threatens terrorist actions in the United States." In contrast, Iran has an unblemished track record of comprehensive, all-out support for Bosnia-Herzegovina during its hardest times. "During the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iran was our most persistent and reliable ally. The Iranians not only helped us with arm s, but with political action as well. They mediated in improving relations between Zagreb and Sarajevo, and in establishing indirect contacts with Belgrade." So, Dizdarevic concludes, Izetbegovic's Sarajevo must remain fastly loyal to its proven allies rather than fall victim to Washington's manipulations.
It did not take long for pro-Sarajevo observers to anticipate growing pressures to amend the I-FOR mandate into being a distinctly pro-Bosnian Muslim force. A failure by NATO to comply with Sarajevo's wishes might result in a crisis. For example, in early April, Djuro Kozar, a Slovene commentator, warned that 'T-FOR does not need much provocation to become unpleasant in implementing its mandate." The West is abusing the "Mujahedin excuse" to the point of making I-FOR's presence counter-productive, especially as the Serb military threat is waning. In view of the concurrent rise in the Bosnian Muslim military might, Kozar recommended that "Sarajevo should initiate corrections to I-FOR's mandate and should demand a decrease of its current number of arms and manpower. The status quo should not be allowed to go on for too long."
The dynamics between Sarajevo, Tehran, and the Islamist elite has, as always, continued to dominate Bosnian Muslim decisionmaking, including the overall approach to the implementation of international commitments such as the Dayton-Paris Accords. Izetbegovic's Sarajevo has left no doubt about its priorities. In the Spring of 1996, as was the case in the Fall of 1995 at the height of the diplomatic process leading to Dayton, Sarajevo clearly expressed the centrality of its relations with Tehran. Tehran has once again demonstrated its willingness to undertake major steps in order to bolster its Islamist allies in Sarajevo. Sarajevo has, since early March 1996, increasingly demonstrated its tilt toward Iran and the Muslim World despite growing US and European pressure. Although Bosnia-Herzegovina was reluctant to confront the US, given its massive all-out support, there emerged a clear statement of polity in Sarajevo: Izetbegovic's Bosnia-Herzegovina is unwilling to, and incapable of, breaking its close relations with Iran and the Islamists. On the contrary, Sarajevo has since increasingly stressed its commitment to further improving and expanding these relations.
This political process began in a demonstrative act. In early March, Bosnian Prime Minister Dr Hasan Muratovic traveled to Tehran at the head of a high-level delegation. Arriving in Tehran, Muratovic stressed that it was not by accident that his first official foreign visit as Prime Minister was to Iran. He stated that Bosnia-Herzegovina "will never disturb its ties with Iran" despite the mounting "certain foreign pressures" on Sarajevo to disrupt these relations. Muratovic highlighted Iran's crucial support for Bosnia "all along the decisive stages of the war" when the West was watching Muslims die.
Speaking to Iranian media, Muratovic elaborated on these themes, emphasizing the growth potential of the bilateral relations. "Relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Islamic Republic of Iran should be revamped on the basis of new conditions that have emerged and should conform to the peace situation in the country."
He also emphasized the importance of the Iranian support to the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina. "The Islamic Republic is a friendly country that has done a lot to help our nation survive." Muratovic expressed little hope that the implementation of the Dayton-Paris Accords will resolve the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He defined the Accords as "an unjust plan but better than war" that serves to cease hostilities. However, it will take a strong international effort "in a coordinated manner" to ensure that "durable peace might be achieved."
Officially, the objective of Muratovic's visit to Tehran was "further expanding bilateral ties and also using Iran's experience in post-war reconstruction projects." Indeed, the overt part of the visit stressed humanitarian and economic issues and the unique role Iran had played in saving Islamic Bosnia at its hour of need. Muratovic said in Tehran that the role of Iran's humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina in different sensitive stages of war in his country "have proved to be vital and decisive". In all his public statements, Muratovic referred to the effective assistance of Iran during the war. He repeatedly stated that "when no other countries were willing to help Bosnia, the Islamic Republic of Iran granted its invaluable assistance to Bosnia".
However, there was a more important clandestine aspect to the visit: coordinating the next phase in the strategic cooperation in view of the presence of I-FOR and the growing pressure from the US and the West on Sarajevo to break relations with Tehran. There was no doubt that the Bosnian-Iranian alliance would only grow stronger. Muratovic was in Tehran to discuss the ways to achieve it at the least possible price for Sarajevo. Significantly, Tehran stresses that the most important and substantive meetings of Hasan Muratovic in Tehran were with Fist Vice-President Hasan Habibi at the Sa'dabad Palace in Tehran. Habibi is responsible for Iran's strategic designs and polity, from the consolidation of the Islamic bloc and Trans-Asian Axis, to the support of various Islamist terrorist organizations and subversive groups.
The clandestine, and most important, part of Muratovic's visit to Tehran was devoted to formulating and coordinating joint activities for the anticipated resumption of violence in Bosnia, from Islamist terrorism against I-FOR to general fighting against both Serbs and Croats. Sarajevo was assured of all-out Iranian-led Islamist support in the forthcoming crisis. Mohammad Javad Asayesh Zarchi, the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Zagreb, alluded to this agreement discussing the emerging trends in Iranian-Bosnian relations. Tehran was most worried about the lingering ramifications of the Dayton-process. "The Bosniaks are the real losers. They have lost more than the others." Consequently, Ambassador Zarchi warned, not only can the present situation go on no longer, but a backlash eruption is most likely. "I hope it will not cause a new war, but wars break out in Europe much more frequently than elsewhere in the world," Zarchi reflected.
Iranian analysis of Muratovic's visit emphasized the political importance of the visit and the long term potential of the bilateral relation despite current adverse circumstances. "The fact that the first foreign visit by Muratovic soon after he assumed office was to the Islamic Republic of Iran, indicates Tehran's strategic importance in bilateral and multilateral relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina." The objective of Muratovic's visit, Tehran explained, was "to strengthen bilateral relations" and to discuss with Iranian officials the "ways and means of cooperation for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina."
The Iranian Government now has no doubt that Sarajevo will resist all pressures from US/NATO/I-FOR to harm its close relations with Tehran. A confident Tehran reminded that it was "no secret for any of the [NATO/I-FOR] countries how the Islamic Republic of Iran provided unstinting assistance to Sarajevo in the most difficult circumstances which boosted the resistance of the legitimate Bosnian government against the Serb dissidents.... Tehran was even accused of violating the arms embargo which -- regardless of the veracity or otherwise of the charge -- indicates that the Islamic Republic of Iran did everything it could to save the lives of Bosnian Muslims." Sarajevo owes a lot to Tehran and is fully aware of this historic debt.
Tehran has no doubt that Sarajevo is willing to repay. "Now that the war has ended in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian nation has not forgotten its true friends. All the officials of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina admit to the decisive role of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the historic resistance of this country against the Serb aggressors and they will never succumb to the pressure of some foreign countries and turn their backs on their friends." Tehran considered Muratovic's visit to Iran to be proof that Sarajevo was determined to exercise "its own independent will as to its future. Despite the presence of 60,000 NATO soldiers on Bosnian soil and the strategic-political pressure they exercise on Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to "consider itself part of the vast corpus of the Islamic World" and not a puppet of the US. Indeed, "the Bosnian government is [so] eager to benefit from the assistance and experiences of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the country's reconstruction," as to risk the adverse ramifications of Muratovic's visit to its relations with the US and the West.
Sarajevo's own analysis of, and commentary on, Muratovic's visit to Iran was in agreement with Tehran's reading. Sarajevo has no doubt that the Muratovic visit to Iran was like "a jab in the eye of the West". One Bosnian commentator rejoiced: "The hair on the heads of senior US State Department officials stood on end at the sight of the picture of Muratovic's cordial meeting with Iranian President [Hashemi-] Rafsanjani." Sarajevo had known from the very beginning that the visit would have an adverse impact on its relations with the US-led West. However, the West, and especially the US, had already failed Bosnia-Herzegovina at its hour of need. Even after Sarajevo had acquiesced to the negative Dayton-Paris Accords, neither financial aid nor military support had been arriving. Instead, Sarajevo has been experiencing only pressure from the US for more compromises in order to keep the Dayton-Paris process alive when it was clear that it had no chance. In a sharp contrast, Sarajevo stresses, Iran and the Muslim world have unfailingly demonstrated genuine commitment and support to the Bosnian Muslim cause.
Nevertheless, Sarajevo is fully aware of the gravity of the crisis it faces and the hard choices to be made. Sarajevo stressed that the US was the root of the problem. "Recently, there has been great pressure from Washington on Bosnia to reduce its links with Iran. There are threats, too; for instance, that otherwise the Federation Army will be denied help. Can Bosnia give up Iran?" Sarajevo's answer is a resounding "No".
In the first half of March 1996, Sarajevo examined very closely the conflict of interests between the US and Iran, and its implications for Bosnia-Herzegovina. From the very beginning, there was no question about Sarajevo's debt to Tehran. Sarajevo readily acknowledged that "out of the Islamic countries the worst US enemy, Iran, supported Bosnia the most. Bosnia came into a situation in which it very much depended on friends who cannot stand one another." In March, Bosnian Muslim officials realized that in view of the overall course of US-Iranian relations, their co-existence in Bosnia cannot last for long. In other words, either the US/West or Iran/Islam has to leave the Balkans.
Sarajevo still stresses that the fact that Washington has already decided that Iran should go is far from being a foregone conclusion, definitely not in Sarajevo. Bosnian Muslim officials described their interpretation of the US position in Bosnia-Herzegovina: "The United States is the measure for everything; Iran is a synonym for Islamic fanaticism and international terrorism. The United States is afraid that a greater influence by Tehran in Bosnia could be a springboard for greater Iranian influence among the growing number of European Muslims. The United States is fighting against that problem, forgetting Bosnian counter-arguments." Given these circumstances, the Bosnian Muslim officials conclude, Sarajevo need not pay the price for the US fears and self-interests.
On closer examination, Sarajevo has become increasingly critical of the extent and importance of the US influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Without any consideration to Sarajevo's own desires, the US's "interests are 'subtly' imposed in the region". Off the record, Bosnian Muslim officials were extremely critical of the US accusations concerning Iranian "instructors" and mujahedin remaining in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They stressed that these "unfounded allegations" were but flimsy excuses for Washington to impose "the global American interest, which aspires to the complete negation of any influence by Iran in this region. Th is interest could be seen as a part of the State Department efforts to combat terrorism in the Middle East, for which the United States always accuses the Iranian authorities." In a rare interview, Alispahic dismissed US concerns of Iranian presence and influence as "very silly". Sarajevo should not, and will not, be part of these anti-Islamic designs of Washington, the Bosnian Muslim officials emphasized.
In contrast, official Sarajevo could only hail the closeness of, and benefits from, its relations with Tehran. Bosnia-Herzegovina expressed great satisfaction with the ongoing bilateral relations with Iran, including the flow of economic aid and cooperation. Sarajevo is committed to further development and expansion of these relations, as expressed in the early March visit to Tehran by Prime Minister Muratovic.
By mid-March 1996 the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was deteriorating from both the political and strategic points of view. Grim assessments by US intelligence and area experts were coming out as leaks to The New York Times. The mere publication of these assessments convinced the leadership in Sarajevo that these leaks reflected the real opinion of the Clinton White House, and that the Bosnian Muslims were on their own.
What concerned Sarajevo most was that the US intelligence assessment was based on highly accurate information and could not be faulted for biases. In late March 1996, the Pentagon's intelligence assessment warned that Bosnia-Herzegovina was fragmenting and was likely to return to fighting the moment I-FOR withdrew, unless massive economic and political aid was to pour in. The Pentagon warned that only enormous international aid programs at huge cost and achieving such miracles as the swift rebuilding of the Bosnian economy and revitalizing the political institutions, might forstall and perhaps even reverse the country's rapid slide into fragmentation and resumption of fratricidal fighting.
The US experts considered the prospects for a viable unified Bosnia-Herzegovina as "dim" unless it remained under the guns of I-FOR or a comparable follow-up US-dominated "international" force. The key to the situation was the US experts' recognition that the strategic objectives of the three groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina "have not fundamentally changed" since the very beginning of the war. In the absence of any tangible outcome from Dayton-Paris, the leaderships and population alike would return to the battlefield invigorated, determined to realize their respective manifest destinies by force of arms. The US intelligence experts concluded that it was likely that the myriad of "fragile alliances" imposed by the peace accord would soon collapse. Significantly, the US intelligence analysts were most worried about the prospects of a violent eruption between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, the members of the "federation." They noted that the Bosnian Croats were adamant on "de facto integration" with Croatia, and were ready to fight Sarajevo to attain this goal.
This grim assessment was shared by the Bosnian Muslim elite in Sarajevo. Former Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic was the only one brave enough to discuss this subject openly.
In mid-March 1996, Silajdzic warned the Arab world that Bosnia was in danger. He claimed that even the Washington-imposed "federation", let alone the Bosnia-Herzegovina mandated by Dayton, was not being implemented. "In fact, so far, the Washington agreement has not seen the light. In Bosnia we have two blocs, one Croatian defended by the Croatian militias, and the other Muslim, protected by the Bosnian Army. If the situation remains thus, it will mean the beginning of the end for Bosnia and the Islamic presence here." For Silajdzic, Croatia is the most significant threat to Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He criticized harshly Izetbegovic and his close aides for making too many concessions to the Croatians who "are doing what they like in Bosnia, as if it was the Croats who fought for us and defended us, when in fact they are the ones who destroyed our country, killed our people, and left not a single mosque standing in their areas. We now refer to these people as political partners." Silajdzic stated repeatedly that "the Dayton agreement is collapsing" and that "Bosnia-Herzegovina is being partitioned".
Little wonder, therefore, that by late March, Sarajevo was openly expressing its exasperation with Washington's attitude toward Bosnian-US relations. Despite Sarajevo's repeated and consistent effort to reach an understanding with Washington, the US kept coming up with new demands. "There are certainly limits up to which cooperativeness can be discussed in a positive sense, but there is a level, however, at which cooperativeness turns into defeatism," explained a Sarajevo insider. The firing of Alispahic, and particularly the stated reason for it -- Bosnia's close relations with Tehran -- exceed Sarajevo's ability to cooperate with the US.
Moreover, the Sarajevo insider explains, Bosnia-Herzegovina has nothing to show for its acquiescence to "cooperation" on Washington's terms. As far as Washington is concerned, "when the implementation of the peace agreement is seriously endangered, it seems that the implementation process too should be healed by yielding, or more precisely by the defeatism of the Bosnian leadership". Instead of generating all out Western assistance for the recapturing of the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo is increasingly pressured to reconcile with Croats and Serbs, thus losing the Islamic character of the state. Washington's demands for the "freezing of all serious contacts with Iran" is only one component in "the list of major concessions" demanded from Sarajevo in the name of Dayton. And the Sarajevo insider sees only grim prospects ahead. Acquiescing to Washington's latest demand "would probably not round it off, however, since if foreign pressure continuously bears fruit, as is the case with Sarajevo, it can only become bigger. Usually, either culprits or losers of a war are forced to make concessions and bow their heads after the war. Bosnia thinks that it has neither caused nor lost the war. The United States and the Europeans obviously do not share that opinion, at least regarding one of these two aspects."
By now, late March 1996, Sarajevo's decision was becoming clear even if its public posture remained vague. Yugoslav and Bosnian Serb intelligence analysis of Sarajevo's options in dealing with the US and Iran stressed that Sarajevo has to make a choice: go either with the US or Iran. And while Sarajevo's uppermost leadership was reluctant to reach a formal and final decision, Sarajevo's actions were already speaking volumes. Rhetoric notwithstanding, the intelligence analysts concluded, Sarajevo has been "increasingly strengthening its ties with Iran, both secretly and publicly, as well as with other militant Islamic countries. These ties actually mean the creation of an Islamic fundamentalist state or center of Islamic terrorism in the south of Europe."
Indeed, Sarajevo was also increasingly highlighting that the hour of reckoning has arrived. Bosnian officials have sharpened their criticism of the US demands from Sarajevo. Special attention was paid to unjustified US interference in the internal affairs of Bosnia. Sarajevo complains that the US "has stamped Dzemal Merdan, the head of the Department for Military Education of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Army General Staff; Bakir Alispahic, the head of the Agency for Research and Documentation; Omer Behmen, the Ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Iran; and Hasan Cengic, the Deputy Defense Minister, as 'unsuitable Bosniaks' because of their links with Iran." There is no way that Sarajevo can purge these and many other senior officials with similar opinions from the upper most echelons of the Bosnia-Herzegovina leadership. The real issue, Sarajevo insiders concede, is not Izetbegovic's fears of the adverse ramifications of such a widespread purge, but that these individuals represent the genuine hard-core of the SDA, his own party and power-base.
In late March, the main problem facing Sarajevo was not choosing between the US and Iran -- for the latter has been chosen without any question -- but compelling Izetbegovic to make the decision final and public. Sarajevo insiders and officials began to demand that the US requirement of Sarajevo "that Bosnia should decide between the United States of America and Iran" be answered.
The insiders launched bitter criticism of Sarajevo's public policies in this regard. "Instead of making public its connections with Iran;
instead of documenting and defending them, the Bosnian government tacitly participates in stamping itself and its citizens as criminals." Sarajevo must confront head on Washington's "latest accusations" concerning the dispatch of security and military personnel "to Iran for intensive paramilitary and intelligence education. There is, again, no response from Sarajevo that would defend the dignity of its citizens who traveled to Iran during the war." The Sarajevo insiders demand that SDA officials respond immediately to these accusations because "the US criticism is aimed at their own behavior" and challenges the very basic rights of Sarajevo to choose and determine its own allies and benefactors.
It was impossible for Izetbegovic not to respond to the increasingly open challenge from the innermost circles of his own power base. The repeated secret and internal assurances given to senior officials and insiders that Sarajevo had already determined that its future lay with the Iran-led Islamic bloc were no longer sufficient. Senior officials immersed in the clandestine expansion of cooperation with Iran sought recognition and especially the cessation of their abuse by the US and the Sarajevo media reporting the latest in US-Bosnian relations.
Therefore, in late March, Izetbegovic chose to respond publicly by giving an interview to Ljiljan, his own mouthpiece. It was left for the interviewer, Dzemaludin Latic, to bring up and state the real policy of Sarajevo concerning the crisis with the US. Facing Izetbegovic, Latic stated that "after having found one or two Iranian nationals near Fojnica, the Americans have begun dictating conditions and which staff is to be taken, which infringes upon the sovereignty of our state. It is no longer a secret that they want to overthrow the Izetbegovic administration. Its possible fault because of ties with the Islamic world, and particularly with Iran, during the aggression, when no-one else wanted to give a single bullet to the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is said to be the main reason."
Izetbegovic snapped back with what appeared to be a prepared response. Phrasing his answer as a question, he addressed Latic: "Let me ask you something: Will you, or will all of us be happier if I confirm the hidden implication in your question that the United States is our enemy?" Izetbegovic then added that the US was not an enemy, and explained why he was making this statement. He implied that the presence of I-FOR on Bosnian soil was a major reason for that statement. "Iran proved itself as our genuine friend during the war, but Iran is far away, whereas our enemies are quite near, we can almost touch each other." Simply put, Sarajevo needs the US-led I-FOR to crush the Serbs and Croats before it can regain control over the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, Izetbegovic emphasized that considering the US as a friend must not come at the expense of Iran. "Speaking of allies, my full answer reads: We must have the United States and the Islamic world by our side, and to the greatest possible extent the rest of the world as well," he concluded.
As anticipated by both Izetbegovic and the Sarajevo elite, the Ljiljan interview served as the catalyst for further public clarifications of Sarajevo's policies. An early April commentary on the interview in Ljiljan relied heavily on the above sections of Izetbegovic's answers concerning Iran. The Ljiljan commentator stated explicitly what Izetbegovic could only allude to. "Analysis of this remark, as well as some of President Izetbegovic's last remarks, points to the conclusion that there has been a change in his political tactics. This change has been forced by a gloomy view of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the situation in the ruling party, and new pressures from the United States, which believes that Izetbegovic has been enjoying its indulgence for a long time." Since there was no way for Izetbegovic's Sarajevo to make a drastic change in its core policies and objectives to meet the conditions set forth by the Dayton-Paris Accords (which Izetbegovic himself signed), there was no escape from a crisis and confrontation with the US.
Tehran had no doubt about Sarajevo's real policies and commitments. In early April, Tehran completed a major analysis of the economic and political trends in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Special attention was paid to examining the Islam versus the West posturing. Tehran was satisfied with Sarajevo's progress. "Some political analysts believe that although it seems that the Sarajevo government has bowed to the pressure of the West, it emphasizes the maintenance of the religious aspect of the government." Tehran noted that "the Western countries are not satisfied about the Islamic countries giving money and capital to the Bosnian Government". Fearing the rise of Islam, "under no condition will the West allow the Islamic countries to expand their role in Bosnia via military and economic channels. Therefore the West, especially the United States, intend[s] to take control of the circulation of the investment of capital in Bosnia." However, in view of the economic difficulties throughout the West, it is impossible for the US and its allies to replace the investments from the Muslim world. Hence, Tehran concluded, the US was incapable of confronting Iran even in fields where the US is considered to have undisputed supremacy.
Iran's confidence was confirmed in the early April 1996 OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) summit in Sarajevo on the Islamic role in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the insistence of Iran, the OIC specifically declared "the Islamic countries' readiness to render military assistance to Bosnia to beef up its defense capabilities" irrespective of the constraints of the Dayton-Paris Accords.
Using the summit as an excuse, Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati made a major visit to Sarajevo, meeting Izetbegovic, Ganic and Muratovic to deal with bilateral issues. Moreover, Velayati inaugurated two additional Iranian institutions in Sarajevo "the reconstruction headquarters and the culture house of the Islamic Republic". Both institutions are usually connected with the Iranian support for Islamicization and export of the Islamic Revolution. They serve as venues for the distribution of Iranian funds for all "causes" and "projects" as well as for the presence of Tehran trained and sponsored Islamist education, agitation, and recruitment personnel. The entire Bosnian leadership showed up for the inauguration ceremonies of these two institutions commonly associated with Iranian intelligence and terrorism-sponsorship activities: their actions speaking more than words.
According to Iranian sources, Velayati's most important discussions in Sarajevo were with Bosnian Vice-President Ejup Ganic. They examined closely the emerging trends in Tehran-Sarajevo ties and were in full agreement on meeting present and emerging challenges. According to Iranian officials: "Ganic referred to Iran as the greatest supporter of the government and nation of Bosnia during the war years as well as the economic reconstruction era." Despite the growing pressure from the US, Ganic "called for further expansion of ties in political, economic and cultural fields under the present conditions in the Balkans". Velayati concurred that "the friendly ties between the two countries" must be further expanded and strengthened and promised Tehran's all-out support.
The Iranian commentary and analysis of the visit stressed that Velayati discussed "the latest developments in Bosnia and the Balkans, as well as Tehran-Sarajevo ties." Official Tehran pointed out that "Izetbegovic praised Iran's all-out assistance and support during the Bosnian war and Tehran's unstinting efforts in the international arena to restore the legitimate rights of the Bosnian people ... He asked that these efforts be continued now that Bosnia is undergoing reconstruction." In his response, Velayati stated that the relations between Iran and Bosnia are "deep and unbreakable, emphasizing that cooperation should be bolstered in all fields". Returning to Tehran, Velayati declared: "Tehran-Sarajevo ties are expanding despite the propaganda of enemies of Islam." Sarajevo and Tehran agreed that "Iran will continue its support for the government and nation of Bosnia during the reconstruction era as it did at the time of war".
Tehran is very satisfied with the outcome of Velayati's visit to Sarajevo. The close on-site examination of the moods and resolve of Sarajevo's most senior leaders and officials reaffirmed Tehran's conviction that the consolidation of an Islamic Government in Bosnia-Herzegovina was on track. Tehran has to concentrate on consolidating "Iran's growing ties with Bosnia-Herzegovina" in the face of "the hopeless efforts by [the] White House to isolate Iran".
Tehran's reassured self-confidence does not mean that Tehran is not aware of the magnitude of the crisis with the US over the future of Bosnia. The Iranian analysis of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the aftermath of the OIC summit noted the direct involvement of the White House in Bosnian-Iranian relations. "White House Spokesman Mike McCurry, claiming Iran ignores the interests of the Bosnian people and Iran's objective is to promote belligerence in Europe, called for relations between the Bosnian government and Iran to be severed." However, Tehran concluded that the position of the White House had more to do with the overall US-Iranian confrontation than with Washington's interest in the well-being of the people of Bosnia. "The roots of the statements made by the White House spokesman concerning Iran's intentions in Bosnia must be sought in America's hopeless hostility towards the Islamic Republic of Iran which has now turned into a tedious psychological war, which once in a while results in such posturing."
Tehran argued that the West was incapable of reversing the long-term ties built between Bosnia and Iran. In contrast with the US and the West, "the Iranian nation and government have always stood side by side the Bosnian nation and government". But the key to Tehran's confidence was in Velayati's impressions of the situation at the inner circles in Sarajevo: the resolve of Izetbegovic and his confidantes to establish an Islamic state in Bosnia-Herzegovina regardless of the position of the US or the West. Given the ability to make its choice without overwhelming pressure from Washington, Sarajevo would choose Tehran. "It must not be forgotten that Bosnia is a free and independent state and no power has the right to intervene in that country's internal affairs. Only the Bosnian Government and nation have the right to decide the formulation of their foreign relations, choice of friends, and identification of their foes."
Tehran moved to compel official Sarajevo to amend its public policy to the Iranian line. In mid-April 1996, Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, the Iranian Ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, gave a lengthy interview to reporter Senad Pecanin. Taherian was very optimistic about the future of Iranian-Bosnian relations. "Over the last hard years, we have considered it to be our honor to be with this people. We have been witnesses of a heavy aggression committed against this nation. We have always had very good relations with the officials of this country and with the people of this country. And we have always been welcomed warmly. There are possibilities of the realization of good relations at the highest level between the two countries. On the occasion of the visit of the Bosnia-Herzegovina prime minister to our country, one meeting was held with the president of our republic, and he confirmed once again that we were ready to stay with this people. In one word, so far, we have had very good relations, and God willing, it will be so in the future, too."
At the same time, Taherian was fully aware of the US pressure on Sarajevo to break relations with Tehran. Iran has resolved to ensure that its position in Bosnia-Herzegovina remains secure. Taherian warned that "the United States will make a mistake if it plans to make such a program" to compel Sarajevo to break its relations with Tehran. Moreover, Tehran has no doubt that Sarajevo is committed to the further strengthening of their bilateral relations. Taherian explained that "Mr. Muratovic's visit to Tehran, God willing, [already] extends the things that were started in the past into serious cooperation."
Tehran was now also interested in Sarajevo's role and participation in the spread of the Islamist trend -- that is, sponsorship of Islamist terrorism and subversion -- throughout the world, and especially Europe. The growing importance of this aspect of their cooperation, which is greatly expedited by the presence of the mujahedin infrastructure in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was raised in a late April meeting between Taherian and Izetbegovic. In the meeting, Taherian submitted a message from the Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Hashemi-Rafsanjani's letter expressed Tehran's "hope that with the cooperation of all Islamic governments, the unity among Muslims throughout the globe will be further consolidated." With Hashemi-Rafsanjani's message in mind, Taherian and Izetbegovic discussed "the latest international and regional developments", delving on their respective roles in furthering their common objectives. Izetbegovic noted the enduring US pressure and the importance of having I-FOR destroy the enemies of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In view of Sarajevo's continued reluctance to initiate an open confrontation with the US, Tehran re-examined the US posture and strategy in the Balkans. The Iranian analysis of the situation in the Balkans, and Iran's relations with Bosnia-Herzegovina, identifies a profound difference between real interests and transient political posturing. Tehran correctly identifies the sudden rise in the public profile of the question of Bosnian-Iranian relations as an expression of US elections policy, and therefore anticipates that the issue will die down. "During the past few weeks the issue of Bosnia and Iran's role in that republic has turned into a major pretext to alter political equations in America's inner politics, especially when the Republicans are pressuring the Clinton Administration for having given a green light to Iran during the Bosnian war to dispatch arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina." Tehran anticipates near-term problems because of the extent of US interference with the internal politics of Sarajevo. "Therefore, establishment of security or maintaining peace in the strife-torn areas, including Bosnia, only take[s] place in line with special interests and internal political considerations within the country and are hence unstable." Therefore, it is imperative for both Sarajevo and Tehran to prepare for the inevitable and imminent crisis which will erupt with the collapse of the Dayton-Paris Accords.
Tehran was not alone in anticipating the imminent collapse of the Dayton-Paris Accords. In late April, Silajdzic warned anew of an imminent breakup of Bosnia-Herzegovina. "Bosnia is in greater danger today than it was six months ago when the war was still going on," Haris Silajdzic believes. "Under the surface of apparent peace the country is breaking up further," he explained. "The principle of separating ethnic groups from each other is well on the way to being implemented. The outcome of such a development will be the division of Bosnia." Silajdzic considers the further rise of Islamic militancy and "fundamentalism" a grave danger to the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and noted that, fueled by the plight of the Bosniaks, Islamism was on the rise. "I am surprised that Islamic fundamentalism has not grown stronger, as a reaction against the persecution suffered by my Muslim ethnic group," he opined.
Croatian insiders, expressing the opinion of senior officials in Zagreb, acknowledged in mid-April 1996 that Zagreb had already concluded that a crisis with Sarajevo was inevitable because "Bosnian Muslim leaders hate Croats." Zagreb is convinced that both Alija Izetbegovic and Haris Silajdzic have the same strategic objective:
"They want to achieve a unitary, civic Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the Bosnian Muslims will always outvote the other two constitutional nations on matters regarding their basic rights."
The Croat insiders pointed to recent development in Sarajevo as indications of the evolution there. They noted the increase in the number of articles in the press about "Tudjman's Fascist-Nazi regime" and other direct attacks against Croats and Croatia. Sarajevo, both the official media and the insiders' rumor mill, was full of conspiracy theories about an alliance between Belgrade and Zagreb to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina once I-FOR withdrew. Sarajevo insiders' were now repeating Tehran's theme about a global conspiracy aimed at preventing the rise of a Muslim State in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and about I-FOR remaining in Bosnia-Herzegovina forever as a Christian occupying force. Taken together, the Croat insiders explain, these media themes serve "to create in the Bosnian Muslims a feeling of being threatened by every other party" and thus condition them for the resumption of conflict.
Having conducted numerous negotiations and other dealings with Izetbegovic's administration, Zagreb has no doubt that "the Bosnian Muslim leadership hates the Croats". Izetbegovic's Sarajevo, Zagreb has concluded, remains determined to achieve a Muslim-dominated unified Bosnia-Herzegovina. "When we consider all that," the Croatian insiders concluded, "it is clear that the Bosnian Muslim leadership is not ready to accept the situation created by the Dayton Agreement -- the former Bosnia-Herzegovina is no more and never will be again, the world does not want a Muslim state in the heart of Europe, and their dreams of a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina dominated by only one nation have been shattered."
Sarajevo's dread of a US-led conspiracy against a Muslim Bosnia were heightened in mid-May 1996 when yet another US intelligence document was leaked to The New York Times. This time, it was a draft of an intelligence report -- a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) -- which was then being circulated in Washington. This NIE concluded that chances were poor that a multi-ethnic, unified state called Bosnia would hold together as stipulated by the Dayton-Paris Accords. As published, the NIE was in stark contradiction with the declared position of the Clinton Administration.
Furthermore, the US intelligence analysts stated that the continued survival in power of the two Bosnian Serb leaders -- Pres. Karadzic (who has subsequently relinquished power) and Gen. Mladic -- was not the primary reason for the growing crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The primary reason for their grim assessment was the entrenchment of ethnic self-identity and the adamant refusal of all three groups to relinquish their respective self-identity in favor of a unitary Muslim-dominated state. This was a strong grassroots commitment which was growing irrespective of documents signed by leaders or economic incentives.
Within that context, the US intelligence experts identified the Muslim-Croat "federation" as the greatest impediment to reaching stability. The intelligence experts now conclude that this US imposed "federation", originally created to channel aid to the Bosnian Muslims, "remains largely a figment of the American imagination".
Tehran's realization of the dominance of the US election year considerations on the formulation of US policy and posture in Bosnia-Herzegovina was immediately transformed into a policy initiative. Tehran had resolved in late April to widen the gap between the US and Western Europe over economic cooperation with Iran and especially access to oil and technology transfer. Tehran concluded that given growing tensions between Europe and the US over international economic issues, Europe would be adamant in its reluctance to support the implementation of Washington's policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. With Europe taking a neutral position, Tehran was confident in the Islamists' ability to "defeat" the US through the use of terrorism and infliction of casualties.
In a late April 1996 analysis of the evolving situation in Western Europe, Iranian economic experts were hopeful about the political and economic relations. They identified the core problem which Iran had with the West to be US and Israeli pressure, and observed that this was already a lost cause. "Although the United States and the Zionist regime have carried out extensive efforts in recent months to persuade Europe to break off ties and talks with Iran, and although they have made unfounded allegations against Islamic Iran in order to justify their request, ... none of the foreign ministers of the 15 member countries of the European Union wished to break off talks with Iran."
In contrast, Tehran was offering an olive branch and a myriad of economic inducements. Iran was hopeful that Western Europe would be able to overcome US pressure. "Islamic Iran considers the expansion of ties with Europe, with full respect for the interests of both sides, to be one of its foreign policy programs and it believes that Europe must regulate its relations with Tehran through the adoption of independent policies and free from foreign pressures. Good relations between Iran and Europe are, undoubtedly, to the advantage of both sides." Tehran is confident that further dialogue between the EU and Iran will be "a positive step towards removing misunderstandings, gaining the greatest possible knowledge about the other side's stances and, also, thwarting the efforts of the opponents of 'the consolidation of ties between Europe and Iran' to harm these relations."
The crucial importance of this initiative was clarified in mid-May, when Hashemi-Rafsanjani personally assumed the leadership of Iran's "charm offensive" in Europe. He acknowledged that Iran had launched an effort to court the EU to improve economic relations and prevent Europe from joining the US in taking on Iran. Hashemi-Rafsanjani stated he was "working towards improving relations with the European Union in spite of tensions raised by Middle East instability". Tehran was reassured by the further widening gap between Europe and the US. Economic polarization between Europe and the US was bound to have strategic ramifications, thus contributing to European acquiescence to the Iranian presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the increasingly Islamist character of the Izetbegovic administration. In the meantime, Tehran would be using its economic appeal to "buy" Europe's reluctance to support the US in imposing the Dayton-Paris Accords on Sarajevo.
Meanwhile, Tehran continued to consolidate its hold over the Bosnia-Herzegovina security system in anticipation of the resumption of fighting and anti-Western terrorism. In late May 1996, a defiant Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, the Iranian Ambassador to Sarajevo, stressed Tehran's commitment and resolve to increase its involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to further the cause of Islam. "We have come to train the Bosnians to defend their land. The international community wants such training to stop, so that Bosnian guns will not be directed towards a community that looked on during some of the ugliest genocide in the history of Europe, " Taherian said. "We are proud that we did our duty to help the Bosnian population in its most difficult times. The United States or any other country has no right to stop us sending arms to the Bosnian army." This statement should be considered a veiled threat to the US and its West European allies not to interfere with the Iranian activities in and out of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and particularly Iran's security-related presence.
Part II
While public and media attention in the West are preoccupied with the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, important strategic developments are taking place in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, the implementation of the non-military aspects of the Dayton-Paris Accords -- from the "hunt" for alleged war criminals to the discovery and preservation of new grave sites -- are but irrelevant sideshows to real dynamics in the region. A profound process of crucial significance to the future stability and shape of the former Yugoslavia is taking shape. The essence of this process is that the key players are preparing for the establishment of a status quo and strategic posture they can live with so that they can concentrate on post-war recovery. Significantly, all the anticipated key events in this process are planned for the days after the anticipated withdrawal of I-FOR. In other words, as far as the regional powers are concerned, the mere presence of I-FOR constitutes an impediment to their ability to reach a form of non-violent co-existence and stability.
However, the two dominant local powers -- the Serbs and the Croats -- are increasingly apprehensive that they would have to go through a regional war more horrible than the Bosnian wars before they could consolidate a tangible solution for the former Yugoslavia. The desire for a Zagreb-Belgrade solution has been prevalent in both capitals throughout the war. Presently, there is a grim realization in both capitals that only a fierce and essentially needless war would compel the US, and to a lesser extent other Western states, to permit the majority of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia to determine their own fate. As of the Fall of 1995, at the very same time world attention was focused on the historic "peacemaking" process in Dayton, the local powers embarked on an intense military build-up. Their concurrent strategic maneuvers clearly demonstrate the determination of Zagreb, and to a lesser degree Belgrade, to embark on a regional war once they are convinced that that might be the only option to compelling Washington to recognize their preferable long-term solution for the region.
Thus, in the long-term, the dominant strategic trend in the former Yugoslavia is the escalation of an arms race between Croatia and the rump Yugoslavia. This military build-up is in preparation for the regional war to determine the fate of the post-crisis Balkans. The only thing Zagreb and Belgrade agree on is the inevitably of the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina between them: the elimination of a Muslim political entity. The differences in the military build-up in the new Yugoslavia and Croatia are a reflection of the emerging national priorities of these two key players. Both are united in their commitment to co-existence in a new Balkans, having carved up Bosnia-Herzegovina between them. However, before they can address their own destinies, both Zagreb and Belgrade must first cope with the presence of a mighty international force -- I-FOR -- deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina specifically in order to bolster and consolidate the Islamic administration in Sarajevo and facilitate its hold over the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
By early 1996, the NATO-dominated I-FOR (Implementation Force) had established itself as the dominant military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as potentially a most destabilizing catalyst for a future escalation of fighting. This dynamic is the outcome of the mere presence of I-FOR, directly affected by the creeping of its missions and roles for political reasons. That the current evolution in I-FOR's roles is in variance with its intended role -- as well as the principles of, and guidelines for I-FOR's operations during the year-long stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- is quite irrelevant by now. Rhetoric about I-FOR's "real" roles and operations espoused by the Clinton Administration in the US created false expectations in Sarajevo, resulting in pressures on the forces in-country to deliver on the US promises. I-FOR's inability to deliver, for both operational and legal reasons, had thus, by mid-1966, become a source of a major contention between Sarajevo and the international force established to defend it. By the early Spring of 1996, tension was building to the point that any minor incident or provocation could easily have incited a major clash between the Bosnian Muslim forces and their I-FOR protectors.
The deployment of I-FOR began in December 1995. Mandated by the Dayton-Paris Accords for a one-year implementation of the Accords, I-FOR is a NATO-dominated international force of about 60,000 troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. More than 35,000 additional troops -- mainly naval and air assets, as well as services and support units -- are deployed in Italy, the Adriatic, Hungary and Croatia. I-FOR is controlled through a convoluted US-dominated command structure which includes elements answerable to NATO and other bilateral "arrangements" with the US, including the presence and operations of the Russian contingent. This reality has created a series of command and authority loopholes through which interested parties -- particularly the Clinton Administration -- can circumvent the mandate and intent of I-FOR.
In accordance with the Dayton-Paris Accords, I-FOR is deployed in three zones, each of which is dominated by one NATO main power that is responsible for the implementation of the Accords in its specific zone. The three zones are:
- The North Zone dominated by the US 1st Armored Division based in Tuzla.
- The South-West Zone dominated by the British 3rd Division based in Gornji Vakuf. In the Spring of 1996, the British desire to move their HQ to the better installations in Banja Luka was frowned upon by the US arguing that this would legitimate and embolden the Bosnian Serbs. * The South-East Zone dominated by the French 6th Light Armored Division based in Mostar. Sarajevo, the most contentious area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is in the French zone.
While the US element deployed from Germany, the main French, British, and other international elements were formed on the basis of the upgrading of their respective contributions to UNPROFOR and the Rapid Reaction Force organized in mid-1995.
The I-FOR ground forces element in Bosnia-Herzegovina is supported by massive NATO air power located mainly in Italy and onboard aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. Other intelligence and support missions are flown from as far away as Germany and the UK.
Another I-FOR-related UN force of 6,700 was to be deployed in Croatia to create a buffer between the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia and the Croat Armed Forces pending the implementation of a year-long hand over of power to Zagreb in compliance with a separate agreement that is a byproduct of the Dayton Accords (more on the Slavonia issue below).
For all intents and purposes, I-FOR is an occupation force dominating the key roads and strategic infrastructure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as regulating the activities of the various armed forces of the local factions. I-FOR's first mission is to oversee the withdrawal of the warring factions to the new "Peace Agreement Line" and establish a 4 km wide demilitarized separation zone between them.
This mission has already been largely accomplished without any major difficulty. The disarmament phase, which includes concentration of agreed-upon arsenals and units in specified barracks and cantonment areas, as well as the destruction of excessive heavy weapons, is still unfolding with many bumps along the road but no major crisis.
Once the separation of forces was completed, I-FOR settled into a routine of patrols and checkpoints. However, by early 1996, there was an expansion in I-FOR's activities into increasing involvement in pursuit of Serb "war criminals" as well as oversight of suspected sites of mass graves, mostly of presumed Muslim victims alleged to have been killed by the Bosnian Serbs. These additional activities and missions have directly resulted in a growing number of incidents of friction and contention between I-FOR and local armed groups. While the vast majority of these incidents have so far ended up peacefully and without resorting to the use of force, the marked rise in the number of such incidents increases the likelihood of a localized confrontation getting out of control and rapidly escalating into a wider clash before it can be contained.
Potentially most destabilizing are the rules of engagements, especially those given to the US forces. These were summed up by President Clinton: "If you are threatened with attack you may respond immediately and with decisive force." In a country awash with small arms and infantry weapons, any conflagration involves the display of arms and even pointing of weapons. Any such raising of weapons in the vicinity of I-FOR may be interpreted as a hostile intent and swiftly reacted to by an inexperienced young soldier. This option alone provides an open field for provocations, misunderstandings and uncontrolled escalation. There should be no doubt that I-FOR, with its superior firepower and mobility, would quickly emerge on top. But there remains the consequent escalatory potential for revenge and protracted clashes. Bosnia-Herzegovina is, after all, a land hardened by more than four years of extremely cruel fratricidal wars in which all sides inflicted and endured tremendous levels of casualties. The threat of massive military punishment is not as effective as it might seem from Washington DC, and the political impact of accumulating casualties in the capitals of the West is bound to be devastating to the policies of the Clinton Administration.
And the possibility of such a confrontation and casualties continues to grow. As of late April 1996, I-FOR had found itself increasingly in the middle of efforts by the Bosnian Muslims to stage mass returns, later termed "visits", into Serb-held territory in strategically crucial areas. These "spontaneous" refugee demonstrations, well organized by AID, are conducted mainly in order to incite clashes with Bosnian Serbs, or, if successful, to unilaterally reclaim property presently held by the Bosnian Serbs. It is Sarajevo's intent to have these "visitors" established in Bosnian Serb held places. There, they will be inevitably attacked by Serbs -- whether by a spontaneous street mob or in a government-sanctioned crackdown is irrelevant -- and then call on I-FOR and Bosnian Muslim forces to defend them against the Bosnian Serbs. This type of I-FOR intervention is bound to instigate wider clashes between I-FOR and the Bosnian Serbs, as well as provide Sarajevo with the "justification" to dispatch its own Bosnian Muslim forces into Bosnian Serb-held territory in order to protect the "refugees". The mere fact that all the "refugee" demonstrations in April 1996 took place in areas patrolled by the US Army, known to be disposed toward the Bosnian Muslims, is in itself alarming.
By now, there was strong and incontrovertible evidence that the deep hostility and mistrust between the warring factions were not diminished by the signing of the Dayton-Paris Accords. The few segments of the implementation of the military parts of the Accords -- the parts that all sides were interested in -- involving civilians clearly demonstrated the intensity of the hostility. Among these incidents are the scorched earth policy implemented by Croat forces withdrawing from areas in western Bosnia to be returned to the Bosnian Serbs, and the harsh and tragic self-eviction of the Bosnian Serbs from their suburbs of Sarajevo -- which were handed over to the Muslims -- simply so that they would not have to remain under Sarajevo's rule. The ongoing clashes instigated by the Bosnian Muslim "refugees", coming on top of the earlier incidents, demonstrated that despite the cessation of fighting the various communities were opposed to any meaningful reconciliation and cohabitation.
Little wonder that by March 1996 even US intelligence gradually accepted the long-held positions of European experts with I-FOR. Official Washington has been increasingly apprehensive about the prospects of Bosnia-Herzegovina. US Intelligence now expected that I-FOR's "operating environment" in Bosnia-Herzegovina "will grow more complicated" in coming months primarily because of the disinterest of all factions to reach a permanent "peace".
The Pentagon experts warned that the prospects for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina were rapidly declining. Lt.-Gen. Patrick Hughes, Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), told US Senators on July 24, 1996, that without a continued I-For presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, "the former warring factions will turn once again to violent conflict in an attempt to achieve their aims". Officially, Washington was still holding to the opinion that a massive reconstruction program channeled through Sarajevo would bring all the factions together by self-interest to benefit from the flow of reconstruction assistance. However, the skeptical and more experienced Europeans proved reluctant to provide the enormous international aid required to rebuild the Bosnian economy and political institutions. Moreover, with the Middle East donors insisting on spending their contributions only on Bosnian Muslims, and with the US denying international aid to the Bosnian Serbs as additional leverage to extradite their leaders as war criminals, the lure of foreign aid has been illusory. By March 1996, the dynamics of civil affairs virtually stalled and there was no hope in sight for repatriation of refugees or countrywide elections. Under such conditions, the peace effort, as differentiated from the temporary cessation of fighting, could very well be doomed. Hence, there is the potential for eruption sparked by any incident or provocation. Indeed, US and European intelligence experts agreed that Bosnia-Herzegovina would probably fragment after the withdrawal of I-FOR toward the end of 1996.
US intelligence now concurs with the analysis of the Europeans that a de facto coalition of Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs has emerged out of common determination to prevent, virtually at all costs, the ability of the Muslim administration in Sarajevo to assert its authority over the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Any effort by the Muslims to impose their power would most likely be resisted by force by both Croats and Serbs.
Despite widespread vilification and the indictment of their leaders for war crimes, the Serbs' Srpska Republic continues to function. It increasingly appears as a viable entity, building closer -- albeit still arms'-length -- relations with Yugoslavia and expressing resolve to survive as a Serb entity. Furthermore, the Croats' Herzeg-Bosna has already been de facto integrated into Croatia. Zagreb is the undisputed dominant power in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this, Sarajevo is completely powerless. This reality now gives hope to the Bosnian Serbs that they will ultimately be able to do the same, possibly joining the new Yugoslavia as an independent Republic. On top of this, by early 1996, the Muslim-Croat tensions had been rising so high that the viability of the "federation" was threatened. (More on this below.)
In the Spring of 1996, with the shock of the US-led NATO bombing of the Bosnian Serbs, the harsh imposition of the Dayton-Pans Accords, and the ensuing deployment of I-FOR waning, the indigenous leaderships in Bosnia-Herzegovina returned to the pursuit of the objectives for which so many of their people had killed and died. Hence, the ultimate objectives and strategic goals of the Erring factions have remained the same, Dayton-Paris Accords or not. There is no indication that any leader or constituency is willing to give up on its maximalist objectives. The "year of I-FOR" is seen more and more as an interlude -- to rest exhausted forces, amass weapons, and boost local economies a bit -- rather than a venue to try "peace".
The key military commanders in Bosnia-Herzegovina showed no interest in the premature resumption of fighting. Indeed, senior I-FOR commanders remain quite confident that the warring factions, particularly Croats and Serbs, will continue to abide by the military aspects of the Dayton-Paris Accords. They are also increasingly apprehensive that as far as the Bosnian Serbs and Croats are concerned, fighting will flare up only after the withdrawal of I -FOR. Neither government has an interest to challenge the I-FOR buffer that ensures a certain degree of stability for the time being. The plans of the Bosnian Muslim leadership are not that certain, and actually may be quite different.
I-FOR is currently scheduled to withdraw toward the end of 1996. However, Washington, despite explicit statements to the contrary by President Clinton and his top aides, now contemplates an extension of I-FOR's stay and greater involvement in civilian missions -- from re-building to policing "reconstruction" and "resettlement -- as the sole alternative to a virtually inevitable violent and spasmodic collapse of the US "peace".
In mid-March 1996, the Clinton Administration was openly warning that "the fragile Bosnian peace" would most likely collapse the moment I-FOR was withdrawn. Several civilian humanitarian agencies joined in the urging to ensure the presence of NATO troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina beyond the one year stipulated by the Dayton-Paris Accords. Nobody bothered to ask any of the local leaderships whether they would agree to such a drastic change in a document to which they are signatories.
While the Clinton Administration continues to pressure for keeping at least a reduced NATO force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the other key contributors of forces -- Britain and France -- were, in late Summer 1996 insisting on leaving when the US left. Both London and Paris were adamant about this despite pressure from Washington that they stay longer. Undeterred, the Clinton Administration is talking to the Europeans about a "follow-on force" comprised of European troops and enjoying fire, air and logistical support from nearby US forces. Despite what is being described by European officials as "relentless American pressure", the West European governments remain reluctant to buy this policy.
By late March 1996 the West Europeans were looking for even earlier dates to begin their withdrawal. Having realized the growing pressure inside Bosnia-Herzegovina and the collapse of even a semblance of desire for reconciliation, the Europeans are searching for a "dignified" schedule for an early withdrawal, which could be presented as the completion of duty. Presently, the Bosnian elections are considered a milestone worthy of expedited withdrawal. "Everything has to stay until the Bosnian elections, which have to be held by the middle or the end of September," a senior French official explained. "After that, everybody leaves if the Americans do." But as things were standing in April 1996, there was no guarantee that there would be countrywide elections because of the reaction to the Islamicization campaign waged by Izetbegovic's SDA, and the consequent building mistrust by both Croats and Serbs. This apprehension was significant because the Croats were increasingly eager to get rid of the "federation", officially the key to a future multi-ethnic Bosnia.
Undeterred, the Clinton Administration continued to press for a further increase in the enforcement of Sarajevo's power under the barrels of I-FOR. I-FOR was to achieve that by escalating the hunt for Serb "war criminals" and imposing civilian authority on Bosnian Serb-held territory through the movement of refugees. European and even US senior officers repeatedly expressed their objections to these new tasks, citing both the original mandate of I-FOR and their fear of clashes with the local and heavily armed population. Meanwhile, as these I-FOR dynamics were taking place, and attracting political and public attention in the West, a far more important military activity was occurring throughout the former Yugoslavia. Hectic military preparations for the day I-FOR would leave were taking place. The main event anticipated is when the aspirant regional powers -- Croatia and Yugoslavia -- will surge to assert their regional power posture. Fully aware of these dynamics, Sarajevo was not sitting idly by: the Islamist leadership was contemplating seizing the initiative by launching a pre-emptive strike.
The differences in the military build-up in the new Yugoslavia and Croatia are a reflection of the emerging national priorities of these two key players in the Balkans. Both are united in their commitment to co-existence in a new Balkans, with Bosnia-Herzegovina divided between them. However, there is a profound difference in their perception of the immediate future. Tudjman's Zagreb believes there is no escape from a major war before a new realignment of forces in the territory of the former Yugoslavia can be established. Milosevic's Belgrade, still hopes to be able to negotiate and bargain its way to Western recognition of the emergence of a new Serb-dominated Yugoslavia and a new Croatia dominating the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina between them. The new Yugoslavia is exhausted from the sanctions and the collapse of Serb spirit. Croatia, in sharp contrast, is rejuvenated by the success of the offensive in the Krajina and Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the Western tolerance of the ensuing ethnic cleansing of Serbs. Tudjman is in a fighting spirit, convinced that Zagreb will be able to realize its regional aspirations only through the force of arms.
In the Fall of 1995, a Zagreb emboldened by the recent military victories in the Krajina and western Bosnia-Herzegovina, began examining both the next phase of its regional strategic ascension and the overall character of its intended military build-up. Although the ultimate military challenge remained a major war with Yugoslavia, the strategic emphasis was on preparing for a post-war era of coexistence with a larger Yugoslavia. The primary challenge then facing the HVO (Croatian Defense Council of Herzeg-Bosna) will be a relentless and uncompromising quest for regional hegemony.
There is also a political aspect to this build-up. Croatian President Franjo Tudjman increasingly stresses the military factor in Croatian politics. In late September 1995, Tudjman unleashed far-reaching personnel changes in, or purges of, the Croatian High Command. Even the heroes of the recent fighting were removed from power in order to ensure a politically and personally fiercely loyal High Command. Official Zagreb protested any political motive behind these personnel changes. "There is no direct political motivation for the majority of recent changes and promotions in the Croatian Army General Staff, but it is not clear how these changes will be reflected in the structure of the Croatian Army command that has had considerable successes this year," a Croatian commentator explained. By early November, this became a trend so strong that even nationalist intellectuals in Zagreb began to worry whether the Croatian Democratic Union's (HDZ) politicization of the Croatian military had gone too far.
The militarization of Croatian politics is clearly expressed in Tudjman's own adoption of a special set of uniforms for the Commander-in-Chief, complete with gold braid. Far more important has been the increasing politicization of the military and reliance on the active participation of uniformed senior officers in HDZ public political activities. For Zagreb as of the Winter 1995-96, military triumph and glory had become interwoven with the quest for political victory. Increasingly disdainful of the democratic process and public opinion, Pres. Tudjman and his immediate coterie feel increasingly compelled to deliver external military achievements as the primary source of public support and legitimization.
This need to ensure positive military dynamics only complicated Zagreb's ability to cope with the unfolding security challenges. Over this period Zagreb has been, and still is, confronted by two major national security challenges. Militarily more complex is the yearning to take on the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia. Zagreb is convinced that barring a completely new Tudjman-Milosevic agreement or understanding, such an operation will most likely result in a war with Yugoslavia. Of far greater political importance and sensitivity is the challenge of coping with the endurance of the "federation" with Sarajevo. Zagreb has no illusions that it is its being the sole corridor to Sarajevo that constitutes the key to the US support, including the Massive support for Zagreb's wars with the Serbs. However, as tensions grow in Mostar and throughout Herzeg-Bosna and related areas, the viability and survival of the "federation" is increasingly in doubt. This trend closely befits Zagreb's real long-term strategic military analysis, as expressed in President Tudjman's hand-drawn map of May 1995 (see page x, at the front of this book). Moreover, Zagreb cannot see a non-violent solution to these fundamental crises and challenges it is presently facing.
In late 1995, Zagreb set the order of meeting and solving its security challenges on the basis of political expediency: primarily the position of the Clinton Administration. It is because of the importance of the US support to the Croatian war effort -- from endorsement of the violation of the embargo, to providing military expertise and intelligence -- that the Croatian High Command wanted to conduct as many offensives as possible while being in Washington's good graces. Tudjman also sought to retain the US political umbrella for the aggressive military operations and the ensuing ethnic cleansing of the local Serb population. Therefore, Zagreb resolved to first deal with the Eastern Slavonia challenge, that is, before the inevitable collapse of the "federation" which will inevitably have very adverse repercussions for US-Croatian relations.
The mere threat of a bloody and imminent collapse of the "federation" had a major impact on Zagreb's approach to the crisis. Zagreb had an added incentive to consider the escalation of tensions in Eastern Slavonia in the context of its long established grand strategy. Rhetoric about the completion of the "liberation" of the motherland not withstanding, the essence of the Eastern Slavonia crisis became a prime instrument for the implementation of the Croatian grand strategy; namely the capitalization on a regional eruption in order to get the US to shift priorities away from Sarajevo and into endorsing Zagreb's priorities. Thus, as far as Zagreb was concerned, an occupation by force of Eastern Slavonia became expedient for as long as there was no doubt that Belgrade would react with force, escalating the Croat surge into a major Croat-Yugoslav war.
In the Fall of 1995, the emboldened Zagreb decided that there was no alternative to the seizure of Eastern Slavonia by force of arms. With the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina reaching a peak, and the US-led search for a negotiated solution intensifying, Zagreb was apprehensive about the possibility of a cessation of hostilities that would 1 eave Eastern Slavonia under Serb control. Such an arrangement was unacceptable if only because of the economic importance of the region, considering the oil resources and agricultural potential, as well as the commercial potential from access to the Danube. With a possible shift to reconstruction, Croatia needed these resources. Croat military experts stressed that there was no conceivable substitute to Croatia's complete and unchallengeable control of the territory all the way to the Danube. Therefore, Zagreb felt a sense of urgency in dealing with Eastern Slavonia.
Meanwhile, Zagreb also formulated a strategic assessment of its new and emerging posture in the region, particularly with the evolution of the situation in Eastern Slavonia as indicative of the overall change in the regional role of Croatia. Zagreb concluded that the quick resolution of the Eastern Slavonia problem, even if by force, was the key to establishing Croatia's regional hegemonic posture. While the US-led NATO air forces did not bomb the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia, Croatia was confident that the US would demand the return of the area to Croat sovereignty in the context of any US-imposed plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Zagreb reasoned that the US was so motivated primarily because of the Croatian Army's recent successes in Krajina and Bosnia. With such a record, Zagreb would inevitably be inclined to continue the offensive momentum and, Zagreb believed the US decided, the only way to contain the spread of violence would be by the US ensuring that Croatia's demands were met fully. Having thus established its deterrence profile, Zagreb now expected to be recognized as "an inevitable partner [of the West] capable of solving by military means not only the internal problems of the occupied areas, but also decisively influencing the total balance of military forces in the territories of the former Yugoslavia".
Even as practical considerations dominated the Croat decision to assault Eastern Slavonia, the Tudjman Government concentrated its public agitation on patriotic themes. Zagreb stressed the symbolism in returning Vukovar -- the site of fierce battles at the beginning of the war -- to Croat sovereignty. Official Zagreb stressed the occupation of Eastern Slavonia as the key for the successful conclusion of the "Motherland War": "This area is politically very important. This is where Vukovar, the greatest symbol of the Homeland War, is. With time, Vukovar has become a myth, and until it is liberated the Homeland War will not be over."
In early October 1995, Croat officials began openly raising the prospects of the resumption of hostilities against the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia. "If we fail to resolve in a peaceful way the problem of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, I am certain that the Croatian Army will do this very successfully," Croatian Army Chief of General Staff General Zvonimir Cervenko said at a military event in the town of Osijek, in western Croatia. The commander of the Osijek area, Gen. Djuro Decak, said at the same event that "the Croatian Army in this region faces numerous complex tasks". He expressed his confidence that all the then existing challenges to Croatia's security would be removed in the very near future.
Militarily, Zagreb was confident in its control over the decision where and when to strike in order to reclaim Eastern Slavonia. In mid-October 1995, the Croatian elite was ready to go to war. In a speech to the 3d HDZ Congress in Zagreb, Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak openly urged President Tudjman to give the order to attack: "Mr. President, by carrying out your orders we have managed to defend Croatia. The Croatian Army is at present a powerful regional force; the direction and the screenplay for the final act are finished. We await your order!" While President Tudjman did not give the order, by now -- mid-October 1995 -- the military option for resolving the Eastern Slavonia crisis was Zagreb's preferable solution. This decision was based in part on the growing Croat military might.
Earlier, in late September 1995, in the aftermath of the 1995 offensives, the Croatian Army could mobilize up to 400,000 troops in a very short period. The heavy weapons arsenal included over 600 tanks, some 400 of them relatively modern and in good operational status. The Croats also had some 600 other armored vehicles. The artillery was under strength, but Croatian military experts were convinced their forces were "certainly great enough to crush the Serb defense". In the aftermath of Operation Storm, Croatia began concentrating its best forces toward its east border. The core of these forces included seven professional brigades, the Guards corps forces, as well as the special forces units of the Ministry of the Interior, considered Croatia's best. All these elite Croatian forces were being concentrated against Eastern Slavonia.
In early October, Croatia intensified its preparations for the forthcoming military operation. Croatian reinforcements included 15 brigades in a first military convoy, and eight in a second: a total of about 45,000 troops. The heavy weapons assembled included 200 tanks, 150 armored personnel carriers, 350 artillery pieces, and 28 multiple rocket launchers. The professional brigades arrived with the first convoy and deployed in offensive dispositions behind the Vinkovci-Zupanja line. Additional quality units established defensive positions in anticipation for a possible Yugoslav Army counterattack in the direction of the Spacvanske woods.
The key to the Croatian offensive contingency plans was a swift decision of the war through the aggregate impact of special operations and strikes throughout the entire depth of the Serb dispositions.
Toward this end, Croatia deployed several special forces and sabotage units, including commandos and frogmen. The Croat operational plan called for these elite forces to advance along the Danube, partially by boat, in an attempt to destroy the bridges near Bogojevo, Batina, and Backa Palanka. Croatian special forces might also operate inside Hungarian territory in order to get to the Serbian rear.
The Croatian offensive would start with synchronized strikes by special forces and artillery across the Serb lines, along with assaults by combat engineers to neutralize the Serb minefields and open assault routes for the tank and mechanized units.
The Croatian contingency plans also included plans for preventive strikes against the possible intervention by the Yugoslav Army. Toward this end, the Croats established in the Osijek area a strong bridgehead on the Drava River, directly threatening Darda. New mobile bridges were brought close to the Drava River in order to serve for a limited-size Croatian assault into Yugoslavia. The primary objective of such an attack would be the disruption of command, control and communications of the 11th Yugoslav Army Corps. Zagreb was convinced that the mere fact that the Yugoslav Army would have to concentrate on chasing Croat units on Yugoslav territory instead of rushing to save the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia would have a devastating propaganda and psychological impact on the Serb defenders. Therefore, an increasing number of Croatian special forces were allocated to such operations in the Yugoslav rear.
A closer look at this aspect of Croatia's contingency plans suggests that Zagreb planned to instigate the involvement of the Yugoslav Army from the beginning. Croat military experts explained that the army expected Yugoslav flank fire against its tanks surging into Eastern Slavonia. The local army units were briefed to be ready for a theater-wide escalation as a result of a Croat "shell falling on Yugoslav territory either deliberately or accidentally. In such a case the Yugoslav Army would certainly respond to this fire, again either deliberately or accidentally." The Croat contingency plans stipulated that once such a localized fire exchange "happened", it would be "even more difficult to get it under control". Therefore, and regardless of the political ramifications, the concentrated Croatian military power facing Eastern Slavonia was calculated from the beginning to be able "to defeat" whatever military intervention might occur from Yugoslavia.
The Croat military intelligence assessment in early October 1995 stipulated that "Yugoslav Army troops will become involved in the fighting in the area, but to what extent and how many is still unknown". The options examined in Zagreb ranged from a dispatch of "volunteers" sanctioned by Belgrade to an organized military involvement of quality forces such as artillery, armor, and air forces on the side of the local Serb forces. Croat military intelligence was most disturbed by the Yugoslav concentration of forces around Sid and at the bank of the Danube. From their permanent dispositions, these forces could deploy into Eastern Slavonia within a few hours, thus creating an escalatory threat Zagreb could not address but through preemption. The Croat assessment also claimed that small Yugoslav units were already deployed on Croatian soil in Baranja and Eastern Slavonia, thus creating a justification for a Croatian preemptive strike.
Croat Military Intelligence identified the main Yugoslav force grouping their forces would have to confront as the "the Northern Army": the former 1st Army of the "Yugoslav Army" with Headquarters in Belgrade. The Croat analysts concluded that in case of a major escalation, the Northern Army would be able to commit to battle the corps from Belgrade, Novi Sad, Valjevo, and Uzice. These forces constitute some 48 percent of the entire Yugoslav Army. By Croat calculations, Belgrade would be able to commit to battle about 300,000 troops (under conditions of general mobilization), 450 tanks, 350 armored combat vehicles, and 7,000 guns of all calibers. Croat Military Intelligence concluded that under conditions of such an all out Yugoslav military intervention, "the combat power of the Croatian Army is not too superior to theirs, at least on paper". As will be discussed below, this realization influenced Zagreb's decision to modify the political-strategic context of its forthcoming offensive.
The primary area of concern for Zagreb was air power. Both military experts and military intelligence analysts agreed that air power was the only area where Croatia faced major military problems when facing a possible Yugoslav intervention in the fighting in Eastern Slavonia. The performance of the Croatian Air Force in the earlier fighting was unsatisfactory and the losses incurred -- four MiG-21s -- were beyond the sustainability of the Air Force. Facing the well-trained and well-equipped Yugoslav Air Force would be a far greater challenge. Zagreb was most apprehensive because their MiG-21bis were outclassed by the Yugoslav MiG-29s even when equipped with comparable AAMs (air-to-air missiles). Therefore, the primary objective of the Croatian forces would be to deny the Yugoslavs the ability to conduct air operations rather than support Croatia's own ground offensive.
The Croat military experts remained so apprehensive about the prospects of Croatian air power that Zagreb resolved to address the issue of Yugoslav air power at the political level. Zagreb made a Yugoslav use of air power a casus belli. In communications with the Clinton Administration, Zagreb now conditioned its continued participation in, let alone support for, the then-intensive US mediation efforts for Bosnia-Herzegovina on the active containment of the Yugoslav Air Force by US/NATO forces. Consequently, Croat military experts were no longer worried about the threat of surface-to-surface missiles and air power from Yugoslavia. Military experts in Zagreb stressed that "by using those [missiles], and the Air Force in general, Milosevic would clearly show his involvement in the fighting on the Croatian state territory, which could prompt primarily the United States to take more determined action. It would not be too surprising if, after that, several dozen Tomahawks from US warships in the Adriatic were to take off and fly toward the airports in northern Serbia and Vojvodina." Subsequent Croatian military intelligence assessments were based on the premise of early neutralization of the Yugoslav strategic infrastructure by cruise missiles from US Navy vessels. Zagreb was confident it had a US commitment to that effect.
However, by mid-October 1995, intense political negotiations dominated the crisis around Eastern Slavonia. Several international mediators, Peter Galbraith and Carl Bildt among others, tried to avert a Croat offensive by pressing Belgrade for additional concessions. The mediators' efforts were aided by continued Croatian military pressure. Zagreb continued to concentrate additional troops toward the Srem-Baranja region. Moreover, Croat Special Forces began infiltrations and provocations across the Serb lines. In Belgrade, the international mediators used the ensuing growing tension as a point of leverage on Milosevic, threatening that Yugoslavia would be punished if the Slavonia crisis escalated into major fighting. Toward the end of October, the mediators were quite confident in their ability "to deliver" Belgrade.
But Zagreb was not so confident. The Croat leadership continued to consider any conflagration with Yugoslavia as the key to consolidating the permanent partition of the former Yugoslavia. This ambivalence was clearly expressed in the threat assessment by Croat military experts. Zagreb was still not certain about the extent of a potential Yugoslav military intervention in case of an assault on Eastern Slavonia.
Croat military intelligence pointed to recent Yugoslav military exercises which could be considered as rehearsals for intervention. For example, when the Yugoslav Army in western Vojvodina conducted its annual joint tactical exercise, Croat experts stressed it was "of an interventionist type" if only because live firing practice was included. The main task of the exercising forces was to conduct "a quick counterattack and maintain a persistent defense after capturing a certain area". The Northern Army command, to which the exercising 12th Corps belongs, defined the primary role and task of the 12th Corps to be "a rapid reaction force" in the endangered "Serb" territory. Not without reason, Croat experts interpreted this scenario as providing support to the 11th Slavonia-Baranja Corps in the event that the Croatian Army suddenly launched the anticipated offensive against Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. Further more, the Croats were alarmed when the Yugoslav River Gunboat Flotilla from Novi Sad, the Army's Airborne Troops, as well as the Air Force and Air Defense Forces participated in these exercises. Croat analysts noted that the Yugoslav units demonstrated "power and strength" to be taken into consideration. They noted the wide gap of quality between these units and the "domestic" Serb corps in Eastern Slavonia.
Croat military experts paid special attention to the role and performance of the Yugoslav Special Forces. Croat military intelligence concluded that around 2,000 elite troops of river minesweeper units, Amphibious and Airborne Troops units, as well as specialized combat engineers units, were being trained to restore communications and access to Eastern Slavonia under adverse conditions. Most important, from Zagreb's perspective, was the Yugoslav demonstrated ability "to provide urgent support" for the Serbs across the Danube even after the bombing or exploding of the bridges on the Danube. Croat military experts consider the pre-emptive blowing-up of these bridges a precondition for the assault on Eastern Slavonia. Thus, the Yugoslav ability to restore communications across the Danube worried Zagreb.
Most significant, however, was the strategic conclusions which the Croat military experts derived from the exercises of the Yugoslav 12th Corps. "Nevertheless, whatever we might think of the strength of the Yugoslav Army, the exercise was instructive. Because the Novi Sad Corps will sooner or later certainly get involved in the event of the military reintegration of the occupied area into the state and legal system of Croatia. River- and air-borne assaults 'thrown' behind the back of the Croatian Army should weaken the assault strength of the Croatian forces. And both things irrevocably confirm that the 11th Slavonia-Baranja Corps is defenseless on its own, no matter how much and how General Loncar [Commander-in-Chief of the 11th Serbian Corps in Eastern Slavonia] entreats the Serb warriors to take up arms." [Note: the 11th Serb Corps in Eastern Slavonia is a Croatian Serb army, not connected with the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia. -- Ed.] So Zagreb resolved to ensure through political means, particularly pressure on Belgrade from the US and the rest of the international community, that the Yugoslav Armed Forces would not intervene across the Danube when the Croat Armed Forces stormed their brethren in Eastern Slavonia.
Indeed, by the last week of October 1995, Zagreb was increasingly confident that the specter of a Yugoslav intervention was averted. Western, particularly US, military and diplomatic sources in Zagreb concurred with this assessment. "Belgrade will not step in to rescue rebel Serbs occupying part of Croatia if the Croatian Army seeks to retake the area," confirmed a knowledgeable diplomat. "Belgrade's reaction would be more likely limited to some artillery fire from Serb territory against Croatian targets or 'symbolic' plane or helicopter raids," opined another Western military official.
The Western intelligence assessment, as shared with the Croatian Government, was based on a combination of identified difficulties in the Yugoslav military capabilities, and Belgrade's justified fears of the negative ramifications of US objections to such a move. Considering the declared positions of US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith and US envoy Holbrooke, Belgrade's reading of the situation was accurate. Indeed, senior Croat officials confirmed that they were told by senior US diplomats that while in Belgrade, Mr. Holbrooke personally warned Mr. Milosevic about US military action if Yugoslav forces tried to interfere with the Croatian "reunification" of their country. Indeed, a UN political assessment prepared in Zagreb concurred that "the signs coming from Belgrade that it will not defend the Serbs are putting pressure on the rebels to agree to whatever it is Zagreb demands".
Nevertheless, in late October, Zagreb was reluctant to give up on the military option. Croatian forces deployed in offensive dispositions now included around 10 brigades. The hard-core offensive element reached over 40,000 troops ready to attack at any moment. A Yugoslav military intelligence assessment pointed to the unfavorable military posture. "Zagreb has concentrated 40,000 troops with 200 tanks and 400 artillery pieces and systems. The 1st, 2d, 4th, and 7th professional brigades have been stationed in the possible theater of operations. The Serb side has carried out an additional mobilization and it is ready to confront the Croats with around 25,000 soldiers, 150 tanks and 300 artillery pieces and systems. The military balance is thus 2:1 in favor of the Croats, but that is still less than the necessary 3:1 proportion in favor of the attacker, which is considered necessary for a successful offensive."
The Military experts in Belgrade acknowledged that only a political resolution in Zagreb could prevent a Croatian blitzkrieg. Given the magnitude of the threat, and the complexity of defeating the Croats under the constant threat of US intervention, Belgrade opted for a negotiated compromise. Zagreb put forward harsh conditions. Toward the end of October, Zagreb accused its Serb interlocutors of a "combination of stalling and a pretended readiness to negotiate". The Croatian negotiation strategy was based on the assumption that the Serb leaders in Eastern Slavonia were fully aware of their military hopelessness if Belgrade was deterred from an all-out intervention on their behalf. "If the 'Yugoslav army' remains passive, 20,000-30,000 rebel Serbs over there have no chance at all of resisting for any length of time," Croat experts concluded. Zagreb was confident that the Croat forces already in place constituted an overwhelming force that could break any Serb resistance in 24 hours.
All this time, the Croatian military build-up continued. In mid-November 1995, Croatia moved the elite 1st Brigade -- the Tigers -- as well as several 105 mm heavy artillery pieces and a few tanks to Vinkovci. This force movement was in violation of the UN-designated weapons exclusion zone. Protests by the UN observation post in Novska, on the main road between Zagreb and Eastern Slavonia, that the Croat military convoys were in violation of UN directives were ignored by both the convoys' commanders and Zagreb.
In late December 1995, despite the Tudjman-Milosevic "understanding" about the fate of Eastern Slavonia reached in Dayton, Zagreb resumed discussions of the military option to a quick resolution of the Eastern Slavonia "threat". Most knowledgeable officials and observers in Zagreb anticipated an offensive by February 1996. The "Croatian Army will liberate Eastern Slavonia as early as February in only 24 hours," was the opinion of Croat experts. Barring additional comprehensive concessions from Milosevic on all other contentious issues between Zagreb and Belgrade, war was considered inevitable. Zagreb intended to use the anticipated February 1996 onslaught on Eastern Slavonia as a demonstration of Croatia's newly found might and regional posture. Zagreb's over-confidence was well-founded because in accordance with the Dayton "understanding", the US guaranteed Zagreb that "Yugoslavia must no longer intervene militarily in Eastern Slavonia, because otherwise it would immediately be subject to the economic sanctions". Indeed, diplomatic circles in Zagreb assessed that "unless the so-called Federal Republic of Yugoslavia becomes involved in the fighting directly, it should not take more than 24 hours for the Croatian Army to liberate Eastern Slavonia and Baranja".
This threat assessment has since been proven to be well-founded. In late February 1996, Zagreb increased its pressure on the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia. As the weather improved, there was a revival of the Croatian threat to use force, followed by renewed troops movements and force reinforcements in the forward dispositions facing the Serb forces.
As Zagreb anticipated, by late 1995 Croatia had already become a regional power and aspiring hegemon. Irrespective of Zagreb's preoccupation with the improvement of war-fighting capabilities for the anticipated fighting over Eastern Slavonia and the Bosnian territory claimed by Croatia, the key to Croatia's regional posture was strategic weapons. By early Fall 1995, there was an increased preoccupation with the establishment of a strategic balance of power through ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. A Croat strategic study issued in early October 1995 stressed the preponderance of strategic weapons as the key to the future regional balance of power.
The study stressed that the Croat defense planning and primary weapons acquisition programs must go beyond the necessary preparations for the numerous clashes and wars likely to take place in the immediate future. Ultimately, a Croatia and a Yugoslavia which absorbed parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina would emerge as the dominant powers of the former Yugoslavia. There would be a tenuous co-existence between these powers. Therefore, in the absence of "an extended peace settlement in the area," the primary challenge facing Zagreb would be "some kind of arms race between so-called Yugoslavia and Croatia" in order to establish a stable strategic environment and reduce the risk of wars. Toward this end, Zagreb anticipates "attempts of both Yugoslavia and Croatia to introduce surface-to-surface missiles with a 400-kilometer range, armed with conventional warheads, with the capability of carrying chemical weapons, into their arsenals." In addition, the strategic arsenals of both sides would be reinforced with the acquisition of modem strike aircraft and smart munitions, as well as modem long-range artillery. The study also does not rule out that both Croatia and Yugoslavia would ultimately have to embark on military nuclear programs.
Croatia moved quickly to begin implementing the recommendations of this study. In the second half of December 1995, after the signing of the Dayton-Paris Accords, Zagreb and Tehran signed a secret agreement for comprehensive and multi-faceted military cooperation. A major part of this agreement was Tehran's expressed willingness to deliver long-range ballistic missiles to Zagreb. Earlier during the war, Tehran had repeatedly offered to supply both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina with ballistic missiles capable of hitting Belgrade. Zagreb elected to reject the Iranian effort, fearing the ramifications of such strategic weapons at the hands of Sarajevo.
The December 1995 deal, however, was only between Tehran and Zagreb and did not include Sarajevo. Actually, the deal was between Beijing and Zagreb with Tehran serving as the mediator as well as a "fictitious" end-user for the SSMs' delivery. The deal calls for Croatia to get both the 300 km-range M-11s and the 600 km-range M-9s. Both SSMs are to be in the export version which is suitable only for non-nuclear warheads. The SSMs will be provided with their special transport and launch vehicles, which allow very good maneuver-ability. In return for fronting for the PRC, Iran got Croatia to permit the continued consolidation of Islamist presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina despite the constraints in the Dayton-Paris Accords and the Croatian growing fears of Islamist terrorism and subversion. In late December 1995, in Tehran, Chinese and Iranian military experts concluded the deal for ballistic missile deliveries with Croatia.
One of the reasons that Beijing opted for Tehran to act as a front was the concurrent Chinese effort to strengthen economic cooperation with the new Yugoslavia. The PRC is most interested in gaining access to Yugoslav military technology in order to modernize older Chinese weapon systems, as well as winning a big slice of the civil reconstruction market for Chinese products. Efforts to reach such a deal peaked in mid-December 1995, when Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic was on an official visit to China as guest of Chinese President Jiang Zemin. Jiang stated that "China attaches great importance to developing its long-term and stable friendship and relations of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the basis of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit". Premier Li Peng added that the PRC "sincerely hope that this peace accord be implemented practically so that people from countries concerned could heal the wounds of war they have suffered so long and rebuild their economies".
However, the tripartite Croatia-PRC-Iran deal did not live long. In early 1996, Zagreb began pressing Beijing to transform the deal into a bilateral agreement. The Croatian excuse was an expressed apprehension that the US might intervene and prevent the deal because of Iran's central role. Beijing raised that option with Tehran in late January 1996 in the context of strategic discussions between PRC and Iran held in Tehran. These discussions were part of the ongoing strategic cooperation and coordination in relation to the Trans-Asian Axis. The new Chinese Ambassador, Shiji Wang, delivered a special message to First Deputy President of Iran, Hasan Habibi, that covered the SSM issue as well as many other issues of common interest. Tehran agreed. Habibi concluded the talks stressing that "the common outlooks of the two countries in relation to many regional and international topics is a good reason why the two countries could further expand their relations".
Virtually immediately, Zagreb moved to improve its own formal relations with the PRC. Mate Granic, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Croatia, arrived in Beijing in early February 1996 to consummate the missile deal. His was the first official visit of a Croatian official to Beijing. Granic visited the industrial city of Shanghai, including the production sites of many of the PRC's high-technology weapons. In a subsequent meeting with Granic, Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stressed the PRC's growing interest in the situation in the former Yugoslavia and the close relations with Croatia. He stated that "China is willing to make constant efforts for the peace process in the former Yugoslavia along with other countries." Qian added: "China and Croatia share many common views in safeguarding sovereignty, promoting the economy, and maintaining world peace." He concluded: "China has consistently supported the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia."
Beijing's strategic siding with Croatia did not prevent Beijing from continuing its pursuit of Yugoslav military technology. In mid- March 1996, Beijing hosted Pavle Bulatovic, the Minister of National Defense of Yugoslavia, on an official visit. Chi Haotian, Vice-Chairman of China's Central Military Commission, hailed the importance of the visit. Chi called Bulatovic's visit "a symbol of restoration and development of high-level exchanges between the two armed forces", and added that it would "help promote good relations between the two countries". Referring to the PLA's desire for military technology from Yugoslavia, Chi explained that Bulatovic's visit "would lay a sound foundation for the smooth, sustained and stable improvement of their [PLA-JA] ties". Bulatovic expressed his hope for "the reinforcement of overall cooperation" between the PRC and Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia's "willingness to cooperate with China in various aspects".
This Yugoslav-Chinese security relationship did not prevent Beijing from taking over the Croatian missile deal. In early May 1996, Croat military sources stressed "that Iran dropped out of the entire deal as the intermediary and that Croatia will purchase the necessary missiles directly from China". They expected the first SSMs to be delivered soon.
Zagreb publicly scoffed at suggestions that the introduction of new ballistic missiles would alter the regional strategic balance. "The claim that the purchase of such missiles would threaten the peace in the region as Croatia acquires the possibility of carrying out missile attacks on Belgrade does not stand and can only be uttered by somebody who is ignorant of the situation in this region." The Croat experts acknowledged that "the Croatian Army has had missile systems that can reach Belgrade as well as other towns in Serbia for quite some time". These missiles -- old-fashioned SCUDs -- were purchased in Eastern Europe and delivered via Hungary. Their combat effectiveness, operational reliability and accuracy were dubious at best. Hence, the availability of these few older SCUDs never really featured as a strategic consideration during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The acquisition of the accurate and highly efficient M-9s and M-11s would change the strategic posture drastically.
Meanwhile, Zagreb continued to pay close attention to the evolution of conventional military activities. According to the strategic study of early October 1995, Zagreb was anticipating a major change in the nature of the military dynamics affecting Croatia. "The basic characteristic of the war conducted so far in the territories of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (except the NATO air strikes) is that it has been a conflict of a low technological level, with the application of archaic tactics, also including putting cities under siege." The Croat experts were now convinced that future regional conflagrations would rapidly escalate to a more conventional mobile war requiring large scale use of long-range artillery, air power and even various missiles. Meeting the needs of such a war now dominated the Croatian growing military build-up, especially the acquisition of modern air power.
Toward this end, Croatia purchased in late 1995 a small number of MiG-29S fighters. They were slightly used -- with up to 200 hrs -- but thoroughly refurbished by the Russian Air Force. They were purchased through a Central European intermediary. The first two MiG-29Ss were delivered with the latest model and upgraded electronics. Moreover, the Croats purchased R-73 [AA-11] AAMs (both R-73A and R-73M) which would also be installed on the ex-DDR (East German) MiG-21bis, as well as R-27 [AA-10] long-range AAMs. However, in early 1996, pilot training was lagging to the point of adversely affecting operational use of both the MiG-29S and MiG-21bis fighters.
Moreover, Croatia revived its effort to activate the squadron of Su-25s purchased in 1993 (with Iranian funds and also for use by the Bosnian Muslim forces). These attack aircraft were still in crates because of lack of technical skill and pilots. By now, Tehran had given up on the transfer of these aircraft to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Zagreb felt confident it could take possession of all of them. There was a sense of urgency concerning the Su-25s because they would be most beneficial for precision strikes against the key bridges over the Danube in the offensive on Eastern Slavonia. Such strikes could stop 'the flow of Yugoslav reinforcements.
In early 1996, Zagreb had reached the conclusion that its Su-25s would not be operational in February, then the planned time for launching the offensive against Eastern Slavonia. Instead, the primary ground-attack tasks were allocated to the Mi-24 combat helicopters. Croatia acquired a few more helicopters in Ukraine to replenish losses incurred during the war and even increase its arsenal.
Another Croatian strategic effort was to increase its naval power to conduct operations way beyond coastal defense and into the central Mediterranean. Toward this end, Zagreb negotiated with Lviv the purchase, jointly from Russia and Ukraine, of surplus ships of the Black Sea Fleet. Zagreb also discussed the acquisition of production know-how from Ukrainian military shipyards for the modernization of its own major combatant shipbuilding programs.
Weapons acquisition was but a part of Zagreb's bigger and more ambitious military plans. In early December 1995, the Croat High Command submitted and got approval for plans for a marked modernization of the entire defense system. At the top, Zagreb decided to adopt a US-style structure. The Soviet-style General Staff was to be replaced by a new operative body called the Joint Staff. Like its US counterpart, the new Joint Staff consists of the three chiefs of staff of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, and the Navy. The chiefs are subordinate to the chairman. Unlike the US, however, in Zagreb, the Chairman is the Supreme Commander himself: President Franjo Tudjman. This arrangement puts Tudjman in constant and direct operational control of the military system, thus further politicizing it. Zagreb stresses that the new high command system was devised with "massive assistance from US military experts", with the endorsement and encouragement of Washington.
The other major development in the Croatian military is the reorganization of the main ground units to cope with the growing flow of new weapons systems. Croat military experts pointed out that with the rapid acquisition and absorption of heavy weapons, the main unit of the Croatian Army will become the Division, rather than the present Brigade. These new divisions "are being trained to take on more complex assaults or defensive operations over a much wider area and are able to concentrate considerable forces on the main prongs of an attack". Croat experts anticipated that in case fighting resumed in the Summer of 1996, the Croat Army would already be able to field its new combined-arms divisions at the core of any offensive.
Starting early 1996, Zagreb's threat assessment considered the resumption of major fighting increasingly likely. And despite the heated rhetoric and force deployments against the Serbs in Eastern Slavonia, senior military experts in Zagreb now consider Bosnia-Herzegovina to be the most likely theater of a future war. This strategic development reaffirmed the pure military assessment prevailing since the Fall of 1995 but pushed aside for political reasons.
Indeed, the Croatian strategic study of early October 1995, specifically identified the primary site of the main future Croat-Yugoslav contention as being the "area of Bosnia-Herzegovina ...
taken by the Serb entity [and used] as a possible military training ground for some new threat to Croatia." Significantly, this scenario of the future regional war starts from a conflagration along this Yugoslav-Croat border. There is no Bosnian entity in this recent Croat strategic study.
In developing this strategic posture, Zagreb was motivated by the military-geographic realities of the region. In late October 1995, a follow-up strategic study pointed to emerging urgent priorities. Zagreb's analysis of the changing regional military balance, taking into consideration the then-unfolding Dayton process, only further emphasized the importance of Croat control over much of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There could be no substitute to Croatian dominance over most of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the study stipulated, because the "approach to the relations between these territories, including those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is inevitable because Bosnia-Herzegovina territory and Croatia represent an integral military-geographical and communications entity, while its position and shape represent a protuberant operational base for potential attacks on the territory of Croatia. A straight line connecting the northernmost and the southernmost points of Croatia, 490 kilometers long, encompasses 68 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. ... These are only some of the quantitative and qualitative indicators that, from the point of view of a possible threat to Croatian territory, show the interdependence of the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina."
Subsequent developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly over the implementation of the Dayton-Paris Accords only reinforced Zagreb's conviction that a future war ending with the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Croatia and Yugoslavia was virtually inevitable.
Closely examining the regional dynamics in the early Spring of 1996, particularly the intensification of the Islamicization of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the US tolerance of the flagrant violation of the mujahedin clause in the Dayton-Paris Accords, made Zagreb desperate to get out of the "federation". This desperation was best reflected in the growing Croat-Muslim tension in Mostar.
In January and February 1996, tension between the Croats and Bosnian Muslims, particularly around Mostar, reached such intensity that locally based I-FOR senior officers were apprehensive about the imminent resumption of war. In January, HVO forces [Croat armed forces from Herzeg-Bosna], including "seconded" Croat "volunteers" [from Croatia proper], even deployed to forward position in readiness to storm and occupy the Muslim-held eastern Mostar. Only intense US pressure restrained Tudjman from ordering the offensive. The declared compromise ostensibly reached during the Rome summit in mid-February had virtually no effect on the tension on the ground.
Mostar is a symbol for the irreconcilable gap between the true aspirations of the Croats and their declaratory policy adopted to please Washington. The leadership of Herzeg-Bosna continues to insist on their being primarily parts of Croatia rather than an integral part of the "unified" Bosnian component of the "federation". The Bosnian Croats threaten to use force if Sarajevo attempts to deploy Muslim forces on the area they hold. Moreover, locally-based Croatian HV [Croatian Army] units, still in Bosnia-Herzegovina even though they should have withdrawn earlier, cooperate closely with their HVO counterparts against Sarajevo's forces.
In late April, tensions grew again as both Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces refused to compromise over the fate of Mostar. Instead, with strong backing from Zagreb, the Herzeg-Bosna leadership made Mostar into a test case for the survival and viability of the "federation". Dragan Gasic, of the European administrative group in Mostar, stressed the crucial importance of the Mostar precedent:
"If Mostar fails, the Federation will fail. And if the Federation fails, Dayton will fail."
And it is precisely for this reason, that Zagreb has encouraged its proteges in Bosnia-Herzegovina to resist any compromise over Mostar virtually at all cost. In early May 1996, intense European and US pressure on Zagreb somewhat reduced the threat of immediate conflagration. However, the military option, which would inevitably lead to the collapse of the "federation" is still pursued by Zagreb. The Croatian build-up continues in eastern Croatia in areas permitting rapid reinforcement of Herzeg-Bosna. Croat military experts acknowledge Zagreb's anticipation for the revival of fighting: an excuse for the completion of the Croat occupation of the parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed by Croatia.
By May 1996, the overall political dynamics throughout the former Yugoslavia had convinced Zagreb that its own worst case scenarios of an intense regional war were most likely to happen. Zagreb is most alarmed by the extent of US support for Sarajevo despite the lingering mujahedin problems, Sarajevo's proven support for international terrorism, and the growing bellicosity of Izetbegovic and his closest aides. It was not lost on Zagreb that even when political pressure in Washington prevented the Clinton Administration from going on with a rapid implementation of arming the Bosnian Muslim forces, the Administration put tremendous pressure on Turkey and other Muslim states to complete the task. This dynamic convinced Zagreb that the only way out of the consolidation of a Muslim Bosnia tied to it in the "federation" arrangements is with guns blazing. Meanwhile, Zagreb was increasingly apprehensive about the military recovery of Yugoslavia with assistance from Russia and its improved economic capacity. The Croat analysis of the period of unchallenged military superiority over Yugoslavia may have to be re-examined.
Taken together, these developments led Zagreb to conclude that if a regional war was to be waged, it should happen soon. Present strategic and military conditions were most favorable and expedient for Croatia to consolidate its posture as a regional power through the use of force. Furthermore, considering the growing uncertainty in Washington -- from the growing Iran-Bosnia Crisis to a heated elections campaign -- it was imperative for Croatia to strike out when it could still count on the determined support of the Clinton Administration as demonstrated in the offensives of 1995.
In a sharp contrast with the assertive Croat Army, the once-vaunted Yugoslav Army is in a dire state. The arsenal and order of battle are still formidable. However, the legacy of the lingering embargo and political climate has taken its toll. The two main problems adversely affecting Yugoslavia's overall military capabilities are the accumulating effect of shortages of spares and equipment, and the aggregate impact of manpower retention problems caused by the overall devastating economic conditions.
By 1996, the Yugoslav defense establishment was well on its way to alleviating the technical problems. Relying on its defense industries and clandestine imports from Russia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia was able to overcome some of the most acute problems during the early 1990s. It took some time to convert the defense industrial system -- once spread all over the former Yugoslavia and in constant touch with other defense production establishments around the world -- to the confines of the new Yugoslavia and political isolation. But once the conversion was completed, Yugoslavia embarked on a steady and solid road to recovery as far as the military technological capabilities were concerned. The lifting of the embargo and the availability of hard currency funds helped to further expedite the resolution of these problems.
However, the Dayton-Paris Accords also strive to constrain and even eliminate Yugoslav military industrial capacity; that is, the country's ability to cope with national emergency through mobilization of national production. Under the Dayton-Paris Accords, Yugoslavia is not allowed to manufacture weapons above 30 mm caliber, which means sacrificing its entire self-sufficiency in tank and artillery forces. Dependency on foreign suppliers, no matter how committed, is a major consideration for national decisionmaking considering that a foreign supplier can never be fully trusted. Given the lessons of the recent embargo, the international community would most likely prevent supplies from reaching Yugoslavia in any event.
Nevertheless, in the Summer of 1996, Yugoslavia was working on solidifying its strategic cooperation with Russia. The process was boosted in mid-June when Russia announced its willingness and intent to resume military and technological cooperation with Yugoslavia. Such a cooperation would not only provide the Yugoslav Armed Forces with the required arms and spares in the short run, but also give boost to the defense industries which are near collapse (for economic reasons) because of the embargo and the Dayton-Paris Accords. The Russians seek cooperation in joint programs aimed at capitalizing on export markets once held by Yugoslavia and which Belgrade can no longer service. Such cooperation would contribute to the retention of skills and expertise even if actual production lines remain paralyzed.
The manpower problem, however, is far from being resolved. In 1994-95, the manpower crisis had already reached the point of aggregate impact on the operational capabilities of the military system as a whole. With the improvement of the economic situation, the easing of the problem has already begun. But it is far from being alleviated, let alone resolved.
The Army's manpower problem is complex and multi-faceted. As far as the war-fighting capabilities are concerned, the most serious problem is the retention of quality personnel, especially veteran NCOs and technicians, as well as junior officers with potential for long service and promotion to senior ranks. In the long-term, it is somewhat comforting for Belgrade that the main reason for these people leaving the service is economic: namely, the collapse of the standard of living on military pay, the Army's inability to provide basic living conditions, particularly housing, and basic services. This means that there is no serious alienation between this strata and the military system. Hence, once the economic incentives are restored, it is safe to assume that the professional and technically capable population which provided the solid and high-quality cadres will return to service.
Indeed, the overall Yugoslav manpower system remains healthy. There is no serious break between the public and the military system despite the economic hardships. During the 1990s, the percentage of people meeting their obligations for both the draft and mobilization for periodic training remained stable and very high. The population remained patriotic and the intimate contact between the public and "their" army remained viable. The only exception is the potential long-term impact of the migration of youth to avoid military service. Although presently the number of youth escaping service is very small, the phenomenon is nevertheless worrisome as a precedent setting trend, namely, the legitimization of avoiding conscription and national service.
Thus, in early 1996, the central and core problem facing the Yugoslav Army was its finances. However, the financial plight was so acute as to, in the words of a critical military analyst in Belgrade, "question the elementary existence of the Army". As Milosevic's Belgrade continued to disengage itself from crises and commitments which might have escalated into the use of force, the importance of the General Staff and of its influence on the political centers of power, have been "in constant regression". Consequently, the analyst observes, the 1996 military budget "only serves for mere survival": a dangerous situation considering Zagreb's continued preoccupation with the option of a regional war.
Meanwhile, even without any major war, the Yugoslav defense budget does not permit the sustainability of present cadres, let alone the professionalization of the Army structure and other manpower reforms so important for both more efficiency and further democratization of a once-communist system. The post-reforms Army of Yugoslavia was to be 100,000 to 120,000 strong. About half of this was to be composed of professional soldiers: Officers, noncommissioned officers, civilians employed by the military, and soldiers under contract. The present retention problem has a direct impact on Yugoslavia's ability to meet a national crisis. In times of national emergency, the professional component should serve as the core around which a mass army predominantly made of reservists is built. Therefore, the erosion in the capabilities of the professional core also reduces the overall capabilities of the entire military system.
A close examination of the Yugoslav defense budget pointed to significant budget shortages in 13 important subjects: Salaries, supply service and health, training and education, remount and maintenance of technical equipment, maintenance of immobility, social programs within the Army, functional expenditures, massive armament and provision of military equipment, transformation of military objects into objects for accommodation, war materiel reserves, construction and furnishing of officers' apartments, supply of necessary means for general use, and unplanned expenditure. These shortages do not include the funds needed for the replacement of the already outdated weapon systems and the attrition suffered by newer equipment because of shortages in spares.
Nevertheless, faced with growing tension throughout the former Yugoslavia and fully cognisant of the grand designs of Zagreb and Sarajevo, Belgrade could not afford not to attempt a certain level of modernization and build-up despite the acute economic situation. Russia has proven a loyal and generous supporter. Once the embargo was lifted, Russia expected to provide Yugoslavia with large quantities of sophisticated weapons, including additional aircraft, mainly MiG-29s and other modern aircraft. The Russian Armed Forces would assist with the supply of spares and technical expertise in order to quickly raise the serviceability of existing weapon systems. Russia would also contribute to the modernization of the Yugoslav air defense, providing a wide variety of systems from the S-300 and S-300V SAMs/ATBMs to the highly lethal battlefield 2S6 Tanguska. Moscow agreed to examine granting licences for self-production of aircraft and helicopters. Yugoslavia also acquired a few T-72s in order to retain the size of its high-quality tank units despite continued attrition due to maintenance difficulties.
One reason for Belgrade's sense of urgency in accomplishing the modernization of the Yugoslav Armed Forces is the ramifications of the regional disarmament agreements in the Dayton-Paris framework. Given the history of Zagreb and Sarajevo in totally violating arms acquisition legalities in the past, it is understood by Belgrade that the Croatia and the Izetbegovic forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue this practice in violation of the Dayton-Paris Accords. As well, Belgrade is aware of the vulnerability of Yugoslavia to military intervention by NATO and especially the US. Considering the repeated threats by the Clinton Administration "to bomb Belgrade" [i.e.: the Yugoslav Serbs] if the Bosnian Serbs did not give up on any one of a number of key issues during the war, enduring apprehension about a US-led military intervention is comprehensible.
The Vienna talks seek to further limit the size of the Armed Forces of the former Yugoslavia, creating an untenable balance of forces which Belgrade is apprehensive will create temptations for others to exploit. Indeed, the Yugoslav analyst points out, senior officers have great misgivings about the outcome of the Vienna negotiations over "the reduction of its military potential, cooperation with the Western military alliance, and acceptance of foreign control over its materiel, etc." As professionals, they obey Milosevic's orders. But an increasing number of senior officers now worry about the long-term negative impact on "the role of Serbs on the geopolitical map of Europe".
In mid-June 1996, the Yugoslav High Command was determined to rebuild the Armed Forces despite the adverse strategic climate. General Momcilo Perisic, Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Armed Forces, is fully aware of the country's grave strategic environment. "The FRY is surrounded by some 2.5-million soldiers in combative armed forces, in a region that is still exposed to contradictory and uncertain processes. That is why all those who succumb to dilemmas as to whether to have and develop a modem army, or not have an army at all, are completely wrong. Historical experience tells us that in this region extremely strong and well-equipped armed forces are necessary at all times, forces that will be prepared to make great sacrifices."
Gen. Perisic is optimistic about the Yugoslav Armed Forces. Belgrade is "strengthening the Yugoslav Army as the heart of defense, the freedom and independence of the FRY, which in case of armed aggression will be the first to lead and the last to stop in the defense of its country". The Armed Forces in recent years. Gen. Perisic stressed, have prevented the war from spreading to the new Yugoslavia; have supported "our people"; and have created a deterrence posture which affected the overall outcome of the regional political negotiations, reducing the price Yugoslavia had to pay. The Armed Forces have been "a stabilizing factor in the country".
But with the evolving strategic environment, new challenges are facing the Armed Forces, Gen. Perisic explains: "The members of the Yugoslav Army are undertaking enormous efforts to create a modem and well-armed force in line with the defense needs of the country and its financial possibilities." A major effort is directed at reversing the manpower problems and resolving the retention crisis. One solution is the consolidation of a smaller but stronger professional army as the core of the national defense at times not requiring full national mobilization. According to this concept, Gen. Perisic said, "the Yugoslav Army will develop as a modem army, organized, equipped, and trained in a modern fashion, but also as a numerically smaller and partially professionalized armed force. Its maneuvering abilities and firepower will increase, but with the strength of its peacetime component it will be able to prevent any form of aggression against the FRY, and create the conditions for a successful campaign in an imposed war, even under the most unfavorable of circumstances." Gen. Perisic acknowledges that given the strategic and regional dynamics, time is very short for Belgrade to complete these military reforms, restoring its own strategic posture.
In the early Summer of 1996, Belgrade was facing two major national security threats, both of which could easily escalate into a major regional war. The tension with Croatia continued as a direct outcome of Zagreb's determination to enforce the destruction and partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina even at the cost of a regional war. Meanwhile, an increasingly despaired and radicalized Sarajevo was contemplating a strategic breakout against the Bosnian Serbs aimed to ultimately drag the US, and NATO, into taking on Yugoslavia. Sarajevo knows that even a post-Dayton Belgrade would not be able to withstand the total destruction of the Bosnian Serbs, and would have to intervene on their behalf, thus giving Sarajevo and Washington the excuse they have been looking for. Neither of these eruptions is inevitable. However, their likelihood is growing because of the political-military dynamics in Belgrade.
By any regional standard, Yugoslavia is still a formidable military power. The main problem, is that both the political and military elite in Belgrade are passive and dispirited. They are preoccupied with the restoration and reconstruction of the Yugoslav economy and military infrastructure, as they should, but to the point of being politically oblivious to the region around them. The Belgrade elite seems incapable of seizing the initiative and fighting for their own future. This impression, far more than any factual analysis of the Yugoslav military posture and capabilities, creates a sense of vulnerability that is increasingly irresistible for Sarajevo to exploit. Thus, by their own passivity, the Yugoslavs may become victims of the circumstances and conspiracies around them. For Sarajevo, this process appears to be the core of the dramatic breakout it is seeking.
Anew military factor emerged in the Spring of 1996: a "wild card" in the regional balance of power. It is the reorganized Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In accordance with the provisions of the Dayton-Paris Accords, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army should transform into the Federation Army, incorporating both the Bosnian Muslim forces and Bosnian Croat forces (HVO). Massive military aid from the US and its NATO allies (mainly Turkey), including training and indoctrination, should transform these various military forces into a single genuine "multi-ethnic" armed forces committed to the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the emerging Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is actually a Muslim entity committed to the realization of Sarajevo's maximal objectives, with or without the promised US aid. It is because of this real character of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army that it constitutes a potential spark for a regional conflagration.
In the early Summer of 1996, before the anticipated massive build-up had begun, the Bosnian Muslims already had a formidable force, highly suitable for operations in the mountainous terrain of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In the aftermath of the initial demobilization required by the Dayton-Paris Accords, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army still had around 120,000 men. The main regional division is the corps structure: 1st Corps with its headquarters in Sarajevo, 2nd Corps in Tuzla, 3rd Corps in Zenica, 4th Corps in Mostar and Konjic, 5th Corps in Bihac, and the 7th Corps in Travnik. The troops themselves are divided into 78 infantry brigades, 13 mountain brigades, nine motorized brigades, two artillery brigades, five territorial brigades, one long-range reconnaissance brigade, and one special forces brigade, as well as two anti-aircraft defense regiments. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army also has three divisional headquarters that were used during the war to conduct and lead the main offensives. Their peacetime state is yet to be determined.
While the size of the tank and heavy combat vehicle forces of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina falls short of the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces, their artillery and rocket forces are at least equal. Despite the embargo, the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina has succeeded to amass a diverse force of heavy artillery and long range multiple barrel rocket launchers sufficient for the conduct of major offensives. Further more, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's arsenal of multi-purpose automatic guns, mortars, and particularly light missiles -- both ATGMs (anti-tank guided missiles) and SFSAMs (shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles) -- which are all optimal for mountainous terrain is superior to that of Sarajevo's real and perceived enemies. Moreover, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's fleet of assault helicopters and light aircraft is growing rapidly as their long-denied arsenal is now being openly acknowledged.
These forces and arsenals do not include the formidable HVO -- the Bosnian Croat forces -- that neither Zagreb nor Mostar, the self-declared capital of Herzeg-Bosna, show any inclination of integrating into a military force dominated and controlled by Izetbegovic's Sarajevo.
Meanwhile, motivated by its own political considerations, the United States and a few Muslim states already began to rearm and train the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army in the Spring of 1996. The US launched the program even though the mujahedin and Iranian presence issues had not been resolved. To stress Washington's commitment, the first shipment of largely small arms and military equipment was approved on March 14, the day the UN embargo on small arms was lifted. Over the next few weeks, the US Air Force delivered some 49,000 M-16 rifles, machineguns, and an assortment of military communications equipment. Bosnia-Herzegovina Army officials in Zenica and Tuzla confirmed the arrival of the US rifles. They complained that only small quantities of guns and a few communications systems were actually delivered to the Bosnian forces. As the first shipments of US military equipment were arriving in Bosnia-Herzegovina, some Bosnian soldiers were sent to Germany and Turkey for training. In mid-May, more than 200 Bosnian soldiers left for training on new NATO-style tanks and artillery weapons in Turkey. Gen. Enver Hadzihasanovic expects a group of pilots to soon begin training on new US-made helicopters in Turkey.
Of greater strategic importance was Sacirbey's announcement that Sarajevo was negotiating "a major contract to improve the federation army's command" with the US consulting firm Military Professional Resources. He stressed the firm's previous success in preparing the Croatian Army for its 1995 offensives in the Krajina and western Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Already in its fledgling phase, the "Equip and Train" program was causing discord between the US and its European allies. British and French senior officers with I-FOR openly declared that their governments were dead set against Washington's rearmament plans for Bosnia-Herzegovina. If fully implemented, these programs would only introduce more heavy weapons -- especially tanks and artillery -- into an explosive region that is already falling apart.
The main regional strategic development is Sarajevo's expectations from, and plans for, the US-led military aid. NATO sources briefed by the US expected a second batch of heavy weapons to be approved on June 12. I-FOR believes this shipment to include about 40 M-1 and M-60 tanks, around 100 armored vehicles, mortars, anti-tank rocket systems, and tactical vehicles. Assuming successful completion of the pilot training in Turkey, the US will also supply 30 Apache, Cobra and Black Hawk helicopters between July and September 1996. According to Bosnia-Herzegovina Army sources, confirmed by both Yugoslav/Serb and Croat military sources, the US commitment under the "Equip and Train" program includes the supply of 40 tanks, 80 armored personnel carriers, 2,550 trucks, 144 artillery pieces with calibers ranging from 75 mm to 155 mm, 318 antitank weapons, 30 helicopters, 170 surface-to-air missile systems, as well as large quantities of small arms and other infantry weapons, and communications systems. These quantities will be enough to arm a few high quality combined-arms units. Training and organizational support is to be provided primarily by US and Turkish personnel.
Although Sarajevo would have loved to receive larger quantities of weapon systems, the quantities of weapons promised by the US do not constitute a major problem for the Bosnia-Herzegovina High Command. The General Staffs plans require the establishment of "a professional army, smaller in number, but excellently armed and trained. Its backbone would be the best soldiers of our army, matured in battles throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina."
Sarajevo has tremendous problems with the objectives of the US military aid program. It is the understanding of Sarajevo that Washington would like Bosnia-Herzegovina "to form a very respectable defensive military force which would be capable of repelling all potential aggressors from its territory". For the Sarajevo General Staff, the essence of the US aid for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army means "neither the creation of an Army that represents a threat for anybody, nor the creation of formations that would defeat the army of the Serb entity". Washington is interested in a balance of power which would preclude any side from making a decisive military move as a key component of the consolidation of lasting peace. Committed to the consolidation of control over the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic's Sarajevo would have nothing of it.
Therefore, Bosnia-Herzegovina has resolved to rely on the Muslim world in order to build a far stronger army on its own. Irrespective of the US promises, the General Staff believes that the greatest help for the acquisition of weapons, military equipment and for training will come for the traditional wartime supporters of Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Islamic countries, particularly from Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as from Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Egypt. Sarajevo is optimistic about its ability to implement this design because the US already intends to transfer most of the responsibility for training and equipping to Turkey. Even though Ankara promised Washington that it will abide by NATO's guidelines and will not deviate from the responsibilities as defined by the Dayton-Paris Accords, both Ankara and Sarajevo know better. The Turkish military delegation that had visited Bosnia-Herzegovina back in early 1996 examined the situation and positively noted all the Bosnian requests. Given Turkey's assistance during the war, Sarajevo can only be encouraged.
Sarajevo's decision to go around Washington's back in pursuit of military capabilities reflected a thorough re-examination by the Bosnia-Herzegovina General Staff of the advisability of the entire process of acquiring US military aid. In mid-March, the Bosnian General Staff became acquainted with a Croatian military analysis of the anticipated US arms shipments to Bosnia for the HVO forces. The Croat General Staff anticipated problems because of the quality of weapons proposed by the US and advised the HVO accordingly. A Croatian military expert concluded that "the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO will be given weapons from Vietnam!"
The Zagreb analysis was professionally done. The Croat military experts realized that beyond political preconditions, including Sarajevo's resistance to grant autonomy for the HVO and unwillingness to see a real departure of the mujahedin, the primary challenge facing both the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO was that "the reorganization of the armies must be based upon a completely new concept, doctrine of war and military strategy, and operational tactics". Given the pressing schedule for equipping the armies as stipulated by the Dayton-Paris Accords and the available budgets, Washington will limit the quality and sophistication of the weapons delivered. Most likely, the US will deliver second-hand weapons from existing stockpiles in Germany. The Croat military analysts are reportedly "unanimous" in their conclusion that "the latest generation of equipment is out of the question, but it could be equipment from the Vietnam War or some items from the West's war against Iraq". At the same time, the Croat military experts insist the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army should not reject these weapons because they can still be useful against the Serb arsenal. Left unsaid is Zagreb's relief that these weapons will also be inferior to the HV's growing arsenal.
The Bosnian Muslim General Staff was not surprised by the Croatian analysis. Iran, Pakistan, and other Muslim states have been arguing over the years that the US would never permit a Muslim state in Europe to acquire credible military capabilities. The new Croatian analysis proves them right. Moreover, Sarajevo is not oblivious to the growing criticism among the key European members of I-FOR of Washington's intentions to arm the Bosnian Muslim units as the US component of I-FOR withdraws from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Europeans call the US plan the "arm and run" formula.
Sarajevo was also provided with Iranian advice on the peculiarities of the US election year, and its implications for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Forced to chose between the political support of the Europeans, who oppose the plans to arm the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and implementing the build-up of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the Clinton Administration will side with the Europeans in order to achieve the timely withdrawal of the US I-FOR contingent in time for the US elections. Hence, Sarajevo concluded, the likelihood of obtaining the entire military aid program, as promised, from the US was low. Hence, in March, the Sarajevo General Staff devised two concurrent programs: (1) to acquire weapons and other military supplies from alternate sources not burdened by US supervision; and (2) develop a crash program for a swift acquisition of heavy weapons and related military supplies under emergency conditions.
For the first program, Sarajevo embarked on an effort to revive the Muslim military support programs which existed during the war. Tehran, Islamabad, Ankara and Kuala Lumpur agreed to provide both heavy weapons and expertise on top of their current commitments. Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states contributed large sums of money for the purchase of off-the-shelf weapons systems from the PRC, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe.
In early May, the first shipments of weapons were ready for delivery. Hassan Cengic, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Deputy Minister of Defense, acknowledged that Bosnia-Herzegovina "has arms abroad" which will "soon come into the right hands". The primary impediment for the delivery of these weapons was Zagreb's opposition to their delivery via Croatia. Still, Cengic was optimistic about the arrival of these weapons. "We have arms abroad, bought or donated by friendly nations, and they will soon be delivered to the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," he asserted. During the war, Cengic has been instrumental in organizing and running the main weapon supply programs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, working in close cooperation with Iranian Intelligence.
The second program, devised with Iranian assistance back in early March, is more sinister. The Bosnia-Herzegovina High Command realized that large quantities of some of the best weapon systems in the US arsenal were already on Bosnian soil: I-FOR's equipment. This is front line equipment that belongs to the US Army's best units in Germany. It constitutes a quality leap over anything available to any of the other armies in the Balkans. At first, Sarajevo sought a political arrangement whereupon Washington would decide to leave these weapons behind as surplus once I-FOR withdraws. Riyadh was even approached and asked to influence the Clinton Administration to go along with the plan, and promise some financial compensations for the left-behind equipment.
However, by late March, Sarajevo was dubious about the prospects of such an arrangement. The slow pace of the US supply of small arms and the lingering problems with Washington concerning the Islamist presence and US demands for integration into a joint "Bosniak"-Croat army, convinced Sarajevo that the US could not be trusted to complete the military aid program because of the doubts about the viability of the US commitment. The leak of the Pentagon's intelligence assessment warning that Bosnia-Herzegovina was fragmenting and was likely to return to fighting the moment I-FOR withdrew was considered by the innermost circles in Sarajevo as a proof of Washington's duplicity and enduring anti-Islamic posture.
Hence, the Bosnia-Herzegovina High Command began to seriously examine what the Iranians call the "lessons of Beirut". VEVAK experts have argued for some time that the United States was incapable of withstanding a large number of casualties, especially when they are inflicted suddenly. As demonstrated in Beirut and Mogadishu, faced with a sudden surge of fatalities, the US would give up the pursuit of strategic interests and quickly withdraw. Now, the Iranians argue, any spectacular terrorist operation inflicting heavy casualties on the US troops, particularly given election-year considerations, would compel Washington to swiftly withdraw the troops into safety. It was highly likely that the bulk of the US heavy weapons and equipment would be left behind, especially if pressure was put on the US. According to Yugoslav military and intelligence sources, Gen. Delic bought the idea in mid-March.
Preparations began immediately in a dedicated cell within the ranks of the 1st Bosniak Brigade "Nocne Ptice" [Night Birds]. The 1st Brigade is the unit which would sponsor, operationally support and assist in terrorist operations against I-FOR. These preparations were supervised by a small cadre of Iranian senior intelligence officers and a few expert terrorists from elsewhere in the Middle East. They are supported by a group of specialists and experts from Turkey, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Lebanon, including veteran car-bomb experts from Lebanon.
Moreover, the early May 1996 warning to I-FOR issued by the Egyptian Islamist "Salim al-Kurshani" should be considered in the context of these preparations. The name of the two organizations mentioned by Al-Kurshani -- the "Islamic Group – Military Branch in Bosnia" and the Bosnian Islamic Jihad -- have since been mentioned by other sources in the context of active preparations for Sarajevo-sponsored attacks against the US contingent of I-FOR.
Contemplating the launching of terrorist operations against I-FOR, Sarajevo had no doubt that any use of violence would inevitably lead to the resumption of fighting with both Croats and Serbs. By now, Sarajevo was awash with rumors about joint conspiracies between Belgrade and Zagreb to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina once I-FOR withdrew, and, echoing Tehran's theme, about a global conspiracy aimed at preventing the rise of a Muslim State in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the Spring of 1996, Sarajevo was increasingly pushing itself for the resumption of fighting.
More than anything else, the mere availability of such an option to swiftly reinforce the Bosnian Muslim arsenal, even if through drastic measures, bolstered the self confidence of Sarajevo. The political and military leadership concluded that they could resume the pursuit of their maximalist program without fear of finding themselves without the necessary weapons and military supplies.
By mid-March 1996, the Bosnia-Herzegovina General Staff began active preparations for the resumption of fighting. Brigade General Enver Hadzihasanovic, the Commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, acknowledged that the activities of the army were now focused on planning for the next war Hadzihasanovic explained that his forces were already working on "maintaining... the high combat-readiness of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, [in] case the other side chooses the war option once again. That is why the changes in the army are being carried out in such a way as not to influence the main tasks."
Sarajevo's assertiveness was clearly reflected on Armed Forces Day, April 16,1996. In his address. Gen. Delic stressed the new era of reorganization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. "The peace placed new tasks before the political and military leadership of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which must be realized in a planned, qualitative, and responsible manner. This primarily involves the transformation of the army into a peacetime military formation that is capable of defending Bosnia-Herzegovina and the peace within it."
In his address, Ejup Ganic stressed the predominance of the Bosnian Muslims in the ostensibly multi-ethnic Army. "In this part of Europe, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is a new factor of peace, defense, and stability. The program of the Army has been and will remain Bosnian, regardless of the fact that the Bosniaks, proportionally speaking, constitute the majority. There are also Croats in the Army, there are Serbs and Jews."
The most authoritative statement of Sarajevo's objective came on April 21, 1996, from President Izetbegovic himself. Izetbegovic visited Bihac to celebrate a major parade of units of the 5th Corps. The singular importance of the visit was demonstrated by the presence on the review stand of Vice-President Ejup Ganic; Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic; General Rasim Delic; Divisional Gen. Atif Dudakovic, commander of the 5th Corps; a delegation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina government; as well as representatives of the diplomatic corps mostly from Muslim states and foreign military attaches. The large parade included members of the 501st, 502nd, 503rd, 505th, 506th, 507th, 509th, 511th, and 517th Brigades, the Air Force Group, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the military police, the 510th Mechanized Brigade, the 5th Combined Artillery Unit, the 5th Light Artillery Anti-aircraft Division, and the 5th Engineering Battalion, and other units.
Izetbegovic delivered a short speech to the troops. The parade of the 5th Corps, he explained, was "a message for both friend and foe; to make friends rejoice and to warn the enemy never again to raise its finger against our people". Izetbegovic highlighted the challenges facing Bosnia-Herzegovina. "I am here to say not a great deal... to tell you that the struggle for Bosnia-Herzegovina has not finished yet, that it goes on and to wish you success on this long difficult and honorable road toward a free and democratic Bosnia." In a subsequent political rally later that day, Izetbegovic was even more explicit. He declared that "the struggle will continue until Bosnia is unified and democratic".
Yugoslav and Croat sources were alarmed by the display of militancy in Bihac. Both Belgrade and Zagreb are concerned about the renewal of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina because of Sarajevo's growing siege mentality and militancy. Croat insiders now expect the renewal of war with the Bosnian Muslims. Zagreb notes that such an eruption will take place at a time when the superpowers are pressing Croatia to disarm and demobilize. Such a development only encourages Sarajevo to strike. Therefore, Croatian insiders insist, the renewal of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina "is becoming a reality and a nightmare that it is hard to escape from, despite guarantees from the United States".
Yugoslav and Croat sources explain that Izetbegovic's threats in Bihac were addressed not only to Zagreb, but primarily to the Clinton Administration. Izetbegovic delivered a joint message to Washington -- from the Bosnian Muslims and the Iranians -- that Sarajevo's objective is a "unified Bosnia" under a Muslim rule, and without the presence of the US. Izetbegovic is convinced that he can triumph with Iranian and Muslim aid without the West/US. All that he needs is for the US to leave him alone and definitely not help Croatia. Tehran remains convinced that a Beirut-type act of spectacular terrorism can deliver such an outcome.
The growing military tensions were also expressed in strong positions taken by the Sarajevo military elite, as if intentionally trying to instigate crises with their Croatian counterparts. For example, on May 21, General Rasim Delic, demanded that the commander in chief of the federal army be Bosniak. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army can ensure "the protection of state integrity and the sovereignty and territorial borders of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina," only if "this role be performed by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina".
The next day. Brigadier Salko Begic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina air force and anti-aircraft defense, highlighted the war dangers discussing his plans for the future. "It is our goal to create an air force that, with a qualified cadre and technical equipment, will be a significant element in preventing any sort of aggression against our country. Our objective is to build a defensive air force. If necessary, however, it will be capable of offensive operations," Begic explained. "We need multi-purpose aircraft that will successfully carry out all the tasks of modern fighter planes, bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft. The dominant force will consist of military helicopters, which are exceptionally suitable for fighting on this terrain. The whole system will be enhanced with unmanned aircraft, which can be effectively used for reconnaissance. Transportation needs can be met quite successfully with the present equipment."
By now, late May, senior Bosnia-Herzegovina officers were openly acknowledging that their problems with the US were insurmountable. The US was indeed withholding the bulk of military aid because of its fear of rising Muslim militancy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sarajevo was increasingly convinced that the Iran-inspired scenario of an eruption of fighting instigated by the Bosnian Muslims (through provocations and terrorism) was perhaps inevitable and imminent. "I am seriously preparing for the next war," Gen. Atif Dudakovic, the 5th corps commander, declared. "We see that all sides are trying to undermine the [Dayton-Paris] agreement."
These are not idle threats. The eruption of fighting around the Brcko area is already looming. All sides have been increasingly reluctant to resolve a dispute about boundaries in the critical Brcko area -- the part of northern Bosnia that links the eastern and western Serb-controlled areas -- through negotiations. According to the Dayton Accord s, the parties were to name arbitrators by June 14, 1996, and unconditionally implement their decision by the end of the year. However, all indications suggest that Sarajevo is determined to bring about the disconnection of the corridor at all cost. "In Brcko all the issues that originated the conflict come together again," Carl Bildt, the international representative in charge of coordinating civilian efforts to put the peace agreement into effect, warned. "The area was 52 percent Muslim before the war, but Serb 'ethnic cleansing' was brutal, and President Alija Izetbegovic is insisting that his boundary has to extend through Serb territory right to the Sava River. It's nowhere near being sorted out."
Fully aware of the regional and global strategic significance of any attempt to cut the Brcko Corridor, Sarajevo is determined to implicate the US in its military surge. Indeed, the US is already directly contributing to the potential resumption of fighting and escalation. By training and preparing the 2nd Corps the US has expedited and helped preparations for the Bosnian Muslim attack on the Brcko Corridor. Most disturbing is the US training of the elite units which are saturated with Bosnian Islamists and foreign mujahedin. In late April 1996, Bosnian Serb sources described the ongoing US training effort: "The Muslims are receiving their greatest support for terrorist-sabotage actions from the US. US instructors are providing intense training to the reconnaissance-sabotage units in an attempt to replace the Iranian instructors. In view of this policy, the United States is already supplying Alija's army with arms. The main training camp for the men from the 28th Muslim Division is in the area of the village of Vukovije, northeast of Dubrave airport near Tuzla."
In late May, the Bosnian Army accelerated the conditioning of the strategic theater for the resumption of fighting. Bosnia-Herzegovina Army special forces, including Mujahedin, have been "running operations" behind Bosnian Serb lines throughout north-eastern Bosnia. For example, on the night of May 29/30,1996, Bosnian Muslim special forces blew up a bridge at Krstac on the river Janja, near Bijeljina. Although the bridge was right on the border between the "federation" and the Srpska Republic, its destruction is of far-reaching importance. This operation was a strategic move intended to prevent Serb counter-attacks on Tuzla from the flank in case of a major offensive by the 2nd Corps on Brcko. I-FOR's efforts to further investigate the explosion were rebuffed by local Bosnian Muslim authorities.
In early June 1996, military intelligence in both Belgrade and Pale became apprehensive about joint preparations by the US elements of I-FOR and Sarajevo to deal with the Brcko Corridor. According to their intelligence information, the US and Germany decided to strangle the Serb-held western parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina by cutting the vital Brcko Corridor. A special "federation" task force comprised of Bosnian Muslim and Croatian soldiers trained in the US would attempt to reclaim Brcko in the name of "ethnically cleansed" Bosnian Muslim refugees. A special I-FOR battalion, reportedly made up of US and Scandinavian soldiers, officially tasked to "protect" the Bosnian troops and civilians, would actually seize the city from the local Bosnian Serb garrison. Fearing "escalation", I-FOR would then insist on a cessation of hostilities, thus creating a situation on the ground which would ensure that Brcko would be handed over to Sarajevo by international arbitrators.
In the meantime, military intelligence in both Belgrade and Pale believe, I-FOR will assist the Bosnia-Herzegovina troops to disrupt the Serb traffic along this vital corridor. If permitted to persist, such a blockade will bring about to collapse of the western parts of the Srpska Republic. Any Serb attempt to re-open the corridor by force would inevitably result in the resumption of fighting with I-FOR supporting the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Little wonder that the mood in the Banja Luka region is reported to be resembling the Republic of Serbian Krajina just before the fall of Knin.
Part III
In the Summer of 1996, the Clinton Administration was actively preparing for the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, then anticipated to take place in September. US politicians consider these elections to be the crowning achievement of the Dayton-Paris Accords. A closer examination of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, not just Bosnia-Herzegovina, demonstrates, however, that the situation is exactly the opposite. In the Summer of 1996, the entire former Yugoslavia was transforming into a "pressure cooker": a process of building inner pressure that might expedite violent eruption.
The common denominator to all the regional crisis points -- their role as potential catalysts and sparks for the resumption of fighting -- was Sarajevo's conviction that only a maximalist solution would deliver salvation for the Bosnian Muslims.
Sarajevo has been intensifying preparations for resumption of hostilities since early April 1996. Izetbegovic and his coterie believe that widespread fighting is inevitable if both Croats and Serbs are determined to prevent them from establishing a Muslim state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sarajevo's fear was aggravated by the realization that the foreign patrons may not provide the protection and military support which had been anticipated.
The turning point can be traced to late March 1996, with the emergence of a series of reports about the viability of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the "federation" context in the aftermath of the Dayton-Paris Accords. Significantly, these reports were prepared for the German Government: Croatia's closest ally and the greatest political influence on Zagreb elite. Sarajevo could thus surmise that the acceptance of these reports, and particularly their recommendations, by Bonn, most likely means that Zagreb would also work to implement these recommendations. All the reports offered very grim assessments about the viability of the Dayton-Paris Accords and the political posture they claimed to have created in the Balkans.
One report warned Bonn, and the West as a whole, that "the objective of the present Muslim leaders in Sarajevo is not a multi-ethnic but rather an Islamic Bosnia". In order to ensure its ability to enforce such an "Islamic Bosnia" on a majority of Christians, Sarajevo is increasingly relying on "the penetration of Islamic fundamentalism" in order to shape society. The report singled out the Bosnian Croats, because they are part of the "federation", as the most threatened population segment in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This realization of Sarajevo's real objectives, the report stressed, should serve as the cornerstone of the Western policy in the former Yugoslavia.
Another report stated that the best outcome the West could hope for is for Bosnia-Herzegovina to become "another Cyprus": that is an irreversibly divided country patrolled by international forces but with no violence and fighting. This study concentrated on prospects for the implementation of the civilian reconstruction in the framework of Dayton-Paris. The study identified the mere existence of the "federation" as the main obstacle for long-term stability in the Balkans. Imposed by the US and creating internal pressures by its mere existence, the "federation" has no legitimacy, merit or future. Until its inevitable demise, the "federation" will continue creating inner tensions which are bound to erupt in violence as Croats seek to break away but have no stomach to confront Washington The study recommended that the German Government stay away from the "federation" in order not be associated with the outcome of the eruption.
If Sarajevo hoped that US belief in, and commitment to, the "federation" and Sarajevo's supremacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina would prevail over the growing European scepticism and hostility, then by May it was not so sure even about that. Sarajevo's dread of a conspiracy against a Muslim Bosnia was heightened in mid-May 1996 following the publication of an US draft of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Bosnia-Herzegovina. US intelligence experts also realized that the Muslim-Croat "federation" was the greatest impediment to reaching stability. Even US experts now concluded that the "federation" "remains largely a figment of the American imagination." For Izetbegovic and the Sarajevo elite, the shocking aspect of this revelation was not its statement of the obvious, but what they considered to be a confirmation that even the Clinton Administration, which had invented and imposed the "federation", was now joining the anti-Islamic conspiracy.
Little wonder that in late May, Western diplomats in Sarajevo were noticing that growing segments of the ruling SDA were convinced that only an Islamic Bosnia, where only Muslims could be full citizens, would provide them protection and salvation, as well as ensure that they remained in power. "The [SDA] hard-liners are trying to create an ethnically pure state," a Sarajevo-based European diplomat explained. "They are short-sighted, and in the end their bigotry will create new conflict, but after this terrible war they feel the only way Muslims can be safe is if they have complete control of Bosnia."
The Sarajevo elite has already concluded that there is no substitute for, and no escape from, fighting for their Islamic X. Bosnia. There remained the questions of what kind of fighting would be necessary and who would be the participants. In the Summer of 1996, three critical points of contention emerged as the focal points of a future eruption. The sparks and catalysts for the resumption of major fighting throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and the entire Balkans are:
- The Islamicization of the former Serb suburbs of Sarajevo;
- Mostar as the catalyst for a new Muslim-Croat war; and
- The Brcko Corridor as a spark for resuming the war against the Serbs and getting I-FOR directly involved in the fighting.
The transformation of Sarajevo points to the evolution of crises ahead. The Bosnian Muslim government has embarked on a persistent policy of reclaiming abandoned Bosnian Serb property and the resettlement of Muslims there. Recently, this policy has evolved into the eviction by "popular" coercion of the "moderate" Bosnian Serbs who had believed in the assurances of the government and the US/I-FOR, and did not take part in the exodus. This process has already irreversibly transformed the demography of Sarajevo, establishing an overwhelming Muslim majority and effectively preventing the return of the Bosnian Serbs even in the context of a future agreement.
Significantly, the US is silent about these developments, and the Western European criticism is mute. Sarajevo thus demonstrates both disdain to international community, as well as its staunch commitment to the irreversibility of the separation as far as the Muslim held territory is concerned. The long-term significance of the Islamicization of Sarajevo lies in the fact that at the very same time the US is leading the international community in applying overwhelming pressure on the Bosnian Serb authorities to permit the return of Bosnian Muslim "refugees" to strategic areas such as Doboj and Brcko. The US even threatens the use of I-FOR to enforce the required "freedom of movement". This enduring double standard reassures Sarajevo that it can get away with its plans for provocations. At the same time, the Bosnian Serb position continues to harden, and the hostility and confrontationalism of the affected Bosnian Serb population grows, thus creating fertile conditions for the Bosnian Muslim provocations.
Mostar -- where a new Muslim-Croat war is possible anytime -- is to be the symbol of the viability of the "federation" and genuine Muslim-Croat reconciliation and co-existence. Instead, Mostar has become an excuse and venue for profound and irreconcilable strategic trends. Sarajevo is determined to demonstrate the Bosnian Muslims' unchallengeable control over the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croats -- both the Herzeg-Bosna leadership and Zagreb -- would have nothing of it. War was thus likely because of Sarajevo's unwillingness to confront reality.
The long-term inherent danger in the "federation's" existentional crisis lies in the internal dynamics in Sarajevo -- in the reverberations of Sarajevo's approach to dealing with the crisis. The core issue is the enhanced and forced Islamicization of the Bosnian Muslim population as a precondition for effective mobilization for an all-out confrontation with both Croats and Serbs.
In early June, Adil Zulfikarpasic, the leader of the Muslim Bosniak Organization [MBO] elucidated the problem. He warned that a "new war between the [Bosnian] Muslims and Croats" was possible. Muslim-Croat reconciliation was not being achieved willingly. Zulfikarpasic stated that the Muslim-Croat "federation" was "non-viable" and, given the international pressure to retain it, a new war was most likely. All the negotiations are being conducted under international duress and "with one side holding a knife and the other waving a stick." Since "there is no more backing for an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina," popular fighting would erupt the moment any side overcame its current fear of international forces.
Zulfikarpasic singled out the situation in Muslim Bosnia, terming it "nightmarish". What frightens the MBO most is that Sarajevo's drive to enforce its rule over the Bosnian Muslim population enhances militancy and creates perpetual conflict, by being accomplished through forced Islamicization. Sarajevo is bringing in Islamism from the Middle East that is alien to the Bosnian Muslim population's traditional way of life and heritage. This process, an MBO official warned, served to destroy the Bosnian Muslim community more than either Croats or Serbs.
Because of its vital strategic importance for the Bosnian Serbs, Brcko is a ticking time-bomb. There is no power center which does not recognize that any disruption of the Serb communications and transportation along the Brcko Corridor means death to western Srpska, and thus constitutes a catalyst for eruption. Because of the still unresolved final status of Brcko, Sarajevo considers the crisis a legitimate opening for provocations and harsh demands which can be transformed into ultimatums and the resumption of fighting. Sarajevo is fully aware of the Clinton Administration's continued interest in strangling Banja Luka, and the US Army involvement in training of Bosnian Muslim forces in Tuzla who are overlooking the corridor. Consequently, Sarajevo is confident in its ability to instigate fighting in the Brcko area in a way which will still get the US/I-FOR to crush the Serbs for them.
Such a crisis is most likely to erupt in the wake of violent demands by Bosnian Muslim "refugees" to return to their native Brcko and I-FOR (US) support and protection of such "freedom of movement". The inevitable Bosnian Serb resistance to such a drive will put them in direct confrontation with, perhaps even the use of force against, I-FOR in the US Sector: exactly what both the Izetbegovic and Clinton Administrations would love to see happening. At the same time, even though both Pale and Belgrade are fully aware of the horrendous ramifications of a clash with I-FOR, they cannot afford to lose the Brcko Corridor. Thus, any confrontation in the Brcko area is bound to spark a wider crisis.
The explosive potential of any of these three crisis points lies in their exploiting of the real dynamics in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslavia as a whole. The essence of the US-led imposition of the Dayton-Paris Accords was to freeze strategic dynamics arbitrarily. The use of brute force and the credible threat of further escalation -- the might of the US and NATO -- coupled with the exhaustion of the key warring factions served to create conducive conditions for an interlude in the cessation of carnage.
But the forceful imposition of the Dayton-Paris "process" has not altered the commitment of the local population groupings and their respective leaderships to the realization of their manifest destinies. Perhaps the sole common denominator of the Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs is that their respective manifest destinies do not include a Muslim-controlled, multi-ethnic and unified Bosnia-Herzegovina, the very same type of state the Dayton-Paris Accords were supposed to create.
Hence, any one, or all, of the warring factions will surge at the first opportunity to complete the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina and establish their preferred way of life. The US can impose its will on an exhausted and attritted Bosnia-Herzegovina for a brief period, especially as anti-US and anti-Europe sentiments are growing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and political pressure for a US withdrawal builds in the US. Furthermore, the quintessential grand strategic interests of both Russia and Germany are increasingly harmed by the enduring tensions in the former Yugoslavia. Both Moscow and Bonn are determined to have their proteges resolve their outstanding differences and establish a viable, though tenuous, framework for stability in the region. So Europe may move to contain the US as the local powers surge to establish a viable arrangement, most likely in a new round of intense fighting.
The present overall posture and internal dynamics of the key players is a continuation of the drive for vital interests which motivated them to break up the old Yugoslavia and endure several years of fratricidal fighting and atrocities. The Dayton-Paris Accords fail to address, let alone resolve, any of these issues. Moreover, the interlude in the violence has created a period for reflection and preparation for further pursuit of the traditional objectives. If anything, there is renewed resolve to implement the respective national plans.
The Serbs in the new Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are immersed in internal debate about their destiny. The Serbs are yet to recover from their shock. They are contemplating how to come to terms with the sudden defeat inflicted by the US and their continued demonization, even as the true facts become known. The Serbs' situation is compounded by their continued economic crisis: the lifting of the sanctions has not done much to alleviate the problem because of the withholding of foreign aid and investment. At the same time, there are initial signs of a resurrection of "realistic" or "pragmatic" Serb nationalism. This evolution is encouraged by contacts with the Russians. This revived Serb nationalism builds on awareness of the Serbian historical and regional importance yet without the aggressive militancy of some of the para-military private forces of the war. Once this trend becomes politically viable, it could transform into a driving force for democracy, reconstruction and the consolidation of a balanced strategic posture with Croatia.
The Croats are preoccupied with devising ways to preserve their chauvinistic zeal as the political asset and foundation of the Tudjman administration. Zagreb considers their regional power surge as both a strategic imperative and as the source of popular adoration for the Tudjman leadership. The recovery of Eastern Slavonia by [excessive] force is a tempting option which Tudjman's Zagreb may not be able to resist. Meanwhile, growing fears of the enduring presence of the Izetbegovic administration in Sarajevo, and the ensuing growing threat of Islamist terrorism in Croatia, make Bosnia-Herzegovina an urgent, real-time defense challenge. Indeed, Bosnia-Herzegovina is now openly compared with Iran and Libya as a terrorist state and the source of regional destabilization. Yet a greater fear of US retribution and pressure if Croatia breaks the "federation" prevents Zagreb from resolving the Bosnian problem as it would have preferred. Fearing the long-term ramifications of any delay in containing the spread of militant Islam, Zagreb is eagerly seeking any excuse -- localized conflagration -- to serve as a spark for a strategic eruption.
Izetbegovic's Sarajevo is fully aware of the building pressure from, and resolve of, its enemies. Rather than confront reality, the Islamist leadership is accepting the Iranian conspiratorial theories which explain the crisis in terms of perpetual Western hostility toward Islam. Hence, Sarajevo has given up on the West, especially the US, as a source of long-term support. Instead, Sarajevo is getting ready to lash out in revenge and despair. At the same time, exploiting the gullibility of the Clinton Administration, Izetbegovic's Sarajevo leadership is not likely to let the US forces leave in peace. Rather, General Delic is still determined to instigate a provocation which will lead to the US-led I-FOR taking on the Bosnian Serbs and Croats.
In early June 1996, addressing an Arab audience, Bosnian Vice-President Ejup Ganic anticipated the possibility of a new confrontation if I-FOR failed to impose the implementation of the Dayton-Paris Accords as interpreted by Sarajevo. "As long as there are obstacles to implementation, the danger [of renewed fighting] is always present," he stated. Concurrently, Delic anticipated "the eruption of the war once again". This war, he warned, "would extend to the region as a whole".
At the same time, and in seeming total oblivion to this dynamic, the US was increasing the political pressure on both friends and foes to ensure the timely completion of the "elections" in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Starting late May, numerous European officials in international bodies involved with the preparations for the elections, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), raised doubts about the ability to conduct meaningful elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Consequently, Washington started an effort to conceal and suppress reports, and to prevent publications which might challenge the ability to certify that conditions were ripe for elections. European officials now complain about "intense pressure" from Washington to certify that preconditions for elections exist. The US head of the OSCE's Bosnian mission, Robert H. Frowick, even instructed his staff to focus more on the positive developments rather than report the grim conditions and dim prospects for the elections. The pressure to adapt reporting reached the point that Frowick's chief of staff, also a US citizen, resigned in protest. One European observer called Frowick's instructions "a cynical move, aiming solely at justifying what will probably be a farce".
Flavio Cotti, the Swiss Foreign Minister in charge of determining if conditions were ripe for elections, continued to resist intense pressure from the Clinton Administration, including US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in person, to declare that the elections could be held on time. "If even minimal conditions are not met, then I believe it will be better to delay elections," Cotti told The New York Times. "If these elections degenerate into a farce and a drama, then it will be a negative exercise for all of the parties involved."
Nevertheless, Christopher stated in early June that the elections would go ahead in September 1996 despite all problems. US officials identified the presence of "war criminals", rather than the popular polarization and mounting inner tensions, as the primary impediment to the successful completion of the elections. Therefore, US, and to a lesser extent other I-FOR, forces will expand "more visible and proactive patrols through the country", particularly in Serb-held territory, to apprehend war criminals and assist in establishing freedom of movement. The US officials acknowledged that the primary reason for US pressure to ensure that the elections are conducted on time is Washington's mounting fear of embarrassment and difficulties for the Clinton Administration in the forthcoming US Presidential elections.
If there was nay need for an example of what the Bosnian elections would really look like, the July 1,1996, elections in the city of Mostar provided such a precedent. Technically, the elections were quite successful, for there was no violence and voter turn-out was high. However, the actual outcome of the votes in Mostar, explained a local European Union (EU) official, "is likely to foster [further] division". Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action (SDA) won 48 percent of the votes, all of them in the Muslim East, North and old-town Mostar, and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won 45 percent of the votes, all of them in the Croat-inhabited West, South-West and South Mostar.
Although the elections were for a single city council, the results demonstrated a clear division of votes along communal lines. "The result has vindicated predictions that the elections would not change the current balance of power," an independent Western observer told Reuters. EU spokesman Dragan Gasic also anticipated a functional co-existence at best. "The estimate is that there will be no classical majority-opposition relationship. It would not be politically feasible in a town where the electorate is physically divided along ethnic lines," Gasic explained. "The SDA and HDZ will most probably be forced to form a grand coalition and cooperate on questions of joint interest." There is no expectation of a unified city government, let alone functional unification.
Nevertheless, by early July, the Clinton Administration was exercising tremendous pressure on the EU and OSCE to certify that conditions were ripe for the conduction of the national elections in September 1996. For the first time, cracks were reported in the thus-far united and resolute European stand against these elections.
But the US continued pressuring its European allies to retain forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in an I-FOR framework well into 1997, while the US forces would withdraw to enable President Clinton to keep his promise before the elections. Still, to circumvent Washington's own promise, the US forces would establish new bases in southern Hungary, near the Croatian border, and would assemble a very heavy and "overwhelming" rapid reaction force supporting the European I-FOR remaining in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the Summer of 1996, with the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina deteriorating, the US pressure on the Europeans to retain larger I-FOR in place into 1997 and beyond was growing. The declared mandate of this I-FOR-like force, according to the Clinton Administration, would be to impose unified Bosnia-Herzegovina on Sarajevo's behalf.
And by the Summer of 1996, the original mandate of I-FOR was reaching the halfway mark. Despite US pressure on the Europeans to extend their stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was increasing preoccupation among all the regional leaderships with "the day after". There should be no doubt that virtually all leaders and aspirant leaders of the three warring factions are determined to resume the active pursuit of their respective vital national objectives, if necessary through the use of force. In this context, two groups of possible scenarios are emerging:
1. The moment I-FOR withdraws, Croatia instigates a regional crisis which might escalate into war, in order to impose the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Zagreb and Belgrade. If Zagreb feels threatened or sure that post I-FOR conditions will not permit the escalation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croats will instigate their regional war by attacking Eastern Slavonia and dragging the new Yugoslavia into the war. It will not take long to expand this war southwards into Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Zagreb is convinced, and not without reason and confidence, that if the US tries to intervene directly to save the Sarajevo administration the war would escalate into a European and possibly a world war. Therefore, fearing such escalation, both Bonn and Moscow would jointly strive to deter outside intervention in the Bosnian war. With the West Europeans already reluctant to do "something" for an Islamic administration in Sarajevo, such a move would essentially be anti-US.
2. Izetbegovic's Sarajevo is fully aware of the above scenario. As a result, the Bosnian Muslim elite is working to pre-empt the Croats by instigating a regional war while the US-led I-FOR is still in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Sarajevo is confident that given the right "excuse" the US-led I-FOR would take on the Serbs with all the ferocity a superpower can muster, thus also deterring the Croats from challenging Sarajevo. If the Croats intervene, I-FOR would attack them too. Then on the ashes of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic would be able to establish his own Islamist state.
Such a pre-emptive breakout, particularly if the US-led I-FOR is slow to escalate the war, is more likely to lead to an all-out effort by both Serbs and Croats to quickly destroy Sarajevo, virtually at all cost. Both Zagreb and Belgrade know that under such conditions, their respective patrons -- Germany and Russia -- as well as the West Europe would unite to prevent the US from disrupting the new Bosnian war. Having witnessed first-hand the cynicism and opportunism of the Clinton Administration's Bosnian policy, Europe is determined to ensure that the long-term dynamic in Europe is not lost, let alone sacrificed on the altar of a misguided and irrational US policy.
As things stand at this time of writing, in the Summer of 1996, the slide toward the realization of the second group of these scenarios is accelerating.
Most telling is the escalation of Islamist special operations, terrorism and subversion. Significantly, these operations go unpunished. I-FOR is fully aware that Sarajevo's special forces, including mujahedin, are "running operations" behind Bosnian Serb lines, mainly in the US sector, and does nothing about it. Little wonder that an emboldened Sarajevo is escalating the audacity, frequency and lethality of the strikes.
The Bosnian Muslim special forces have been gradually escalating their strikes from harassment to actual special operations, such as the blowing up of the bridge near Bijeljina. The accelerated build-up of Bosnian Muslim special and terrorist forces points to Sarajevo's intention to escalate the instigation of more operations of strategic significance.
Sarajevo and Tehran continued in the Summer of 1996 to markedly expand their Islamist terrorist forces and assets, from a vast training infrastructure in the Middle East and South Asia to forward operational bases in the Balkans. Significantly, the terrorist infrastructure in Bosnia-Herzegovina is under direct control of Iran's VEVAK and Izetbegovic's AID; hence it is an instrument of the two governments. This is because Islamist terrorism is of strategic importance in the contingency plans of Sarajevo and Tehran. These activities are earmarked for spectacular terrorist operations in both the Balkans and all over Europe.
Most important, however, is the anticipated role for Islamist terrorism in the context of the consolidation of an Islamic government in Sarajevo. If and when the Europeans refuse to support, and participate in, the imposition of Izetbegovic's Sarajevo over the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Iran-led Islamists will strike, launching an intifadah of the Muslim population in Western Europe, as well as a spate of spectacular terrorism in Europe and the US itself. Beyond that, these terrorist preparations and build-up will contribute to the escalation of the Islamist jihad at the heart of the West, a longstanding objective of the Iran-led militant Islam.
A crucial component/aspect of the new terrorism infrastructure in and out of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the rise of the "Balkans". "Balkans" is now the name given to the Islamist veterans of the fighting in Bosnia -- the mujahedin -- and the Bosnian Islamists who joined their ranks having been trained in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Sudan. Presently, the "Balkans" not only concentrate in the former Yugoslavia, but increasingly contribute to other "battle fronts" in the international Islamist jihad. They build on the infrastructure and traditions established by their "Afghan" predecessors: those guerilla fighters who graduated from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.
Several senior Arab security officials stress, however, that the "Balkans" are more dangerous than the "Afghans". The principal difference between the "Balkans" and "Afghans" goes beyond the improvement in military and clandestine skills between the two generations of Islamist mujahedin. The key lies in the evolution in the spirit of jihad from that of the "Afghans" to that of the "Balkans". Both groups of mujahedin are the outcome of the ideological and theological circumstances of the specific jihad which gave rise to these respective movements, as well as the concurrent overall transformation of the Islamist trend. It is significant that the Islamist world of the 1990s is far more cohesive than that of the 1980s. There is both jointness of purpose and a working operational command and control between Tehran, Khartoum and numerous Sunni Islamist luminaries.
This jointness enhances the fundamental difference between the Afghan jihad and the Bosnian jihad. In Afghanistan of the 1980s, the Muslim world was on the defensive, fighting to liberate Muslim land just occupied by the communists (both Soviets and Afghans). In contrast, there has never been an independent Muslim Bosnia. The closest Bosnia came to being a Muslim state was as the outpost of the Ottoman Empire. Presently, the Muslim world rallies to support a surge of Islam: an offensive, expansionist surge of Islam against Christian Europe. For them, the struggle for Izetbegovic's Sarajevo is the beginning of Islam's renewed march on Europe. The Islamists consider the Bosnian jihad as the first step in the reversal of the historic defeat of Turkey's armies at the gates of Vienna in 1683.
A clear expression of the importance of this trend can be found in the Turkish Armed Forces, a quintessentially secular and Westernized force. These dynamics are the security forces' own expression of the revival of pan-Turkism and Turkic chauvinism by the public at large in Turkey. The Turkish security establishment considers their growing involvement with, and support for, the Bosnian Muslim forces, a manifestation of the revival and continuation of Turkey's old glory. This is both an institutional and individual phenomenon. Turkish officers proudly point to the Bosnian use of historical unit designations, such as the "Janissary", dating back to Bosnia's contribution to the Ottoman Empire. In meetings with both Bosnian and US military personnel, Turkish officers proudly recalled their own ancestors who took part in the Turkish occupation of the Balkans, or who participated in subsequent wars in the Balkans, or who, as well, had blood roots in Bosnia. Many stressed that they considered their present support for, and training of, the Bosnian Muslim forces a direct continuation of their ancestors' contributions to the Ottoman Empire.
This growing tilt toward pan-Turkist sentiments in the security establishment reflects an overall public trend which is as much a return to Islamic self-identity as to pan-Turkist self-identity. Among Turkish intellectuals, many Western-educated, there is a growing blur between Turkic chauvinism and a move toward Islamism. Particularly among the civilians, there are also growing Islamist connotations which are as much a desire for anti-Western expression as a religious desire for a return to politicized Islam. This complex approach to modem Islamism as a political and economic issue, rather than a question of practicing religion, was demonstrated by the diversity of the voting population in Turkey for the Islamist Refah [Welfare] Party in the recent elections, and in the plurality won by the Islamists.
Even if Ankara's own motives and driving force in the revival of pan-Turkism are largely nationalistic and economic, Ankara has to rely on Islamist revivalism in order to implement its policies, from the former Soviet Central Asia, to Chechnya, and on to the Balkans. And even in its own Kurdistan, as well as in neighboring Iraq and Syria, Turkey has to rely on militant Islamists, including veteran "Balkans", to run its bolder covert operations. The close cooperation between the secular Turkish defense establishment and the various Islamist elements in Bosnia has proven a prime instrument in Turkey's own quest for glorious past: from commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, to a growing involvement in Chechnya and the Caucasus as a whole. In this respect, the growing relations between the Turkish Special Forces based in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the various Bosnian Muslim special forces and Mujahedin units has provided the instruments for the recruitment of Islamists.
Starting in the Winter of 1995, a few hundred "Balkans" -- both Mujahedin and Bosnian Islamists -- were shipped to Turkey in a joint operation of the Turkish MIT (Intelligence Service) and the Refah Party. After a brief processing period in Istanbul, they were shipped to an MIT base in Northern Cyprus for advanced training. From there, the majority of these "Balkans" have been deployed to Chechnya, Afghanistan for operations in Kashmir, and eastern Turkey for deniable operations against the Kurds in Turkey and northern Iraq. There are unconfirmed reports that some of these MIT "Balkans" were involved in the recent spate of bombing in Syria. Meanwhile, a few of the best of these "Balkans", mainly Arab Mujahedin, were recruited directly by Turkish intelligence and sent for sophisticated intelligence training (espionage, recruitment of agents, codes, etc.) to be provided by the Turkish naval intelligence service in northern Turkey. These "Balkans" are earmarked as the core of long-term penetration and operations throughout the Middle East and Central Asia.
The adverse potential impact of these new roles for the "Balkans" is not lost on many West European governments. Indeed, starting the Spring of 1996, several European security authorities raised the issue with Ankara. According to European officials, in response, their Turkish counterparts alluded that Ankara would not have done any of this without the blessing of, and support from, the Clinton Administration. The Turkish officials did not provide any substantiation to their assertion, nor is there an independent confirmation. However, if that is the case, and the Clinton Administration even tacitly endorsed the Turkish "recycling" of the "Balkans", then this is even worse than the US record in Afghanistan. The US has, since the end of the Afghanistan war, been burned extensively by the "Afghans", who were originally armed, trained and supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as a result of the CIA "looking the other way". The people they supported, trained, armed and turned loose later came back to lead the anti-Western jihad of the Islamists. Washington should have known better than to "look the other way" with the "Balkans".
The Turkish use of the "Balkans" -- both for their professionalism and Islamist revolutionary zeal -- is but one case in a growing number of Islamist "causes" in which the "Balkans" supplement the "Afghans" as the standard bearers. For example, the four perpetrators of the November 1995 bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, were a Saudi "Balkan" and three Saudi "Afghans". Their network and strike were sponsored by Sudan and Iran.
The extent of the integration of "Balkans", including Bosnian Islamists, into the terrorist elite is becoming apparent in the aftermath of this Spring's exposure of terrorist support networks in Western Europe. These networks were smuggling weapons, explosives and personnel for the Algerian GIA and other North African Islamist groups. These networks answered to the high command in Khartoum. Significantly, the key members and operatives of these networks were Algerian "Balkans" and Bosnian Muslims. Were they not exposed in time, these Islamist networks would have launched a wave of spectacular terrorist strikes in France, Belgium and other West European states. Other Arab terrorists have been apprehended throughout Europe recently while traveling with Bosnian documents.
There are far-reaching global strategic ramifications from the rise and spread of the "Balkans". Already, essentially in the infancy stage of the "Balkans" phenomena, the impact of the veteran mujahedin who had served in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the various Islamist subversions and terrorism all over the world is great. "Balkans" are showing up in senior positions from the US to Western Europe, from North Africa to the Middle East, and from Chechnya to Kashmir and on to Malaysia. Even though they are still very small in numbers as compared to the "Afghans", their impact is greater. Motivated by their assertive Islamist zeal, the "Balkans" and their sponsoring states bring with them a very aggressive and offensive jihad which emphasizes the march of Islam and the conquering of new lands for the Islamist cause.
Consequently, the Islamist movement throughout the entire hub of Islam is being transformed. Until recently, radical Sunni Islam has been a predominantly localized movement: the Islamists striving to transform their own countries or communities into Islamic entities. The "Afghans" were the soldiers of Islamist solidarity, assisting brethren Islamists to build Islamic governments in their own places. In the aftermath of Bosnia, the Sunni Islamist movement is being transformed into an expanding and advancing movements seeking to spread the Islamist Revolution into foreign lands. The "Balkans" are the standard bearers and missionaries of the new Islamist Revolution. Essentially, the "Khomeinization" of the Sunni Islamist movement has been virtually completed with the emergence and rise to prominence of the "Balkans".
A place where this transformation is crucial and the long-term strategic ramifications are crucial is Chechnya. Chechnya is a major crisis which still threatens the stability of the Russian Government, and the ability of any Russian President to implement reforms and increase economic freedoms. Any slowdown in the social and economic dynamics is bound to have dire ramifications on Russia's relations with the West. Given Russia's immense global strategic importance, the West cannot afford such adverse developments.
The evolution of the Chechen crisis can be traced to the influence of foreigners. The "Afghans", with sponsorship of, and strong support from, the Iranian, Pakistani and Turkish intelligence services accomplished the Islamicization of what started as a national liberation movement. A major aspect of this phase was the adoption of terrorism -- both deep inside Russia and overseas -- as a primary instrument of the Chechen revolt. The arrival of the first "Balkans", who are also sponsored and supported by these three intelligence services, facilitated the beginning of yet another profound change in the Chechen revolt. This time, there was a gradual shift to the strategic offensive with a strong pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic character. The Chechens and their Islamist allies have been reaching out to other Muslim nations in the Caucasus in an effort to organize a region-wide Islamist uprising, as well as jointly advance into Russia and the Ukraine. "Balkans" operating out of Chechnya even made contacts with Islamist elements among the Crimean Tatars, urging them to join a regional jihad.
No government in Moscow can be expected to tolerate such a strategic threat. If the jihad rising out of Chechnya was allowed to grow, Moscow would ultimately have no alternative but to strike out at the sponsoring sources of the Chechens and their allies. The strategic ramifications of such a Russian surge would be profound, if only because Turkey is a NATO member and a Russian presence on the shores of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf would drastically alter the global strategic posture. The West cannot afford such strategic changes.
Still, at the same time, the Clinton Administration continues to shield the growing Iranian involvement in AID and Sarajevo's other security activities. The US even misleads its closest allies in an effort to conceal the extent of the Islamist presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, General Michael Walker, the Commander of the I-FOR Ground Forces, complained in May-June 1996 that the intelligence data provided by the US about the presence of mujahedin in Bosnia-Herzegovina was grossly incorrect. In one area where the US reported the presence of four Iranians, I-FOR's own intelligence information pointed to the presence of between 100 and 200 pro-Iranian mujahedin.
Eventually, in July 1996, after months of deliberate lying about the numbers of mujahedin in Bosnia-Herzegovina, senior US Clinton Administration officials began to admit that the mujahedin had remained in the country in overwhelmingly greater numbers than the US had hitherto acknowledged. Many Western and Eastern European intelligence services had based their assessments of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina on US-supplied intelligence. The trust of the Europeans in the veracity of US intelligence claims was thrown away, particularly among the Eastern European states, new to dealings with the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).
The Clinton Administration, meanwhile, was also making great efforts to conceal the surge of militant Islam into Europe from Bosnia-Herzegovina by stressing the "moderate" image of the Sarajevo administration and by presenting the frequent discoveries of aid's involvement in international terrorism as low-level and isolated aberrations. The Clinton Administration sought to divert attention from these developments by preoccupying the European governments, international organizations and Western public opinion with the apprehension of Serbian "war criminals" and with having the elections on time as the primary sources of threat coming out of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In mid-June 1996, the Clinton Administration was pushing to hold the elections in September even as Bosnia-Herzegovina was falling apart. Even Izetbegovic admitted that the time was not ripe. With US support, Izetbegovic now demanded that I-FOR create the appropriate conditions of unification conducive for the holding of the elections: that is that I-FOR suppress both the Bosnian Serbs and Croats.
For the Clinton Administration to acknowledge the truth, and in effect abandon the imposition of its interpretation of the Dayton-Paris Accords, would amount to an admission of the failure of its Bosnian policy. By any standard, this is a hard thing for any superpower to do, especially in a hotly-contested election year. Thus, rather than acknowledge the facts in the Balkans and recognize the vital interests of the closest allies of the United States, the Clinton Administration elected to continue with the imposition of the Dayton-Paris process and the consequent escalation of the US military involvement. It is because of this profound discrepancy -- between the realities in the region and the general course of US policy -- that continued enforcement of the Dayton-Paris Accords by the US becomes a milestone with long-term ramifications going well beyond the Balkans.
The US Clinton Administration continued through 1996 on its anti-Serb crusade, if only to justify past actions. The US insistence on the timely holding of the Bosnian elections in September 1996 despite continued deterioration of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- and organized violence against candidates, such as the attempt on former Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic in mid-June 1996 -- is indicative of this trend. Indeed, European officials stress that the Clinton Administration insisted on holding the elections primarily because their failure would look bad on the Administration's record in the US presidential elections.
Similarly, the entire Balkans policy of the Clinton Administration is driven by domestic, especially election year, interests. Increasingly, the quintessence of the Clinton Administration policy was to retain support of the pro-Bosnian lobby in the US, primarily the Arabists. Thus, with the Dayton-Paris Accords collapsing on their own, the Clinton Administration was trying to revive the Kosovo issue as the next point of contention with Serbs.
The place where the apparent Serb vulnerability and lack of resolve might be effectively exploited is Kosovo. Until recently, the lingering fear of inevitable and ruthless Serb reaction to any encroachment of their hallowed grounds in Kosovo served as a restraining factor for all Islamist factions striving to liberate the Albanians of Kosovo, let alone capitalize on their plight in order to escalate and widen the war against the Serbs.
Presently, however, the mere existence of Kosovo as a potentially unresolved issue serves as a catalyst for a growing crisis engulfing the entire Albanian population of the Balkans. The core of the Albanian issue is the Islamicization of the Kosovo problem. This, in turn, enhances the potential of exploiting militant Islamism against not only Yugoslavia but also secular and increasingly Westernized Albania, as well as Macedonia. Because of the presence of US civilians and US forces, the destabilization of Albania by the Islamists emerges as an ideal way of dragging the US into active participation in the Balkan wars even if the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis is resolved or is no longer considered valid international-political justification for such an intervention.
Since early 1996, there has been a spate of terrorist strikes in Kosovo Most attacks were carried out by Albanian separatists.
In mid-February 1996, a few bombs exploded in several Krajina Serb refugee dwellings in Kosovo. The explosions did not cause casualties or extensive damage. In Prishtina, "The Liberation Army of Kosovo" claimed responsibility for these attacks. "On 11 February 1996, the guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army conducted an armed operation in Operation Zone 1. Hand grenades were used in guerrilla attacks on the refugee camps in Prishtina, Mitrovica, Pec, Podujevo, Suva Reka, and Vucitrn " The communiqué defined the objectives of the organization. "In the interest of peace in the Balkans, and the Serbian and the Albanian nations, we demand the end to the colonization, terror, and occupation of Kosovo, as well as the emigration of the Kosovar Albanians."
Meanwhile, in Albania, a representative of the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo also claimed responsibility: "We planted the bombs in Kosovo, and this is only the beginning." "The Liberation Army of Kosovo" reacted immediately, releasing yet another communiqué reaffirming their responsibility. This communiqué stressed that the recent bombings were only the beginning of a terrorist campaign. The statement said that "for the sake of peace in the Balkans, we are letting it be known to Belgrade that the actions so far were only an indication of fresh bombings and at the same time an invitation to an urgent dialogue on the withdrawal of the army and police forces from the Republic of Kosovo." "The Liberation Army of Kosovo" also urged the United States and other world powers to recognize the independence of Kosovo, "because otherwise war in this region is inevitable"
In late April 1996, Albanian terrorists again demonstrated their reach and ability to operate. On April 22, a spate of shootings in the province's towns of Stimlje, Pec and Decani and at Kosovska Mitrovica on the Rozaj-Pristina road targeted both civilians and police. In one attack, terrorists opened automatic fire and threw grenades into a Serb cafe in Decani killing five patrons and wounding a few. Shortly afterwards two policemen on patrol were attacked with automatic fire and both were wounded. Then a police car was ambushed near Brus with one fatality. Another police car was ambushed on a nearby road, with another fatality and another wounded. A week later, there was an attempt to blow up the house of the police station commander in Dusanovo. The bomb caused part of the building to collapse, but there were no injuries This time, there were only unofficial claims by "The Liberation Army of Kosovo", primarily explanations by third parties in Albania, Turkey and the Middle East that the Army was again responsible for the attacks. More important was the effort by the "establishment" front -- The Democratic League of Kosovo [LDK] -- to ensure the political impact of the terrorism. The LDK denied any connection to the terrorism. However, in late April, its leaders warned that unless Kosovo gained independence, there would be a marked escalation in Albanian terrorism. In a communiqué, the LDK warned of "further radicalization" in the region because "Albanian patience" was running out.
Since then, the low key harassment of the Yugoslav authorities by low-level sporadic terrorism continued. In early May, "The Liberation Army of Kosovo" issued an announcement that "the armed conflict in Kosovo and Metohija would resume and that it would spread throughout the Balkans" Indeed, in mid-June, there were several shooting incidents in Podujevo and Mitrovica, in which one policeman was killed and two others wounded. These attacks were immediately claimed in Prishtina and Tirana by Albanian separatists. Soon afterwards, "The Liberation Army of Kosovo" claimed responsibility for these attacks. Moreover, in Tirana, the Information Center of Kosovo [QIK] pointed out that "the new wave of state violence and terror in Kosovo proves of possibilities for efforts to cause great troubles at a time when the question of Kosovo has become prominent for the international community."
[Editor's Note: some opposition groups use the spelling "Kosova" or "Kosovar". We have standardized here on the formally-accepted spelling: Kosovo.]
The surge of terrorism did not come as a surprise. Since the early 1990s, Sarajevo and its Islamist sponsors had been actively preparing for the next round of assault on the Serbs: this time through Kosovo.
By mid-1993, Sarajevo and its allies were already preparing to launch operations into the Yugoslav strategic rear. The key was the plan to subvert Kosovo and rapidly escalate an armed struggle against Belgrade from bases in Albania. In June, the government of Saudi Arabia donated $ 1-million to build "a refugee camp" for Bosnian Muslims in Albania. However, in mid-July, a senior Bosnian official in Sarajevo confided to the BBC's Misha Glenny that "the Bosnian government intended to use the base for guerillas to be sent into Kosovo. The Serbs would not be able to differentiate the [Bosnian] guerillas, linguistically or ethnically, from the local Serbs." These Bosnian operatives would be able to carry out a series of terrorist operations which could be attributed to a Kosovo Albanian organization, thus instigating a fierce reaction by the Serb security forces, and, consequently, a cycle of violence. The ensuing widespread violence in Kosovo, Sarajevo believed, would then be used to induce Western military intervention against Yugoslavia itself.
Meanwhile, Sarajevo and the Islamists began preparing and training Albanian cadres for the future escalation of the Islamist struggle for Kosovo. In mid-1993, Sarajevo revived the Handzar Division with all its fascist culture and preoccupation with the division's role as worthy successors to its SS predecessors. The primary role of the Handzar Division is the Praetorian Guard for President Alija Izetbegovic and other senior leaders in Sarajevo. The Handzar Division is comprised of a 2,500 to 3,000 elite force deployed in Sarajevo and a 6,000 to 7,500 strong back-up force in Fojnica.
Significantly, the majority of the troops of the Handzar Division are not Bosnian Muslims. Instead, they come from the region's other Muslim minorities, primarily Albanians, and are led by veteran Pakistani and Afghan experts. "Surprisingly few of those in charge of the Handzars in Fojnica seem to speak good Serbo-Croatian. Many of them are Albanian, whether from Kosovo or from Albania itself," explained UN officers in Fojnica. "The Handzars are trained and led by veterans from Afghanistan and Pakistan. The strong presence of native Albanians is an ominous sign. It could be that the seeds of war are spreading south via Kosovo and into Albania, thence to the Albanians of Macedonia." These observations, made in late 1993, proved correct.
By 1995, the Handzar Division had been transformed into a zealot and combat proven special forces. In many cases, particularly in the surge into western Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Summer-Fall of 1995, they operated in close cooperation with the mujahedin units. The deployment of Albanian veterans and support mujahedin cadres to Albania began in the Fall of 1995. Meanwhile, the international Islamist leadership was completing preparations for the escalation of the terrorist campaign into Kosovo. Toward this end, the establishment of new Islamist headquarters in Tehran and Karachi were decided upon during the PAIC [Pan-Arab Islamic Conference] convened in Khartoum in the first days of April 1995. The new regional center in Karachi is responsible for Islamist activities in Albania, including Kosovo. Consequently, by late 1995, both the command echelons and operational cadres were ready for the escalation of the Islamist surge into Kosovo. Indeed, as discussed above, violence erupted in early 1996.
The renewed terrorism in Kosovo was seized upon by the Clinton Administration as an excuse for a marked increase in US intervention in Kosovo on behalf of "oppressed Albanians". This commitment was symbolized by the opening of US a Information Center and a diplomatic office in Prishtina on June 5,1996. Not by accident, it was John Kornblum, the Chief US mediator for former Yugoslavia, who opened the Information Center in Prishtina, thus signifying the political significance of the event. In his remarks, Kornblum stated that the opening of the center was another "proof of permanent US interest and concern for the people of the region".
Albanian leaders quickly stressed the political aspects of the event and their expectations from the Clinton Administration. In his remarks at the opening ceremony, Ibrahim Rugova stated that this was "a historic day for Kosovo and the peoples living there." He thanked President Bill Clinton and all other US politicians who contributed to the founding of the Center in Kosovo. Xhemal Mustafa, Rugova's information counselor, added that the opening of the USIA Center served as "a strong confirmation of the recognition and internationalization of the Kosovo issue. The fact that the United States opened its first office in Prishtina testifies that the US preoccupation, assistance, and interests in Kosovo have already become identified and are assuming the character of a serious and promising institutionalization." Edita Tahiri, LDK Chairman for Foreign Affairs, also stated that "Kosova and the Albanian issue have been acknowledged by the US Administration".
As it is, the Kosovo Albanians are reading too much into a bold maneuver of the Clinton Administration's Balkan aspects of the American election policies. The Administration does not care about the Albanians in Kosovo. The Clinton Administration is troubled by President Milosevic who is essentially living up to virtually all his commitments in the Dayton-Paris Accords and other contracts with the US. With the demonization of the Serbs presented as the justification for the US presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there emerged an urgent need in the White House to find yet another reason to continue to demonize the Serbs and confront the new Yugoslavia: enter the plight of the Kosovo Albanians.
However, these events are read differently in the Balkans. Indeed, the Clinton Administration has already created expectations among the Albanian leadership for massive intervention to ensure Kosovo's independence. Officials in Macedonia already warn that the Kosovo Albanians are "waiting for a new Dayton". Once they realize that this is not going to happen, there will be yet another victory for the Islamists and the surge of terrorism.
Meanwhile, the US regional policy is centered on the demonization of the Serbs because it is a morally-loaded subject which, because it is negative [being against the Serbs], does not require the Administration to face and explain facts. Furthermore, the continued demonization of the Serbs provides populist explanation for the Clinton Administration's not living up to commitments made in the context of the Dayton-Paris Accords.
For the Europeans, who are pursuing their own vital and long-term interests, the Clinton Administration's Bosnian policy is already emerging as a profoundly abject lesson. The Europeans are now increasingly convinced that rhetoric about allies and partners notwithstanding, the US will not hesitate to disregard or hurt European vital interests if they conflict in any way with the conveniences of the Clinton election campaign.
Despite the Clinton Administration's infliction of long-term damage to the US-West European alliance in order to pursue the pro-Sarajevo policy, the Muslim world continues to insist that whatever the US is doing is not enough. It is virtually impossible for the US to pacify and placate the Muslim World because Islamic revivalism is inherently anti-US, and calls for the establishment of a Muslim political order which is in irreconcilable contradiction with the Western world order, including the principles of the Dayton-Paris Accords. This prospect does not deter the Clinton Administration from intensifying its efforts to impose pro-Sarajevo solutions on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its policies are dominated by election-year domestic political considerations The impracticality and deceitfulness of the Bosnian policies are thus of no concern to the Clinton White House.
Other world powers also follow closely the twists and turns of the Clinton Administration's Bosnia policy as an indication of the innermost character and traits of US policy. The readily-observed discrepancy between the declared US policy and the Clinton Administration's real actions in Bosnia plays a major role in how governments around the world base their policies and diplomacy vis-a-vis the US.
In global terms, most important is the evolution in Moscow's grand strategy. In the aftermath of the second and final round of the Russian presidential elections in early July 1996, Pres. Boris Yeltsin's Government will increase its active pursuit and defense of the traditional and strategic interests of Russia. Pres. Yeltsin's selection of Gen. Aleksandr Lebed as his national security supremo reflects Moscow's growing preoccupation with global and security issues. The formulation of a new order in Europe, and particularly the ramifications of NATO's slide eastward, is one of the highest priorities facing the Yeltsin-Lebed team. Moscow considers recent developments in the Balkans as precedents for US aspirations in Europe: emerging trends which are considered a national threat to the Russian Federation. Aleksey Bogaturov and Viktor Kremenyuk, of the Institute of the United States and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences, explain Moscow's concerns:
"The point is not whether the North Atlantic Alliance is aimed against Russia politically or juridically, but that structurally and geopolitically, its expansion carries the logic of ethnic-state fragmentation according to the Western model -- which is highly destructive to Russia -- that has already manifested itself in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the former Soviet Union. A comic -- and at the same time tragic -- manifestation of this logic are the Muslim-Croatian and/or Serb formations in Bosnia, whose statehood has been hopelessly destroyed."
The Russian national security elite is committed to the restoration of undisputed Russian hegemony over virtually the entire former Soviet Union through both a web of economic relations and military might. The Yeltsin-Lebed team considers the rise of militant radical Islam a major long-term threat to Russia. The reverberation of the Islamist rise in Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly the flow of "Balkans" into Chechnya, and the consequent Islamicization of the revolt, are considered threats to the Russian long-term national security posture which Moscow finds increasingly difficult to tolerate, let alone compromise on. Hence, in pursuit of its own national security interests, Moscow will harden its position over finding a "peaceful solution" to the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis.
Essentially, Russia has quietly concluded that it can no longer trust the Clinton Administration's assurances that the eastward expansion of NATO and the cultivation of former Soviet Republics (particularly the Ukraine) are not aimed at containing and destabilizing Russia. Hence, Moscow feels compelled to concentrate on confronting the rising "threat" from the West at the expense of other strategic priorities and considerations. Aware of the Islamist escalation of the war in Chechnya using Bosnian assets, and the rise of the Tehran-led Islamic Bloc, Russia is making deals with the devil in order to free Moscow's strategic attention to dealing with the European challenge. The strategic arrangements with the People's Republic of China (PRC), accomplished during Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Beijing in April 1996 are the most important outcome of this Russian policy. Moscow is preparing for either winning over, or engaging in a major confrontation with, the rise of Islam in the heart of Asia and South-West Asia. Either way, the ensuing consolidation of Russian hegemony over these vital areas of Asia would become a strategic calamity for the West.
Meanwhile, Beijing and its closest allies, particularly the key members of the Trans-Asian Axis, sense the US weakness and vulnerability. Anticipating a growing US involvement in, and sinking into, a Bosnian quagmire, the rogue states are eager and determined to exploit this US preoccupation in order to enhance their strategic posture. Again, the rise of the Beijing-led Trans-Asian Axis as a hegemonic entity in Asia will devastate US economic relations with the Pacific Rim economic powers and threaten US access to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. The US economy of the late 1990s cannot absorb any of these prospects, let alone a combination of both.
So the long-term outcome of the Clinton Administration's Bosnian policies, and especially the imposition of the Dayton-Paris Accords, is that Washington is harming its own vital and long-term interests. Without any tangible strategic gain, the Clinton Administration has already alienated and harmed relations with its closest allies and friends. At the same time, the Clinton Administration continues to help and embolden some of the US's worst enemies. All, in the name of an election year's domestic policies: a prioritization not lost on a large number of world capitals.
And what can the Clinton Administration show the prospective electorate for such a heavy strategic price?
The latest round of US diplomacy has only aggravated the situation. In the aftermath of the June 2,1996, meeting of Presidents Tudjman, Izetbegovic, and Milosevic with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Geneva, Zagreb had all but given up on the viability of co-existence with Izetbegovic's Sarajevo, let alone the continued existence of their "federation". Croatian officials concluded that there was no logic in a continued effort "to speed up the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton agreement, which, despite the international community's efforts, is facing disaster". Moreover, official Zagreb has despaired of the adamant refusal of the Clinton Administration to confront the realities in the former Yugoslavia, and instead continue on its relentless campaign to demonize the Serbs and pursue "war criminals".
By mid-June, Zagreb insiders were openly challenging the US-led international attributing of the collapse of the Dayton-Paris Accords to the unfinished "hunt" for Serb "war criminals", particularly Radovan Karadzic. Zagreb insiders are now stating openly that the Karadzic issue has always been the "alibi" of the Clinton Administration for the failure of its Bosnian policy. The well-connected Goran Rosic explains:
"Everybody -- starting from the international community, to the United States to Carl Bildt, to official Sarajevo -- is ready to find an excuse for the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the fact that Radovan Karadzic remains in power, that is, in absolute power in the Serb Republic. However, that is not the whole truth. For some time now some processes have become clearer, and they lead us to the conclusion that each party has been trying more and more openly to express its dissatisfaction with the peace agreement and some of its provisions, openly placing obstacles in the way of implementation."
Indeed, the collapse of the Dayton-Paris process is the outcome of a profound phenomenon: the solidification of the self-identities of the three main peoples inhabiting Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the Summer of 1996, there was no longer any doubt about Sarajevo's commitment to the Islamicization of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In June, Ejup Ganic stressed the Islamic character of the new Bosnia-Herzegovina as the key to its unique role in Europe as a representative of the Muslim world. "We are part of and at the heart of Europe. Our presence here will give an indication of how Europe interacts with the Islamic world," he explained. Ultimately, he added, the Bosnians "are also determined to keep our Islamic identity, and we will try to reinforce that identity by extensively introducing Arabic in our ways. We will also teach about the Serbs' atrocities and mass extermination."
Zagreb insiders see in this trend a major factor in the collapse of the Dayton-Paris process due to mounting alienation between Bosnian Muslims and Croatian Catholics. They attribute Sarajevo's growing intransigence to "the fact that the Islamization of Bosnia-Herzegovina is taking place more and more openly". The intensification of the Islamicization process is the primary factor for the distabilization of Bosnia-Herzegovina because of the inherent hostility and confrontational relationship between Sarajevo's Islamist doctrine and Christianity.
Expressing the perception of the Zagreb elite, Goran Rosic is most apprehensive about Sarajevo's coping with the unfolding reality in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He notes that "the Bosniak-Muslim leadership is slowly grasping that the whole Bosnia-Herzegovina still exists only on paper". Domestically, Sarajevo "is adjusting its policy more and more openly to the idea of the pure Bosniak state in the territory under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army". At the same time, "before the eyes of the international community, it uses all its forces to struggle for a whole and united Bosnia-Herzegovina". Herein lies the potential source of the eruption of fighting.
Rosic explains that Sarajevo has not yet given up on its desire to instigate a major military confrontation between I-FOR, the Bosnian Serbs and even the Bosnian Croats. "Alija Izetbegovic and his associates have introduced a novelty by which they put pressure on the Serb entity (they are using these tactics in Stolac, too) and increase tension. In an organized way they send members of their nation into the Serb entity (Doboj, Prijedor, Brcko) and thus provoke the Serbs. At the same time they are testing the resoluteness of I-FOR to protect civilians. These attempts have proved unsuccessful so far. The frequency of them suggests that even worse incidents could happen, which is probably the objective of such a 'policy'. In the same way, they put pressure on the international community to enable the large-scale return to the homeland of those Bosniak Muslims who are in exile all over the world. Their return could create a critical mass of homeless and dissatisfied which could result in new crises, both in the Bosniak Muslims' relations with the Serb Republic and with their [Croat] partner within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina." The consequent spate of Islamist terrorism and subversion throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina is all but inevitable.
Goran Rosic, reflecting the perception of official Zagreb, has only a grim outlook for Bosnia-Herzegovina. "Having all this in mind, one can conclude that such an approach by the international community toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the behavior of the Bosniak-Muslim and the Serb side, suggest that Bosnia-Herzegovina is situated between war and peace at the moment. No vital question has been solved, and day-by-day the renewal of conflict is growing more and more certain." Zagreb is losing hope in the US-led international community, concluding that 'T-FOR is no longer such a guarantee of peace as it was three or four months ago, and that its role is becoming more and more questionable". If the September elections were imposed by the US, they would "cement the final division of Bosnia-Herzegovina".
Consequently, Izetbegovic's Sarajevo will have no escape from confronting the contradiction between the reality of a small Islamic state hostile to both Croats and Serbs, and Sarajevo's genuine and declared commitment to consolidating, by force if necessary, Islamic control over the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. Zagreb is convinced, and not without good reason, that Izetbegovic's Sarajevo will make a desperate attempt to "liberate" the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina before accepting reality. The ensuing war will most likely transform into a regional war as predicted by Delic. Belgrade shares this assessment.
Indeed, at the time of this writing, in the Summer of 1996, Izetbegovic's Sarajevo was intensifying its drive for the consolidation of control over the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina through any means. Confronted with the prospects of US-imposed elections, Sarajevo was attempting to remove from the scene potential contenders to Izetbegovic: as demonstrated in the assassination attempts on Abdic and Silajdzic. Moreover, Sarajevo does not rule out the use of force in order to ensure Izetbegovic's hold over the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. "No honest man in Bosnia can remain unarmed," Izetbegovic recently told a crowd in Gorazde. The reason for this militarization is to ensure that "One day, all Bosnia will be liberated." This is not idle rhetoric. Since April 1996, General Delic and the Bosnian Muslim High Command are actively preparing for such a war, a war which includes attack on the US contingent in I-FOR in order to induce a rapid US withdrawal which would leave behind the bulk of the US forces' most modem heavy weapons. At the same time, faced with the realization of the extent of the US commitment to the survival and military primacy of Sarajevo, as reflected in the Iran-Bosnia scandal, Zagreb is determined to reverse these trends. President Tudjman and his closest allies are desperate for a strategic breakout which will not be held against Croatia. Zagreb perceives that a provocation which will alienate the US from Sarajevo, while laying the blame on the Muslims and/or Serbs will result in Western acquiescence for the Croatian ascendency to regional hegemony The consequent carving up of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Croatia and the new Yugoslavia is a strategic must for Zagreb. Hence, the possibility of a sudden upgrade in the conventional military capabilities of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a nightmare to Zagreb: a potential challenge to their long-term plans and strategy. A quick implementation of the Bosnian Muslim military build-up might push Zagreb into an early and expedited implementation of its worst-case plan: instigating a regional war involving the new Yugoslavia. If not contained, such a war would probably escalate and transform into a European or even a world war.
Meanwhile, the Clinton Administration continues to insist on the imposition of the Izetbegovic administration on all of Bosnia-Herzegovina and particularly the Bosnian Serbs. In its relentless efforts to bolster Sarajevo's hold overall of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the demonization and destruction of the Bosnian Serbs, the Clinton Administration remains not only oblivious to the complex realities of the former Yugoslavia of the mid-1990s, but also of the historical record and lessons. In her 1941 masterpiece Black Lamb and Grey Falcon, written in the aftermath of her 1937 travels through Yugoslavia, Rebecca West identified the relations between Serbs and Muslims in Sarajevo as a reflection of the greater dynamics in Bosnia:
"This beautiful city speaks always of their preoccupation with one another, of what the Slav, not to be won by any gift, took from the Turk, and still was never won, of the unappeasable hunger with which the Turk longed throughout the centuries to make the Slav subject to him, although the Slav is never subject, not even to himself."
Selected Bibliography
A Note On Sources
Some Call It Peace is based for the most part on extensive indigenous material from all sides involved in the fighting in the former Yugoslavia itself as well as from Europe (including Russia) the Middle East and the Muslim world and North America This material includes wire service reports by local and international news agencies numerous articles from the local newspapers periodicals and newsletters transcripts of broadcasts on the local media (mostly translated by the US Government's FBIS/JPRS) huge quantities of original source material retrieved through the Internet, as well as a private collection of several thousand books, manuals and articles
In addition the author draws on a unique private collection of primary sources plus original publications documents and reports -- developed over nearly two decades of intensive research Moreover the author had extensive interviews and communications with numerous officials, commanders, émigrés, defectors and otherwise involved individuals from all sides This wide range of sources constitutes a unique database for expert analysis regarding the subjects in question
Selected Bibliography
These are the primary sources used for the writing of Some Call It Peace. They constitute but a fraction of the diverse material consulted over the years of research
News Agencies
AFP (France)
AIM (Independent opposition service in the new Yugoslavia)
ANATOLIA (Turkey)
AP(US)
ATA (Albania)
BETA (Yugoslavia)
BH PRESS (Bosnian Government)
BINA (Belgrade based Serbian service)
DRINA (ad hoc, Bosnian Muslim service from the pockets in eastern Bosnia)
FONET (Serbian independent service)
HABENA (Bosnian Croat organ of Herzeg-Bosna)
HINA (Croatia)
INTERFAX (Russia)
IRNA(Iran)
ISA PRESS (Sandzak based Islamic service close to Sarajevo)
ISKRA (Krajina Serbs)
ITAR TASS (Russia)
MAKPRES (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)
MENA (Egypt)
MONTENA FAX (Independent service in Montenegro)
ONASA (Islamist service closely Associated with the Bosnian Government)
Reuters (US/UK)
SIA (Serbian service)
SRNA (Bosnian Serb the organ of the Republic of Srpska)
STA (Slovenia)
TANJUG (Yugoslavia)
TASS (USSR)
TIKER (Belgrade based independent service)
ZB1A (Abdic's organ)
Main Periodicals And Newspapers
At Alum (UK based Arab)
Al Hayah (UK based Arab)
Al Manila (UK based Arab)
Al Sharq al Awsat (UK based Arab)
Al Shira (Lebanon)
Al Watan al Arabi (Europe based Arab)
Al Wasat (UK based Arab)
Avazov Focus (Sarajevo)
BiH Ekslusiv (Croatia, Bosnian Croats)
Bild (Germany)
Borba (Yugoslavia)
Bota Sot (Switzerland based Kosovo Albanian nationalist opposition)
Bulvar (Turkey)
Corriere Della Serra (Italy)
Danas (Croatia)
Daily Telegraph, The (UK)
Dawn (Pakistan)
Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy (UK/US)
Delo (Slovenia)
Der Spiegel (Germany)
Die Welt (Germany)
Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo)
Dnevni Telegraf (Yugoslavia)
Dnevnik (Slovenia)
Duga (Yugoslavia)
Economist, The (UK)
Ekonomska Politika (Yugoslavia)
Ettela'at (Iran)
European, The (UK)
Financial Times, The (UK)
Flaka e Vellazarimit (Macedonia-based Albanian)
Focus (Germany)
Focus (Sarajevo)
Foreign Affairs (US)
Foreign Policy (US)
Foreign Report (UK)
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany)
Glas Slavonije (Croatia, Slavonia)
Glas Srpski (Rcpuhlika Srpska)
Glasnik (Croatia)
Globe and Mail, The (Canada)
Globus (Croatia)
Guardian, The (UK)
Ha'Aretz (Israel)
Hrvatska rijec (Sarajevo)
Hrvatski obzor (Croatia)
Hrvatski vojnik (Croatia)
Hurriyet (Turkey)
Independent, The (UK)
Intelligence Newsletter (France)
Intervju (Yugoslavia)
lzvestya (Russia)
Jane's Defence Weekly (UK)
Jane's Intelligence Review (formerly Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review) (UK)
Javnost (Republika Srpska)
Jeune Afrique (France)
Jomhuri-ye Islami (Iran)
Kayhan (UK based Iranian opposition)
Kayhan (Iran)
Kosovo Daily Report (Pnstina)
Krasnaya Zvezda (Russia)
L'Evenement du Jeudi (France)
L'Express (France)
L'Figaro (France)
Le Monde (France)
Le Nouvel Observateur (France)
Le Point (France)
Ljiljan (Sarajevo)
Los Angeles Times (US)
Ma'ariv (Israel)
Magyar Szo (Yugoslavia-based Hungarians)
Milliyet (Turkey)
Mladina (Slovenia)
Monitor (Yugoslavia, Montenegro)
Muslim (Pakistan)
Nasa Borba (Yugoslavia)
Nedeljni Telegraf (Yugoslavia)
Nedjeljna Dalmacija (Croatia, Dalmatia)
New York Times, The (US)
Newsweek (US)
Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Russia)
Nimrooz (UK based Iranian opposition)
NIN (Yugoslavia)
Nova Bosna (German based emigre)
Nova Makedonija (Macedonia)
Novi List (Croatia)
Observer, The (UK)
Odbrana (Macedonia)
Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo and international edition in Slovenia)
Oslobodjenje (Republika Srpska)
Pobjeda (Montenegro, Yugoslavia)
Politika (Yugoslavia)
Politika Ekspres (Yugoslavia)
Puls (Macedonia)
Segodnya (Russia)
Slobodna Bosna (Sarajevo)
Slobodna Dalmacija (Dalmatia, Croatia)
Slovenec (Slovenia)
Srpska Rec (Yugoslavia)
Sunday Telegraph, The (UK)
Sunday Times, The (UK)
Svijet (Yugoslavia)
Tehran Times, The (Iran)
Telegraf (Yugoslavia)
Time (US & European editions)
Times, The (UK)
US New. & World Report (US)
Vecer (Macedonia)
Vecernje Novine (Sarajevo)
Vecernje Novosti (Yugoslavia)
Vecernje List (Croatia)
Vesti (German based emigre)
Vjesnik (Croatia)
Vojska (Yugoslavia)
Voyenno Istoricheskiy Zhurnal (Russia)
Vreme (Yugoslavia)
WarReport (UK)
Washington Post, The (US)
Washington Times, The (US)
Yediot Aharonot (Israel)
Zarubezhnoye Voyennye Obozrenye (Russia)
Selected Books
[R| – Russian
|F] – French
Almond, Mark. Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, London, Mandarin, 1994
Baker, James A III with DeFrank, Thomas M. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-1992, New York NY, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995
Banac, Ivo. The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins History and Politics, Cornell PA, Cornell University Press, 1984
Bat Ye'or (pseud.). Les Chretientes d'Orient entre Jihad et Dhimmitude, Paris, Les Editions du Cerf, 1991 [F)
Baudson, Gerard. L'Europe des Apatrides, Paris, Luynes, 1994 [F]
Beloff, Nora. Tito's Flawed Legacy, London, Gollancz, 1985
Bodansky, Yossif. Target America: Terrorism in the US Today [European edition as Target the
West: Terrorism in the World Today] New York NY, SPI Books, 1993
Bodansky, Yossif. Offensive in the Balkan's: The Potential for a Wider War as a Result of Foreign Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, London, International Media Corp, for the International Strategic Studies Association, 1995
Bolger, Daniel P. Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s, Novato CA, Presidio, 1995
Cohen Lenard J. Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia. Boulder CO, Westeview Press, 1993
Commandant Franchet (pseudonym of a French senior officer). Casque Bleu pour Rien: Ce que j'ai
vraiment vu en Bosnie. Paris, J. C. Lattes, 1995 [F]
Copley, Gregory R. Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook, London, IMC (numerous editions)
Cosic, Dobrica. La Yougoslavie el la Question Serbe, Lausane, L'Age d'Homme 1992 [F]
Cmobrnja, Mihailo. The Yugoslav Drama, London I. B. Tauris 1994
Dedijer, Vladimir. TheYugoslav Auschwitz and the Vatican. Buffalo NY. Prometheus Books 1992 (1988)
Denitch, Bogdan. Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death ofYugoslavia, Minneapolis, MN University of Minnesota Press, 1994
Dizdarevic, Zlatko. Sarajevo: A War Journal, NewYork NY, Fromm International, 1993
Dragnich, Alex N. Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia, NewYork NY, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992
Foretic, Miljenko. Dubrovnik in War, Zagreb, Hrvatska Sveucilisna Naklada, 1993
Friedman, Francine. The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation, Boulder CO,Westview Press 1996
Fuller, Graham F. and Lesser Ian O. A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West, Boulder, CO Westview, 1995
Gallois, Pierre-Marie. Le Soleil d' Allah aveugle I'Occident, Lausanne, L' Age d'Homme, 1995 [F]
Gallois, Pierre-Marie. Le Sang du Petrole--Bosnie, Lausanne, L' Age d'Homme, 1996 [F]
Gareyev, Gen.-Arm Mahmut Ahmedovich. Yesli Zavtra Voyna? Moscow, VlaDar, 1995 [R]
Glenny, Misha. The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War. London, Penguin Books, 1993 Gutmann, Roy. A Witness to Genocide: The First Inside Account of the Horrors of Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia, Shaftesbury, Element Publishing, 1993
Harris, Paul. Somebody Else's War: Reports from the Balkan Frontlines, Kranj (Slovenia), Gorenjski Tisk & SPA books in the UK, 1992
Ivanovic, Dr. Stanoje: The Creation and Changes of the Internal Borders of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Serbian Ministry of Information, n. d.
Izetbegovic, Alija Ali. Islam Between East and West, Indianapolis IN, American Trust Publications, 1989
Jones, Christopher D. Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact, New York NY, Praeger, 1981
Kaplan, Robert D. Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History, NewYork NY. St. Martin's Press, 1993
Laffin, John. Holy War Islam Fights, London, Grafton, 1988
Lewis, Bernard and Schnapper Dommique (eds.). Muslims in Europe, London, Pinter, 1994 MacKenzie, Maj.-Gen. Lewis. Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo, Vancouver/Toronto Douglas & Mcintyre, 1993
Maclean, Fitzroy. Eastern Approaches, NewYork NY, Atheneum, 1984 (1949)
Magas, Branka. The Destruction of Yugoslavia, London, Verso, 1993
McAdams, C. Michael. Croatia: Myth and Reality, Arcadia CA, CIS Monograph, 1992
Merlino, Jacques. Les Venlez Yugoslaves ne sont pas Toutes Bonnes a Dire Pans, Albin Michel, 1993 [F]
Mestrovic, Stjepan G. with Letica Slaven and Goreta Miroslav. Habits of the Balkan Heart: Social Character and the Fall of Communism, College Station TX, Texas A&M University Press, 1993
Micheletti, Enc & Debay Yves. War in the Balkans 1991-1993, Poole Histoire & Collections, 1993 Mojzes, Paul. Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans, NewYork NY, Continuum, 1994
Norris, H.T. Islam in the Balkans, Columbia SC, University of South Carolina Press 1993
O'Ballance, Edgar. Civil War in Bosnia 1992-94, New York NY, St. Martin's Press, 1995
Owen, David. Balkan Odyssey, London, Victor Gollancz, 1995
Pinson, Mark (ed.). The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1994
Pujadas, David and Salam, Ahmed. Le Tentation du Jihad: L'Islam Radical en France, France, Editions Jean Claude Lattes, 1995
Rakowska, Hannstone Teresa (ed.). Communism in Eastern Europe, Bloommgton IN, Indiana University Press, 1984
Samary, Catherine. La Dechirure Yougoslave. Paris, L'Harmattan, 1994 [F]
Sekelj, Laslo. Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration, NewYork NY, Columbia University Press 1993
Sherman, Arnold. Perfidity in the Balkans: The Rape of Yugoslavia, Athens, Psichogios Publications 1993
Silber Laura and Little Allan. The Death of Yugoslavia, London, Penguin Books & BBC Books, 1995
Stewart, Col. Bob. Broken Lives: A Personal View of the Bosnian Conflict, London, Harper Collins, 1993
Thompson, Mark. A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia. NewYork NY, Pantheon, 1992
Udovicki, Jasminka and Ridgeway James (eds.). Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare: The Inside Story of Europe's Unfolding Ordeal, Chicago IL, Lawrence Hill Books, 1995
West, Rebecca. Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia, London, Penguin, 1982 (1941)
Woodward, Susan L. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, Washington D.C, Brookings, 1995
Zecevic, Miodrag and Lekic, Bogdan. Frontiers and Internal Terntonal Division in Yugoslavia, Belgrade, Serbian Ministry of Information, 1991
The Author
Yossef Bodansky is Director of Research at the International Strategic Studies Association, and is also Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare at the US House of Representatives. As well, he is a Senior Editor for the Defense & Foreign Affairs group of publications. He is the author of four other books (Target America, Terror, Crisis in Korea, and Offensive in the Balkans: The Potential/or a Wider War as a Result of Foreign Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina), as well as several book chapters, entries for the International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, and numerous articles in several periodicals, including Global Affairs, Jane's Defence Weekly, Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, and Business Week. In the 1980s, he acted as a senior consultant for the US Department of Defense and the US Department of State.
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